

**Multilingual European Institutions
and the Discourse on the EU Enlargement
in the National Public Spheres:
A Pilot Study**

by

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1. Introduction

The present working paper reports on the preliminary findings of the Pilot Study *'Multilingual European Institutions and the Discourse on the EU Enlargement in the National Public Spheres'* undertaken within DYLAN WP2 research on EU-Institutions by Partner 10 (Lancaster University).

In the present study, we analyse press reporting on the recent EU Enlargement (May 1st, 2004) by covering liberal and conservative quality newspapers in France, Germany, Poland and the UK over a ten-day period (between April 26th and May 5th, 2004; see below). ***Our focus on EU-Enlargement as such is not arbitrary: we consider the Enlargement as on of the most pivotal points in the history of the European integration process.*** Therefore, we conceive of the 2004 EU-Enlargement on the following dimensions:

- (a) As a moment of crucial *political change* of the EU as such: it has transformed the latter from the club of 'rich', Western European states into a supranational political organism which now (as of 2004) also incorporates several Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC). By the same token, perceived demographically, the EU incorporated some 'new' 74 million inhabitants from the CEEC as of May 2004.
- (b) As pivotal *institutional change* for the EU organism: from May 1st, 2004, the EU institutions also incorporate representatives of the new CEEC member-states (within, e.g., all three core EU-institutions, i.e. the Council of the EU, the European Commission and the European parliament¹) which thus meant that, *with the Enlargement, new rules for the everyday practices of the EU institutions have been introduced: that, in turn, was of paramount importance for the intra-institutional linguistic repertoire of the EU institutions and for the emergence of new forms of language planning regulating those practices*².

We decided to undertake the present study in order to assess ***how different visions and conceptions of multilingualism and linguistic diversity which eventually define the character of communications in the communicative space of the institutions of the European Union were portrayed in the national public spheres of selected European countries***³. For this reason, we approach the European Union as both a

¹ Obviously, the de-facto enlargement of the European Parliament took place in the aftermath of the first post-EU-Enlargement EP Elections which took place in June 2004. However, it must be noted that representatives of the acceding CEE countries were also present in the EP as its observers as of mid-2003. Notably, still before the May 2004 Enlargement, the CEEC were also incorporated into other key EU-institutional organisms as was the case with, for example, the 2002-03 Convention on the Future of Europe (see Krzyżanowski and Oberhuber, 2007, for further details).

² We also see the 2004 EU Enlargement as an exemplary process for the enactment of new language-based institutional patterns and procedures. The 2004 Enlargement must also be seen as crucial for the later Enlargements, such as the 2007 one by Bulgaria and Romania: we argue that later enlargements, necessarily smaller than the 2004 accession of ten new EU-member-states, would be based on the procedures of enlarging e.g. the linguistic repertoire of the EU worked out and implemented in the aftermath of 2004.

³ This study must be seen as an introductory step which is undertaken, for various reasons spelled out below, prior to entering the research within the EU-Institutions and on the discursively shaped

political organism and a communicative space which, however, cannot be separated from its broader, socio-political contexts (see below). Therefore, we see the communication taking place within the EU (and its institutions), as connected to other communicative spaces located within Europe/EU in general, and in the national public spaces of the EU member states in particular. Accordingly, we argue that ‘the European polity is dependent on the constant and bi-directional flow of communication, the responsiveness to public concerns, and the establishment of a plurality of public spaces, where European problems can be discussed and a ‘European consciousness’ can be expressed’ (Wodak and Wright, 2006, p. 254). From this perspective, we see language choice, language shifts, and language contact and language policies as playing an increasingly important role in the practices and regulations of the EU organizations.

Research into the ways in which language(s) and multilingualism of EU and its institutions are embedded within our main object of the present study (i.e. the national media discourses about the 2004 EU Enlargement) is dictated by *three premises*.

- Firstly, by looking at the qualitative features of how national media in selected European countries position issues of language(s) and/or multilingualism vis-à-vis the EU institutions, we assess whether those issues were indeed problematised within the media (and, if so, when/how).
- Secondly, we are interested whether, in the respective national public spheres and the media therein, the importance of language(s)- and/or multilingualism-related issues was indeed put into the context of the 2004 EU Enlargement and transmitted to the respective national publics.
- Thirdly, we investigate *different language ideologies* (see below) which were constructed in the media as the ‘key sites of production of discourse’ (van Dijk, 1991) and which carry different visions/conceptions of national and supranational/EU-ropean realities.

Our analysis of media discourse helps exploring *whether/how the national publics perceive and conceive of the European Union and its institutions from the perspective of language choice and multilingualism* (and why, in fact, those issues would frequently be deemed as marginal and forced to make place for other EU-specific standard themes such as politics, economy, etc.). On the other hand, our analysis helps discovering which (most probably nationally-specific) ideas and ideologies are transmitted to the national publics by their media.

Studying those ideas and ideologies is of paramount importance: the (linguistic) ideologies created and debated in the public spheres and in the media in particular are later recontextualised/transmitted into the field of politics, which, in turn, is actively involved in the co-construction of the EU institutions as such. Hence, it needs to be emphasised that the role of the present news discourse is crucial for our overall research on multilingualism and linguistic diversity in the EU institutions: this pilot study thus, in sum, explores how ***public ideas and ideologies on the EU institutions and their linguistic status-quo are constructed at the time of the crucial political change*** (i.e. the Enlargement). By the same token, the study also allows us to see how

multilingual practices and discourses – or metadiscourses – about language planning and use within those institutions.

the broadly perceived socio-political context of the EU institutions is accordingly changing and put into state of flux.

2. Relevance for DYLAN / WP2 EU-Institutions / Task 2.3

As an *example of oriented research* this study should be perceived as directly contributing to the study of several *key dimensions of the DYLAN overall research agenda*. From the point of view of the key dimensions of the project's research framework, the present analysis covers⁴:

- (a) *representations* (of multilingualism and linguistic diversity)
- (b) *context* (or "language environment").

While we see the first of those dimensions (i.e. *representations of multilingualism and linguistic diversity*) in a way spelled out by the project⁵, we argue that our study of different representations in the national public spheres of several European countries can effectively be operationalised by means of two further concepts. Those concepts are, on the one hand, *conceptions*, and, on the other hand, *visions of multilingualism and linguistic diversity* (see Krzyżanowski and Oberhuber, 2007; see also Weiss, 2002; Wodak and Weiss, 2004; and below).

With regard to the other key DYLAN research dimensions (i.e. *the context*), we elaborate the *four level definition of context* proposed within the *Discourse-Historical Approach in CDA* (see Reisigl & Wodak 2001; Wodak, 2001; *forthcoming*; see also below). This definition grasps different (horizontally-ordered) levels of text production and reception while, by the same token, it also allows discovering the specificities of discourse-dynamics in different 'fields of action' (Bourdieu, 1989; see below) and in different national settings.

With regard to the key research dimensions of the *DYLAN's WP2 (Workpackage 2) EU Institutions*, our analysis contributes to the general research question of WP2, i.e. 'whether there exists, in a longer temporal perspective, a possibility of keeping up two or more equally positioned working languages in the EU institutions'. We claim that, our analysis allows us to tackle that question from the *outside perspective* on EU institutions, the actual elements and key features of public ideas about the 'importance of different languages within the EU institutions'. Differently put, *our exploration helps assessing what are, in fact, the public expectations towards the form and shape of multilingualism within the EU institutions*. By the same token, it also helps seeing the dynamics of those expectations and assessing whether the most recent 'big bang' within the EU and its structures (i.e. the Enlargement) was indeed a point of their change, or, whether irrespective of the changing intra- and extra institutional

⁴ *DYLAN – Language Dynamics and the Management of Diversity* (Project Proposal, 26/10/2005), pp. 11-12. It is worth being noted that, while also of importance at the present stage, other dimensions outlined by the DYLAN project goals (i.e. the actual language practices; their 'immediate' intra-institutional context; and language policies) shall be covered in a greater detail in the following parts of our DYLAN-related work.

⁵ DYLAN Project conceives of representations of multilingualism and linguistic diversity 'as captured through discourse, since discourse can be seen as the trace of representations harboured by different groups' (Ibid.).

context of the EU, those expectations remain unchanged and still display nation-state-specific tendencies towards linguistic imperialism and inequality.

Finally, the present study contributes to the research within *DYLAN Task 2.3* devoted specifically to *the study of meta-discourse on the understanding and role of languages and multilingualism of/within the EU institutions*. Treated as a prolegomena to our extended analyses of EU-documents (see Appendix I), the present pilot study must be seen as an initial exploration of such discourses which, at the present stage, are examined ‘outside of Brussels’. Focussing on these discourses allows us – in a second step - to construct a catalogue of ideas/ideologies on multilingualism and linguistic diversity in the EU institutions which are disseminated and debated in the national public spheres by means of the media. Such a catalogue of ideas/ideologies will then, in a third step, constitute a basic point of reference when examining the language-related discourses *within* the EU institutions (e.g. within the EU official documents) and allow us to trace their differentiated genealogy. *The latter, we argue, is of paramount importance since it allows us to decipher the contradictions between the intra- and extra-EU-institutional ideologies, concepts, and visions of multilingualism: by the same token it juxtaposes, on the one hand, the frequently autopoietic ‘scope of experience’ of multilingualism within the EU-institutions, and, on the other hand, the public ‘horizon of expectations’ towards how multilingualism should in fact be shaped within the European Union*⁶.

3. Theoretical Background, Key Hypotheses and the Research Design

The theoretical framework of our study remains multidisciplinary in nature and draws on diverse approaches from within social theory as well as, in a narrower perspective, on recent debates within sociolinguistics/linguistic anthropology and (critical) discourse analysis. First, we remain particularly informed by the conception of the public sphere(s) as outlined by Jürgen Habermas (1989) and later elaborated within a variety of approaches embedded within the so-called ‘post-Habermasian tradition’ (see Calhoun, 1992; Crossley and Roberts, 2004; Fraser, 2003). Moreover, we draw on Pierre Bourdieu (1989) and his concept of fields of action and their role in structuring social reality.

Secondly, the key interests of the current study are inspired by the debate on ‘language policies’ and ‘language planning’, and in particular by many critical approaches to those issues (see de Cillia, Krumm and Wodak, 2003; Phillipson, 2003; Ricento, 2005; Shohamy, 2006; Spolsky, 2004; or Wright 2000 and 2004). A bulk of our theoretical insight also draws on research on the issue of ‘language ideologies’ (see Blommaert, 1998; Gal 1998 and 2005; Mar-Molinero and Stevenson, 2006; Silverstein 1998) as elaborated within sociolinguistics and linguistic anthropology. Finally, by perceiving language-based and language oriented ideologies as rooted in, and constructed by, diverse ‘ideological dilemmas’ (Billig et. al., 1991), we see a particular virtue in the application of different concepts from within (critical)

⁶ We adopt the terms ‘scope of experience’ and ‘horizon of expectations’ from the historical semantics, or *Begriffsgeschichte*, of Reinhart Koselleck (1989). On the other hand, the term ‘autopoiesis’ is coined from the social-systems perspective proposed by Niklas Luhmann (1995; 1997). Our earlier studies (see Muntigl, Weiss and Wodak, 2000) have applied the conception of discourse-based autopoietic self-reproduction to the context of EU-institutions.

discourse analysis for the purpose of the present study. Hence, among the key concepts to be applied here, the notions of ‘discourse’ and ‘context’ (Wodak, 2001 and *forthcoming*) remain central as are the ideas on the discursive construction of different ‘visions and conceptions of Europe/EU’ (Krzyżanowski and Oberhuber, 2007). (See also the following Section 4, for key concepts and terms)

In order to assess the existent/emerging *language ideologies*, we assume that each of the investigated countries would confront a unique ‘*ideological dilemma*’ (Billig et al., 1991); and that the *EU-based language-ideological dilemmas should be considered as an important choice between at least two, polarised visions/conceptions of EU institutions as characterised by:*

- (a) *the monolingualism* or, the selective ‘*hegemonic multilingualism*’ (see below) fuelled by the politically- and historically driven linguistic inequality, and
- (b) the ‘*de-facto multilingualism*’ characterised by linguistic diversity and equality between different (EU-working) languages and linguistic diversity.

In this context, our particular interest is in deconstructing the actual status quo of the current ‘*hegemonic multilingualism of/in the EU*’ which we conceive of as a process in which a set of selected working languages of the EU are given preference over other/remaining EU working languages, thus constituting a certain selective set of ‘core languages’ which are ideologically preferred (or de facto more frequently used) in the EU-institutional practices. We argue that such a preference arises from the history of the EU integration process and is driven mainly by political premises: it reflects the leading/crucial role of selected countries in the Union – as is the case with Germany, France and the UK – thus influencing the increased use of German, French and English⁷. We also argue that, despite some ideological appearances, hegemonic multilingualism is an ideological tool from allowing the actual or ‘de-facto multilingualism’ (based on the principle of equality and representation) to be developed and institutionally-grounded within the EU institutions.

In general, we claim, the ideological dilemma highlighted before could/would be realised in the analysed discourses in the following (sets of) arguments: On the one hand, it would be argued in favour of defending and promoting the national language of particular countries (in a one-to-one way: English in the UK, German in Germany, etc. – as the national common value and common good) and of projecting its equally pivotal role for the supranational institutions (and by arguing that, e.g., the EU ‘should speak more German and less English’ etc.). Here, we assume, arguments for the consolidation of the linguistic status quo in the EU institutions of 2004 (with the three, leading ‘core languages’) would appear since, as such, they would also allow presenting the institutional realm of the EU as reflecting the national spaces in question. In such a way, we argue those arguments would also reflect the traditional national ideas of how the EU is or should be constructed (see Krzyżanowski and Oberhuber, 2007; Weiss, 2002; Wodak and Weiss, 2004) and embed a particular language, its role and use, as a specific ideological and legitimacy tool (for example: ‘since it is/should be a federal state like Germany, EU must speak more German, etc.).

⁷ Those premises would, however, be rarely highlighted as the de facto reasons for linguistic inequality, and instead other legitimacy strategies (such as ‘efficiency’, ‘simplification of procedures’, etc.) would be used to justify them. (See also Phillipson, 2003; for further arguments in the debate around the increased use of English in EU politics and institutions).

By the same token, it could/would be argued that the newly-arriving EU-working languages should be, even if at least temporarily, marginalised and given lesser importance than the languages of the member-state countries which throughout the history of the EU (and particularly at the time of Enlargement in 2004) remained the EU's key power players: as the Union's 'founding fathers', 'masters of its treaties' or as key agents of the reform and 'constitutionalisation' of the EU undertaken since the late 1990s, etc. Lastly, the arguments of this strand of the ideological dilemma would recurrently see *the costs of the multilingualism in the EU institutions as far too high* (see de Cillia, Krumm and Wodak, 2003) and argue that limiting the number of languages in which the Union works and functions in practice would make sense.

On the other hand (at the other side of the spectrum), arguments could appear that the realm of EU institutions cannot reflect the (only hypothetically) monolingual national spaces of selected European countries (particularly of the countries we approach). Accordingly, it could be argued that, even if currently/potentially crucial within EU-institutional practices, the 'core' EU languages would need to change and re-negotiate their leading role in face of the arrival of several new working EU languages. In this vein, several arguments would appear. For example, it could be argued that, just like in the case of the entire institutional construction of the Union (born out of the consensus of different nationally-specific approaches towards its form, rationale and functioning) the post-2004 linguistic status quo in the EU institutions would need to be renegotiated anew (in order to open up the EU-institutional - as well as, at the broader level, political - space to the newly arriving members of the Union). For this reason one would opt for *creating, irrespective of its costs, a multilingual EU-institutional realm* founded, inter alia, on the principles of equality and representation. Accordingly, the role of different (national) languages would be rethought and preference given to inclusive models and examples of practice which would allow the EU to reflect, inasmuch possible, the extra-institutional multilingual and multicultural European space.

While these two poles of the 'post-2004 EU language ideological dilemma' constitute a hypothetical point of departure for our research, we are aware that explicit manifestations of opposing language ideologies might be rare. For example, there might be countries which would not at all contribute to the debate on language ideologies thus possibly suggesting that their national language(s) are and will be strongly represented in the EU independently of the changing social and political context⁸. Additionally, we are aware that, in several countries in question, we will be dealing instead (or perhaps even preferably) with the spaces between the two opposed ideologies and their differentiated, context-dependent promulgation in the course of which possibly even different ideologies would be constructed and defended.

Accordingly, our research design is not arbitrary. By investigating countries whose 'national languages' were or are about to be very strongly represented in the institutions of the European Union as of May 2004, we wanted to assess whether particular *language ideologies* which were once (and still are) tied to those languages and if their role in the processes of nation-building (see Wright, 2000) has also been

⁸ As can be the case with, e.g., the British media and its belief that English is anyway set to become the *lingua franca* for Europe and that thus debating it is not necessary or desirable (see below).

‘enlarged’ and projected upon the future ‘grand’ construction (as well as, indeed, everyday functioning) of the institutions of the Union.

For this purpose, we investigated, on the one hand, *the national public spheres in countries whose languages (i.e. English for the UK, French for France, and German for Germany)* were already dominant in the practices of the EU institutions in 2004, albeit remained in a very frequently contested state of competition for the primacy of the Union’s most commonly used and most important (working) language (see Ammon, 2006; Phillipson, 2003; van Els, 2001, 2005). On the other hand, we focussed on *Polish as an example of an ‘Enlargement Language’* (i.e. the national language of the largest country acceding to the EU 2004). Here, we wanted to discover whether Poland’s public sphere would perceive Polish as a language which should be added to the ‘core group’ of languages described above, or, whether irrespective of its extra-EU-institutional population of speakers⁹, the role of Polish would be marginalised in the everyday functioning of EU-institutional and policy-making system after May 2004.

4. Key Concepts and Terms

The following key notions are central to the theoretical and methodological approach of the present study:

- **Discourse and Text:** Inline with Critical Discourse Analysis, we see discourse as comprised of different sets of various discursive practices which constitute society and culture as well as being constituted by them (see Fairclough and Wodak, 1997). Conscious of the ongoing struggle over ‘power of discourse’ in society, we also endorse the conception of different ‘orders of discourse’ (Foucault, 1971) which argues that ‘the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organized and canalized in every society – and that this is done by way of certain procedures whose task it is to subdue the powers and dangers of discourse’ (Foucault 1984, pp. 10–11). Finally, we see the relation between discourse and text as proposed by Jay Lemke: ‘Discourses, as social actions more or less governed by social habits, produce texts that will in some ways be alike in their meanings. (...) When we want to focus on the specifics of an event or occasion, we speak of the text; when we want to look at patterns, commonality, relationships that embrace different texts and occasions, we can speak of discourses’ (Lemke, 1995, 7ff)¹⁰.

⁹ We surely do not want to portray the example of Poland as ‘more important’ than the other countries acceding the EU in 2004. However, it must be borne in mind that the country of a size of/similar to Poland was not allowed to enter the EU since 1986 (when Spain acceded the EC) and that with 38 millions of inhabitants (almost all of whom are speakers of Polish) the country constituted more than half of the population acceding the Union in 2004 (while the speakers of Polish would eventually constitute just a little less than 10% of all inhabitants of the entire EU). Thus, we argue, the Polish example yields itself automatically if one is willing to, as is the case in the present study, compare a large Enlargement country with the other, large, EU-member-states such as France, Germany or UK.

¹⁰ See also: Reisigl and Wodak (2001), Wodak (1996), Wodak et. al. (1999).

- **Interdiscursivity:** Based on the Bakhtinian notion of ‘intertextuality’, the conception of ‘interdiscursivity’ (see Wodak, 2001) allows discovering links between various discourses produced synchronically and diachronically. It takes place when e.g. various arguments ‘typical’ for certain forms of discourse are recontextualised in other discursive forms/types in order to achieve some pre-defined social goals.
- **Context:** As indicated above, we rely on a four-level definition of context which distinguishes between (cf. Wodak 2001, p. 67): (1) ‘the immediate, language or text internal co-text’; (2) ‘the intertextual and interdiscursive relationship between utterances, texts, genres and discourses’; (3) ‘the extra-linguistic social/sociological variables and institutional frames of a specific “context of situation”’(...) and; (4) ‘the broader socio-political and historical contexts, which the discursive practices are embedded in and related to’. In relation to the present object of study (EU-Enlargement press discourse), all four levels of context shall be taken into consideration. With regard to our general object of study (EU institutions) the present exploration shall be treated as a large-scale study of the fourth level of context (i.e. of the socio-political and historical context of those institutions).
- **Recontextualisation:** We see recontextualisation as the key element of the process of interdiscursivity (see above): ‘By taking an argument and restating it in a new context, we first observe the process of de-contextualization, and then, when the respective element is implemented in a new context, of recontextualization’ (Wodak, *forthcoming*)
- **Genre:** In the post-Bakhtinian tradition, we see genres as different types of texts through which a discourse is represented. For example, a political discourse would be represented in different genres such as speeches, policy papers, debates, etc.
- **Fields (of Action):** Drawing on Pierre Bourdieu, we see fields as different areas of social and political activity (e.g. one can distinguish between the fields such as political, journalistic, academic, etc.). In turn, the ‘fields of action’ (Girnth, 1996) may be understood as segments of the respective societal “reality”, which contribute to constituting and shaping the “frame” of discourse (Wodak, 2001, p. 67).
- **The Public Sphere and the Media:** In a post-Habermasian tradition, we conceive of the public sphere as a ‘sphere between civil society and the state, in which a critical public discussion is guaranteed’ (McCarthy, 1989, p. xi). While we are aware of the recent debates on the transnationalisation of the public spheres (Fraser, 2003) or their Europeanisation in the strictly-European context (see Habermas, 2001; Trenz and Eder, 2004; Langenbucher and Latzer, 2006; Splichal, 2006), we are looking at the national public spheres as our main object of study. In turn, the media are seen as the basic constituents of the public sphere since they ‘constitute the main access to the public sphere and provide the forum for public communication’ (Schulz-Forberg, 2005, p. 1). For this reason, our study is also based on recent research on how EU politics are perceived in the national media in general (see Oberhuber et. al., 2005) and on the role of media debates on

presenting the 2004 EU Enlargement to the public in particular (see de Vreese and Boomgarden, 2006; Schuck and de Vreese, 2006).

- **Language Ideologies:** Like Blommaert (1999), we conceive of language ideologies as ‘the socioculturally motivated ideas, perceptions and expectations of language, manifested in all sorts of language use and in themselves objects of discursive elaboration in meta-pragmatic discourse’ (ibid., p. 1). Accordingly, we also see language ideologies as primarily constructed in the debates ‘in which language is central as a topic, a motif, a target, and in which language ideologies are being articulated, formed, amended, enforced’ (ibid.). (See also Ricento, 2000).
- **Visions and Conceptions (of Multilingualism and Linguistic Diversity).** We conceive of different representations of multilingualism in the EU as constructed of both *visions and conceptions* thereof. The concept of different discursively-formed visions and conceptions is adopted here from our recent studies about the discourses of/about Europe and the European Union (see Krzyżanowski and Oberhuber, 2007). Different *conceptions* of Europe/EU (ibid., p. 132):
 - (a) are ‘static definitions of Europe/EU’,
 - (b) are ‘based on (...) previous experiences’
 - (c) are ‘stable and not necessarily prone to change in the context-specific way,
 - (d) are referring ‘to the ontology (viz. history) of Europe/EU and its current stage, rather than to their potential future development.

On the other hand, different *visions* (ibid., p. 132-133):

- (a) ‘include the more *dynamic ideas* on Europe/EU’,
- (b) ‘would be much more future-oriented and tend to speculate on the future shape and form of both European and EU-ropean space, rather than on their past/history or their current form,
- (c) may change in a context-dependent way,
- (d) ‘could be formed in the process of adjusting to other powerful conceptions’
- (e) ‘would be much more future-oriented and tend to speculate on the future shape and form of both European and EU-ropean space, rather than on their past/history or their current form’, and
- (f) ‘may also be defined as a way of putting conceptions into the practice of political actions and transforming them into concrete visions of the future development of Europe/EU’.

We also endorse the view that, as shown in previous studies (see Weiss, 2002; Wodak and Weiss, 2004), different *national motivations* prevail in public discourses constructing visions and conceptions of Europe/EU (and, subsequently, the role of multilingualism and linguistic diversity within EU politics and institutions).

5. Methodology

5.1. Data Collection and Establishing the Corpora

The newspaper corpora described below (see Section 6) have been established by means of extensive library search in several libraries in Germany and Poland as well as by means of web-archive search. Several of the analysed newspapers (for Germany and France) were obtained in a microfilm form (allowing for copies, etc.) whereas all of the Polish newspapers had to be screened in a printed form with the search archived by means of photographic camera-images. The British newspapers (collected in two stages) were obtained by means of the *Lexis-Nexis Database* of newspapers and publications.

The newspaper search focussed on ten days between April 26th and May 5th, 2004, i.e. five days before and five after the date of the EU-Enlargement (May 1st, 2004). During the search, the so-called *large corpus* of all of the identified newspaper-articles reporting on the ‘2004 EU Enlargement’ was established. That corpus allowed identifying the scope of the general newspaper-interest in the ‘Enlargement’ as such by pointing to the diversified ways/intensities with which the issue was focussed upon in different newspapers (liberal vs. conservative) and countries.

At a further stage, the aforementioned large corpus was downscaled and a *small corpus* was established. The elements of that corpus were discovered by screening the contents of all newspaper-articles in the large corpus on the EU Enlargement and by identifying those articles which (thematically) related to the issues of languages, multilingualism, etc. Here, we have selected articles which both entirely pertained to languages/multilingualism as well as those which referred to those issues in their larger/smaller parts. In both cases, the articles were identified by searching keywords such as: ‘language’, ‘languages’, ‘multilingual’, ‘multilingualism’, etc. The process of identifying the *small corpus* was well-facilitated in the British newspapers (digital copies obtained from a data-base) and was significantly more time-consuming in case of all of the other newspapers archived as paper-copies or digital images.

5.1. Analytical Methodology

The analytical methodology applied in this study is largely based on the methodological apparatus of Critical Discourse Analysis (cf. Fairclough and Wodak, 1997), particularly in its ‘*Discourse-Historical*’ tradition (cf. Krzyżanowski, *forthcoming*; Reisigl and Wodak, 2001; Wodak, et. al, 1999; Wodak, 2001; Wodak, 2005).

Within the first step of the analysis, a general overview of contents of the reporting is aimed at in order to show the variety of themes and topics discussed with regard to the 2004 EU Enlargement. Within that step, a scrolling of all articles is undertaken in order to devise lists of key ‘*topics of discourse*’ which are understood as text-semantic units which represent ‘the most ‘important’ or ‘summarizing’ idea that underlies the meanings of a sequence of sentences [...] a ‘gist’ or an ‘upshot’ of such an episode [...] it is what such passage is *about*’ (van Dijk, 1984: 56, original emphasis)¹¹. The analysis of discourse topics in the media texts proceeds in a dual way and is divided into:

¹¹ For other conceptions of ‘discourse topics’ available in linguistic discourse analysis, cf. Brown and Yule (1983), or, van Dijk (1982).

- (a) *definition of the topics of the text* (i.e. the list of 2-4 ‘larger’ or general topics of a text), and
- (b) *definition of the sub-topics of the respective parts/passages of the text* (viz. designation of a list of ‘smaller’ topics embedded within the aforementioned ‘larger’ ones).

The main aim of the second step of the analysis is to discover the *qualitative features of those strands of discourse about the 2004 EU Enlargement which debated the latter from the point of view of ‘languages’, ‘multilingualism’ and other language-related issues, particularly in the focal context of the EU institutions*. Allowing for the primarily argumentation-oriented focus of the second step of analysis, its core analytical category is that of *arguments* (or *topoi*) which are applied to examine the ways in which arguments were structured and endowed with a discourse-pragmatic meaning. Stemming from the promulgation of both classic (viz. Aristotelian) and modern argumentation theory (cf. van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1984, 1992; van Eemeren, Grootendorst & Kruijer 1987), *topoi* are defined here as “parts of argumentation which belong to the obligatory, either explicit or inferable premises (...) [and] are the content-related warrants or ‘conclusion rules’ which connect the argument or arguments with the conclusion, the claim” (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001: 74-75). Differently put, *topoi* shall be considered as certain ‘structures of arguments’ which then need to be ‘realised’ by the construction of argument leading to a particular (logical and intentional) conclusion¹².

Other categories of analysis applied to support the examination of the ‘key’ arguments described above encompass a set of elements of discourse categories previously applied to the analysis of language of transnational press-reporting on EU-related issues (cf. e.g. Oberhuber et. al. 2005) to, inter alia, include:

- a) different *metaphors* and *metaphorical expressions*¹³ approached here as chiefly linguistic-rhetorical devices supporting different arguments summarised by the *topoi*
- b) strategies of ‘*nomination*’ and ‘*predication*’ as well as other strategies of ‘*self- and other-presentation*’ (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001) which allowed discovering how the image of different real-world objects and groups¹⁴ was constructed in discourse and how their varied degree of agency was thus also portrayed and conveyed through the analysed media texts.

¹² Additionally, at a theoretical level, there are *topoi* which are treated as ‘formal’, and which are based on the set of ‘classical’ *topoi* or ‘loci’ (such as the *topos* of ‘difference’, ‘analogy’, ‘example’, ‘equality’, ‘consequence’, etc., cf. Kopperschmidt, 1989) as well as there are *topoi* which are context-dependent (or “content-dependent”, cf. Kienpointner, 1992) and which are ‘unique’ and ‘typical’ for the aims of the texts which have previously been structured according to aims set up by the author/speaker.

¹³ From the very sizeable variety of approaches towards the role of metaphors in discourse, metaphor is perceived here from the point ‘classical cognitive metaphor theory’ (cf. Koller, 2004; Lakoff, 1993; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Lakoff & Turner, 1989;

¹⁴ For a specifically actor-oriented analysis of a construction of different social groups in discourse, cf. van Leeuwen (1996).

6. The Corpus

6.1. The 'Large' Corpus on the 2004 EU Enlargement

6.1.1. France

The analysed French corpus amounts to France's largest liberal daily *Le Monde* (LM) which was screened in a printed form (microfilm)¹⁵. Though yielded by only one newspaper, the French corpus proved to be immensely sizeable: it yielded 91 articles in total (cf. Table 1, below), i.e. a second-largest of all 'liberal' corpora (Polish *Gazeta Wyborcza*, cf. below, led the liberal corpora with 128 articles in total).

Looking at the internal specificities of the French corpus it must be acknowledged that the latter was very generically-diverse and referred to the issues of EU Enlargement by means of mainly commentaries (43 in total) and news-reports (31). Importantly, other genres, like editorials, country-profiles of Enlargement states or photo-reports were also used to add further depth to the significantly broad interpretation of the EU Enlargement presented by the French press.

	26/04 MO	27/04 TU	28/04 WE	29/04 TH	30/04 FR	01/05 SA	02-03/05 SU-MO ¹⁶	04/05 TU	05/05 WE	T O T A L
NR ¹⁷	5	2	2	8	3	--	8	2	1	31
COM	-	7	-	25	6	--	1	1	3	43
EDIT	-	1	-	1	-	--	1	-	-	3
OT1	-	10	-	1	-	--	1	-	-	12
OT2	-	-	-	1	-	--	1	-	-	2
TOTAL	5	20	2	36	9	-- ¹⁸	12	3	4	91

Table 1: Reporting on the EU-Enlargement 2004 in *Le Monde* (LM)

6.1.2. Germany

In the German case, we have focussed on the largest German liberal daily *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (SZ, published in Munich) as well as on the largest conservative daily *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (FAZ, published in Frankfurt am Main). The included editions of the FAZ also comprised the paper's Sunday edition, i.e. the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung*. Both SZ and FAZ were obtained in a printed form (microfilm).

¹⁵ Originally, since both liberal and conservative quality newspapers were targeted, we also aimed at analysing the conservative *Le Figaro*: the latter, however, was not available in the approached libraries in Germany and Poland due to an apparent two-week strike in the French logistic sector falling exactly onto the period of our investigation.

¹⁶ Joint issue of *Le Monde* on Sunday/Monday 02/03 May 2004.

¹⁷ Abbreviations in Tables 1-7: NR = News Report / COM = Commentary / EDIT = Editorial / OT 1 = Other 1 / OT 2 = Other 2. Other 1 and Other 2 denote different genres used variably in the analysed newspapers.

¹⁸ No issue of *Le Monde* on Saturday 01 May 2004.

With 186 articles in total, Germany yielded the largest of all national corpora (see Tables 2 and 3, below) as well as, through the very active reporting in FAZ (113 articles in total), the largest conservative corpus which, e.g., was 3-5 times broader than the conservative corpora in other countries (44 articles in the Polish *Nasz Dziennik* or 24 articles in British *The Telegraph*). That very immense and sizeable reporting/commenting proves the very general-political engagement of Germany in the Enlargement: perceiving the latter as, to a large degree, German-driven project, the German press was very eager to discuss several dimensions of the Enlargement irrespective of the ‘poles’ of the left-right (liberal-conservative) political spectrum.

	26/04 MO	27/04 TU	28/04 WE	29/04 TH	30/04 FR	01/05 SA	02/05 SU	03/05 MO	04/05 TU	05/05 WE	T O T A L
NR	2	3	3	5	7	--	--	9	1	3	33
COM	5	4	2	5	10	--	--	3	-	3	32
EDIT	-	-	-	-	-	--	--	-	-	-	0
OT1	1	1	-	1	1	--	--	1	-	1	6
OT2	-	-	-	1	-	--	--	1	-	-	2
TOTAL	8	8	5	12	18	-- ¹⁹	-- ²⁰	14	1	7	73

Table 2: Reporting on the EU-Enlargement 2004 in *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (SZ)

	26/04 MO	27/04 TU	28/04 WE	29/04 TH	30/04 FR	01/05 SA	02/05 SU	03/05 MO	04/05 TU	05/05 WE	T O T A L
NR	5	2	2	4	5	--	5	11	1	-	35
COM	2	8	36	3	7	--	1	4	1	-	62
EDIT	1	-	1	-	1	--	1	2	-	-	6
OT1	-	-	4	-	1	--	1	1	-	-	7
OT2	-	-	1	-	1	--	1	-	-	-	3
TOTAL	8	10	44	7	15	-- ²¹	9 ²²	18	2	0	113

Table 3: Reporting on the EU-Enlargement 2004 in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (FAZ)

While the generic specificities of the German corpus prove to certain extent the previous point on the large political engagement in the discussed issues, it must be noted that, in a traditional ‘quality-press’ fashion, FAZ and SZ debated the issue of the enlargement mainly by means of news-reports and commentaries, with other genres (incl. editorials) clearly lagging behind. Importantly the conservative FAZ was much more eager to comment and analyse the Enlargement from various standpoints: the number of commentaries in the FAZ (62) was almost double than that of its news-

¹⁹ No issue of *Süddeutsche Zeitung* on 01 May 2004.

²⁰ No issue of *Süddeutsche Zeitung* on 02 May 2004.

²¹ No issue of *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* on 01 May 2004.

²² Edition of *Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung*.

reports (35), while the liberal SZ (with 33 news-reports and 32 commentaries) clearly struck the balance between reporting and commenting.

6.1.3. UK

In the British case, we have analysed: (a) *The Independent* (IND, including its Sunday edition of *The Independent on Sunday*) – currently British key liberal daily of a strongly anti-governmental (anti-neo-liberal) undertone opposing the New Labour politics of Tony Blair and his government, and (b) *The (Daily) Telegraph* (TEL, incl. *The Sunday Telegraph*), i.e. the UK's key conservative daily. The British press material was obtained in the electronic form via. the Lexis-Nexis newspapers' database.

With 46 articles in total (see Tables 4 and 5, below) the UK provides the smallest of all national corpora. Namely, the UK corpus amounted to only ca 20 % of its German counterpart and ca. 40 % of the French corpus (while, importantly, the latter included only one newspaper). Also, very crucially, the UK corpus proved particularly 'bleak' when compared to that of an Enlargement-country of Poland: the Polish corpus was almost four times the size of the British. Additionally, the British corpus was also the smallest of all national corpora despite being the only one to have (within both liberal and conservative press) newspaper-editions on all days within the ten-day period of our investigation (26/04 – 05/05/2004).

Thus, in general, the very limited and modest reporting on the EU Enlargement proves Britain's very traditionally restricted interest in European issues as such (particularly when compared to mainland-European corpora, above and below) and importantly displayed within both liberal and conservative strands of the UK media. The generic aspects of the British corpus seem to emphasise that point even further: within the entire period of investigation mainly news-reporting was used while the commentaries (9 in total) were immensely scarce (thus, only reporting and not commenting/interpreting the Enlargement events was provided). Other genres were almost inexistent in the British corpus (with the exception of a transcript of a journalist-debate on EU/Enlargement in TEL of 28/04/2004).

	26/04 MO	27/04 TU	28/04 WE	29/04 TH	30/04 FR	01/05 SA	02/05 SU	03/05 MO	04/05 TU	05/05 WE	T O T A L
NR	2	2	1	3	1	4	3	1	-	-	17
COM	-	-	-	1	-	2	1	1	-	-	5
EDIT	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
OT1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
OT2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
TOTAL	2	2	1	4	1	6	4²³	2	0	0	22

Table 4: Reporting on the EU-Enlargement 2004 in *The Independent* (IND)

²³ Issue of *The Independent on Sunday*.

	26/04 MO	27/04 TU	28/04 WE	29/04 TH	30/04 FR	01/05 SA	02/05 SU	03/05 MO	04/05 TU	05/05 WE	T O T A L
NR	1	1	1	1	4	5	4	2	-	-	19
COM	-	-	-	2	-	-	2	-	-	-	4
EDIT	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
OT1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
OT2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
TOTAL	1	1	2	3	4	5	6²⁴	2	0	0	24

Table 5: Reporting on the EU-Enlargement 2004 in The Telegraph (TEL)

6.1.4. Poland

Finally, in the Polish case (see Tables 6 and 7, below), we have analysed the largest Polish liberal newspaper *Gazeta Wyborcza* (GW): originally initiated in 1989 by the intelligentsia members of the Polish dissident movement, and by now Poland's largest newspaper (in terms of readership) of the strongest pro-European (intellectually-based). Within the conservative strand of the spectrum, the Polish corpus also included the country's key conservative daily *Nasz Dziennik* (ND) of radical-conservative views and closely tied and co-owned by the equally radical Radio Maryja (both recently gaining importance under the current Polish populist-conservative government). Both Polish newspapers were obtained in a printed form.

With 172 articles in total, Poland provides the second largest national corpus (only behind Germany with 186 articles) which remains impressive for the then still EU-bound country. GW provides the largest corpus for a single newspaper (with 128 articles, leading FAZ with 113 and LM with 91) as well as for a liberal press. Interestingly, despite its very clear strategy to 'silence' the EU-Enlargement and surrounding issues (see below), the very modest Polish conservative ND corpus (44 articles) is still as large as, e.g., the entire national corpus composed for the UK. Importantly, within the Polish national corpus, there is a clear difference in the size of the corpora for GW and ND – the reporting in the latter is only ca. 30% of the former, whereas the large corpus for GW underlines its role as Poland's key pro-European nationwide daily. Interestingly, despite being the strongest advocate of the anti-European and anti-EU-Enlargement stance, the ND does not voice as much against the Enlargement but (seemingly on purpose) it radically limits the Enlargement reporting as such (a clear strategy of 'mourning the issues' instead of 'talking what we are against').

Lastly, looking at the generic specificities of the Polish corpus one must also, inline with the discrepancies described above, point to the very extreme generic variety within the GW-reporting. The latter used not only the 'classic' press-genres of news-reports and commentaries (61 and 49 respectively) but also resorted to several other means (such as country-profiling, several photo-reports from Poland and other 'loci' of the Enlargement, etc.) to very broadly discuss and interpret the EU-Enlargement in general and the Polish accession in particular (with its traditionally 'internationalised

²⁴ Issue of *The Sunday Telegraph*.

views’, the GW, however, clearly struck the balance between the former and the latter). In turn, in the very modest and ‘quiet’ reporting of the ND only news-reports and commentaries were used, though, importantly the negative interpretations of the EU and its enlargement (anchored mainly within the commentaries, 23 in total) clearly preceded the actual fact-based news-reporting (19 news-reports in total).

	26/04 MO	27/04 TU	28/04 WE	29/04 TH	30/04 – 03/05 FR – MO	01/05 SA	04/05 TU	05/05 WE	T O T A L
NR	10	5	10	8	8	4	9	7	61
COM	2	-	1	7	6	25	5	3	49
EDIT	-	-	-	-	2	1	-	-	3
OT1	1	1	1	-	2	4	-	-	9
OT2	-	-	1	-	-	5	-	-	6
TOTAL	13	6	13	15	18 ²⁵	39 ²⁶	14	10	128

Table 6: Reporting on the EU-Enlargement 2004 in *Gazeta Wyborcza* (GW)

	26/04 MO	27/04 TU	28/04 WE	29/04 TH	30/04 - 03/05 FR-MO	04/05 TU	05/05 WE	T O T A L
NR	2	2	4	1	3	2	5	19
COM	1	4	3	6	4	2	3	23
EDIT	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
OT1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1
OT2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
TOTAL	3	6	8	7	7 ²⁷	5	8	44

Table 7: Reporting on the EU-Enlargement 2004 in *Nasz Dziennik* (ND)

6.2. The ‘Small’ Corpus on Language- and Multilingualism-Related Issues

As said, the *small corpus*, from which texts eventually put under the in-depth analysis were selected (see below), was established by means of scrolling all of the contents of all texts of the large corpus on the Enlargement (see above) and by identifying those articles which (thematically) related to the issues of languages, multilingualism, etc. Here, we have selected articles which both entirely pertained to languages/multilingualism as well as those which referred to those issues in their larger/smaller parts.

²⁵ Due to the fact that both 01 and 03 May are bank holidays in Poland – weekend/holiday edition of *Gazeta Wyborcza* covered the period 20 April - 03 May 2004.

²⁶ Special Issue of *Gazeta Wyborcza* of 01 May 2004 (on the occasion of EU Enlargement).

²⁷ Holiday issue of *Nasz Dziennik* for the period 30 April – 03 May 2004. As there are no editions of *Nasz Dziennik* on the weekends, the holiday edition substituted only Friday and Monday issue.

The quantitative analysis of the small corpus (see Table 8, below) reveals that languages/multilingualism and related issues were discussed very rarely and were pushed into a clearly marginal position: languages/multilingualism were mostly discussed (or actually mentioned or touched upon) by means of references (87 in total for all of the analysed countries) as well as, though to a significantly lesser degree, by means of entire articles devoted to language-specific issues (11 in total). As one could expect, language issues were almost totally absent from the British corpus (only 6 references in total), while Polish GW was the newspaper that was the most eager to refer to languages/multilingualism (32 articles and references in total, the largest number of references with 31). On the other hand, of all the analysed countries, the German press was the most eager to discuss languages (44 references/articles for both SZ and FAZ), while it was also in the SZ that the largest number of articles devoted mostly/solely to multilingualism/languages were published (5 in total). In almost all of the analysed countries, no clear discrepancies in referring to/describing language issues could be observed if taking into consideration the liberal/conservative division: the only exception was Poland where the number of references/articles in liberal GW (32 in total) clearly outnumbered those in the conservative ND (3 in total).

	FRANCE	GERMANY		UK		POLAND		T O T A L
	LM	SZ	FAZ	IND	TEL	GW	ND	
References	12	19	18	3	3	31	1	87
Articles	1	5	2	0	0	1	2	11
SUB-TT	13	24	20	3	3	32	3	-
TOTAL	13	44		6		35		98

*Table 8: Key Data on the Small Corpus
on Languages/Multilingualism and Related Issues*

On the other hand, the qualitative features of the small corpus help reveal the key *topics of discourse* which served bringing multilingualism and language-related issues into the analysed textual representations and their role within the wider contents of the previously-outlined large, country-specific corpora on the 2004 EU Enlargement.

First, in the French case (LM), where the large corpus mostly debated the historical dimensions of the EU Enlargement as well as several current Enlargement-related issues (Turkey and its eventual EU-accession, the EU Constitutional process, division of Cyprus, changes in Eastern/Western Europe before and after the Enlargement), languages/multilingualism (viz. the small corpus) were widely put into the context of ‘profiling’ of the new/old EU members and merely describing them. Accordingly, we encountered frequent references to languages whenever linguistically-diverse countries were profiled (e.g. Latvia with 35% Russophone minority, Estonia and its Russian-speaking minorities, Cyprus and its ‘Turcophone’ part, etc.) or whenever a particular language (as is the case with, e.g. Malta and the Maltese) was perceived as a very unique feature of a country. Languages/multilingualism were also referred to whenever different social actors (e.g. successful entrepreneurs from the acceding Eastern-European states) were described and their skills in several languages (with French clearly favoured) acknowledged. Importantly, languages/multilingualism were

rarely put by the French press into the (both textual and broader) context of EU institutions and their multilingualism: only one reference (29/04) and one full article (also of 29/04) of that type were put forth, both referring to the imminent growth of linguistic diversity (and language-related problems) in the EU-institutions, the growth of the EU translation service and the forthcoming job opportunities for representatives of the acceding states (the said article is analysed in detail in section 7, below).

In the German case, the large corpora of SZ and FAZ discussed the largely-similar lists of topics, though from the newspaper-specific liberal and conservative angles. And so, the SZ focussed mostly on socio-economic aspects of the Enlargement (in Germany and elsewhere in Europe) as well as on the then persistent post-Iraq ‘Old Europe’ vs. ‘New Europe’ debate, all with a very strong focus on selected acceding countries and their relations to Germany (with Poland receiving the largest degree of attention). In turn, FAZ which also made its discourse clearly bilateral (by describing relationships between Germany and the accession countries), also focussed very eagerly on strictly-EU-ropean matters (Constitution, Enlargement vs. development of the European integration, etc.) while not neglecting specific areas of socio-political reality which would be affected: economy, education, etc.

It is therefore that, as was the case in France, the small corpora of the German newspapers put languages/multilingualism into the larger topics/issues debated in conjunction with the Enlargement and, just like in France, marginalised language issues onto the level of ‘features’ of countries or issues described in the texts. Hence, as was the case above, different countries were profiled partially by means of their languages and linguistic diversity (Slovenia, Cyprus, Latvia) while, e.g., the frequent descriptions of the education sector (in Germany and elsewhere in the current/new EU countries) included many references to (SZ and FAZ) and several articles on (SZ) language tests, classes undertaken in various languages, translations of diplomas, language learning for future professional opportunities, etc. Importantly, within those rather marginal references to languages/multilingualism, little attention was paid to combining those issues with the changing EU institutions. Out of references which linked the two, FAZ spoke about the growth of the number of EU working languages to twenty (03/05), while the imminent growth of the European Commission’s translation service was also described (27/04). On the other hand, the SZ (05/05) provided one full article about the changing linguistic situation in the EU institutions (analysed below).

In the very limited British reporting described before, the key discussed issues were the historical dimensions of the Enlargement (viz. its role vis-à-vis previous divisions of the cold war, etc.) as well as the projection of the enlargement onto the then current reform and crisis of the European Integration (Constitutionalism, etc.). Importantly, as is traditionally the case in the British reporting on Europe/EU, all of those issues were described from a strictly ‘national’ perspective, and, therefore, mostly political issues are highlighted for the point of view of their impact on the British foreign policy (note that unlike in other countries, the EU was perceived as an element of that policy rather than of the actual transnational political reality). In that manner, the profiling of different accession countries was also provided, though, unlike elsewhere, the language-related issues were very scarcely made into objective elements of that profiling (it is only once – IND of 01/05 – that twenty new languages of the EU were mentioned to describe the Enlargement process). On the contrary, languages and

multilingualism were only highlighted whenever they were made into elements of international political struggles: e.g. the place-name conflicts between Austria and Slovenia were mentioned in that context in IND on 30/04. Equally, languages were only (if at all) put into the context of the EU institutions to portray different country-positions on the topic of the future of the European integration process: in that context the French defence of the French language in EU meetings was described in TEL (01/05) in a reference analysed in detail below.

Finally, unlike in other countries, the Polish reporting proved to be very diverse in terms of intensity and scope of issues/topics discussed in connection with the EU Enlargement. As could be expected (see also above), the strongly-pro-EU-ropcean GW discussed the Enlargement in diverse dimensions which amounted to topics pertaining to politics, society, economy and culture (in both national terms in current/future EU as well as in a transnational perspective) and to a very detailed profiling of the EU-accession states. In that context, Enlargement was perceived by the GW as a historical chance and opportunity for both current and future EU members, while many historical and symbolic aspects of the Enlargement as the 'de facto breaking of the cold-war divide of Europe' were thematised. On the other hand, the very anti-EU approach of the conservative ND (visible in, e.g., the very clear silencing of the EU-Enlargement as such) resulted in the fact that, if at all, the Enlargement was perceived in negative terms, that is as danger and threat to Polish national independence (and further politics, economy and, very explicitly, Polish national culture) and as another type of Poland's loss of independence (here many parallels were provided between, e.g., the post-War Soviet domination of Poland and the current 'new domination' of the EU and its negative impact on Polish socio-political reality).

The issues pertaining to languages and multilingualism were put into the Polish small corpus in a manner which clearly reflects the general features of the (respectively, liberal and conservative) press reporting. Hence, GW uses languages to describe the immensely positive and broad diversity of Europe: here, in the provided country-profiles and description, the reporting encompasses both Enlargement countries (Latvia, Slovenia, etc.) and the current EU-member states with very 'characteristic' languages or linguistic landscapes (Finland with two official languages, the Netherlands with its language which is 'difficult' for Poles, UK with its many dialects and sociolects of English, etc.). Secondly, the language skills of Polish citizens (mainly in English, German, etc.) were also described in the context of the new job opportunities for Poles in some of the 'old' EU countries. On the other hand, in the ND, the specifically 'endangered' Polish language was mentioned in two articles (both of 28/04) when Poland's ratification of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (Council of Europe) was debated and (despite not having a clear link to the EU-politics as such) put into the context of the EU-Enlargement and the ongoing Europeanisation of Poland. Lastly, as expected, the EU institutions were linked with language issues only in the GW, specifically in a one page-long article of 05/05 which described the linguistic struggles in the EU institutions (see below, for analysis).

7. Languages, Multilingualism, and the EU-Institutions (In-Depth Analysis)²⁸

7.1. France

The key French article linking languages/multilingualism and the EU institutions was published in LM of 29/04/2004 under the heading '*Institutions: plus de personnels, de langues et... moins de collégialité*' (author: L. Zecchini).

The article, taking altogether a space of ca. 15% of a page, starts with a short argument that, according to some pessimists, the machinery of the EU institutions is set to become stalled (*'se gripper'*) in the aftermath of the Enlargement. As a reason for such stall it is said that reaching a consensus with 25 member states will be very difficult, as was the case with the then recent debate on the EU Constitution. Then, some statistics on the EU institutions in relation to the Enlargement are put forth: it is being said that the already 34.800 large cohort of the EU officials will soon be enlarged by the further 6.400 bureaucrats recruiting from the incoming EU-member states.

Those statistics are then projected onto the areas where, supposedly, the Enlargement will become the most salient: here the EU-institutional translation service is being talked about and it is argued that, with 20 official languages after the Enlargement (and, as it is indicated 'only 11 until then') the EU is set to become a 'Babel Tower' (*'une tour de Babel'*). That metaphorical, language-related description of the EU-institutions (cf. below, for the same type of metaphor used in the Polish corpus) is supported by the argument relating to numbers which states that effectively, to observe the EU's new linguistic plurality, every meeting at the EU level would include at least sixty members of the translation service. However, as it is being suggested, the full linguistic plurality is only going to be executed within the meetings of the Council of the European Union, whereas in all other meetings only 'usual working languages' that is English, German and French are set to be used:

Example 1:

Pour la plupart des autres réunions, l'anglais, l'allemand et le français resteront les langues de travail habituelles.

Importantly, the reference to the three aforementioned working languages points to the fact that the pre-Enlargement de-facto linguistic status quo is going to be projected onto the post-Enlargement EU-institutional situation: as shown in Example 1 (above), the three languages are not set to become but actually remain (*'resteront'*) the key working ones.

In the further part of the article, the issue of costs of the new multilingualism in the EU institutions is put to the fore. As is suggested, the budget for translation services

²⁸ Due to the specific focus of our study (multilingualism in the EU institutions), we analyse in the following sub-sections 7.1-7.4 only the key articles on or references to the issues of multilingualism and languages in the context of EU institutions. Due to limitations of space, we do not analyse in-depth other language-related debates which were also put forth in the analysed corpus yet which did not relate to the EU-institutional linguistic landscapes. Those debates are, however, taken into consideration on the conclusions of the present report (see below).

(succinctly described as a ‘budgetary effort’ – ‘*l’effort budgétaire*’) is going to increase from 550 to 808 million Euro. However, crucially, that issue is not developed further but, quite surprisingly juxtaposed with a statement of the EU-Commission’s press-spokesman who clearly discards the cost related arguments and claims that:

Example 2:

‘Le respect des langues, c’est la base même du project Europeen’ (...) ‘Un peu plus de 2 euros par an et par habitant, c’est peu pour permettre à tous les Européens d’avoir accès, dans leu langue nationale, à tous les documents’

Importantly, in the further part of the article, new enhancements (e.g. prompters) used at the high-level (head-of-state) are also mentioned as clearly facilitating the negotiations in the new EU-institutions of 25 member states. Thus, however, again the very official level of the new linguistic functioning of the EU is described: that level at which it is clearly aimed at the symbolic representation of different languages and standpoints is, however, set to remain very different from the everyday multilingualism in the EU institutions (where, as mentioned before, the ‘core’ working languages will still be used).

However, it is also in the diversification at the symbolic, high-official level that problems in the functioning of the EU institutions are foreseen. Namely, as it is argued towards the end of the article, the new plurality of voices will eventually result in the fact that the key negotiations at the EU level (mainly between heads of states) will now be mainly undertaken in a bilateral way between the EU Council’s presidency and selected states. That, as is suggested, will result in a fact that ‘the intergovernmental approach’ (*‘l’approche intergouvernementale’*) will now become even more salient – rather than the (French-led) federal form of the Union.

7.2. Germany

The key German article linking multilingualism/languages and the EU institutions was published in the SZ on last day of examined reporting, i.e. on 05/05/2004²⁹. That article, describing mainly the EU-institutional translation service in the aftermath of the Enlargement was entitled ‘*Heilbutt Maltesisch? Seit der EU-Erweiterung rotieren die Übersetzer in Brüssel*’ and took ca. 20% of the page.

The article, which describes the post-Enlargement growth of the EU translation service from the perspective of an interviewed Danish translator/interpreter, argues that, with the Enlargement, the linguistic ‘complexity has again risen’ (‘nun ist die Komplexität nochmals gewachsen’) since, as is suggested:

Example 3:

‘Mussten die Dolmetscher bisher nur mit elf Amtssprachen jonglieren, so sind es seit Anfang der Woche knapp doppelt so viele. Neun Sprachen sind mit der Eu-Erweiterung am 1. Mai dazugekommen’

²⁹ Importantly, despite discussing languages/multilingualism in a broader context of the Enlargement, none of the articles published in FAZ related those issues to the EU institutions, while only several minor ‘statistical references’ on the growing number of EU official languages were provided.

Though that new linguistic situation is not described as a danger or problem, it is clearly seen in uneasy terms as ‘a challenge’ (*‘eine Herausforderung’*) which mainly boils down to the fact that not enough well-skilled new translators could be found in time for the Enlargement. As it is then suggested in the article, despite the very active search for new members of the translation service since 2003, the general ‘Marathon-like selection process’ (*‘den marathonartigen Bewerbungsverfahren’*) of the EU-specific ‘Concours’ resulted in the fact that, of all the Enlargement countries, only Poland could secure enough of translators/interpreters. In case of other, particularly small countries, among which Malta is mentioned as a key example, it is questioned whether it actually made any sense to make the languages of those countries into the EU official languages. Here an argument is provided that:

Example 4:

‘Und angesichts der nur 400 000 Einwohner auf Malta denkt sich mancher in der EU wie absurd es war der Hartnäckigkeit der Inselpolitiker nachzugeben und Maltesisch zur Amtssprache zu erklären, obwohl die meisten Bewohner der Mittelmeerinsel ohnehin Englisch sprechen’

In the quoted argument the representative character of the EU-multilingualism is being questioned in favour of one of the ‘core’ EU-15 working languages (English) – that questioning is crucially achieved by discarding the Maltese as not an element of Europe’s culture but rather as a political tool used by Maltese politicians (whose ‘toughness’ is overtly thematised) in the accession process. Importantly, while such view is rather elaborate, an unspecified quantifier is strategically used instead of the subject of the sentence: by means of the latter one only gets to know that unspecified (though seemingly numerous) ‘some in the EU’ think that it was ‘absurd’ to allow Maltese to become EU-official language.

Such arguments which succinctly oppose the new EU-institutional linguistic diversity are also provided later on in the article when a statement by the interviewed member of the translation service is quoted and interpreted:

Example 5:

‘Das schöne an Europa ist die Vielfalt – auch die der Sprachen – erklärt Andersen die offizielle Linie. Es klingt wenig enthusiastisch’

Here, the interpretation of the statement as ‘official line’ is crucial to see the actual standpoint of the newspaper vis-à-vis the new and nominalised ‘diversity’ of languages in the EU. Namely, by claiming that the translator’s statement ‘sounds little enthusiastic’, it is shown that the quote (which apparently remains per-se objective) was purposefully interpreted as a negative statement to prove the anti-diversity stance which by then becomes ever-clearer in the article.

That stance is later developed when (for actually no particular reason) the fact of weakening role of the French language in the EU institutions is discussed. As it is suggested, seemingly inline with the unspecified French media:

Example 6:

‘Durch den Beitritt der osteuropäischen Länder schwindet der Einfluss der Französischen (...). Andersen bestätigt die Sorge der Franzosen: “Von den Bewerbern aus dem Osten haben die meisten als erste Sprache Englisch gelernt, nicht Französisch’

Here, the factual evidence of English being widely used among the representatives of the Enlargement countries is, quite surprisingly, used as a sufficient proof for the fact that the French is ‘losing its influence’. Importantly, the French is hence portrayed as in a specific type of struggle with English, whereas, despite the fact that we are dealing with a German newspaper, the position of German language in the EU institutions is never brought to the fore or discussed (thus, German appears as if aside all of the linguistic struggles taking place in the institutions of the EU). On the contrary, the important role of English tends to be recurrently referred to as in the final part of the article devoted mainly to different translation-related anecdotes from the EU institutions. Within the latter it is for example suggested that English is frequently used in translation/interpreting as a type of a bridge language with different debates being first interpreted into English and then into the remaining languages.

7.3. UK

A news-report (with a strong element of a commentary) from the conservative British daily *The Telegraph* of May 1st, 2004 (i.e. the day of the Enlargement) seems to be the most representative for the British perspective on language and related issues in the context of the Enlargement.

The article, generally describing the history and the process of the Enlargement, is entitled ‘*Thatcher’s Bruges Vision becomes reality as Eastern bloc returns*’: the title alone is very symptomatic for the British typical ‘Euro-realism’ (Mautner, 2000) according to which the terms like ‘Europe’ or ‘European’ are avoided and, if presented at all, Europe-specific ideas and actions (such as the Enlargement) are ‘domesticated’ and shown from the strictly-national British perspective (therefore the EU Enlargement is rarely mentioned and is substituted by the nominal clauses like the ‘Thatcher’s vision’ in the title). The opening sentences of the article develop a similar stance, when it is argued that:

Example 7:

‘The prophetic words of Margaret Thatcher's Bruges speech become reality today when the European Union expands to the former Soviet bloc and Britain celebrates a triumph in foreign policy’.

Accordingly, it is argued that the EU Enlargement as such is the achievement of the (nationally-understood) British foreign policy (see Example 7), whereas in a specifically British conservative tone it is argued (see Example 8, below) that Enlarging the Union was in any case a far better idea than the (clearly discarded) process of deepening the European integration process (i.e. moving the EU towards a form of a federation, rather than a confederation of the independent nation-states).

Example 8:

‘Successive Conservative governments promoted the idea of "widening" Europe as a means of arresting the "deepening" of the EU’

The bulk of the article (693 words of length) focuses on the historical dimensions of the Enlargement and on different (geo-)political aspects of that process: the fact that several of the new EU-member states share British ideas on European integration (as shown in the then recent struggle over the 2003 Iraq invasion) are highlighted in particular:

Example 9:

‘The Prime Minister maintains that the new members "agree with the British vision of Europe, they are pro-American and the transatlantic alliance, they are pro-economic reform and they are in favour of the nation state".’

It is within that set of exceptionally British-specific arguments (and the idea that, in general, there exists a set of struggles over the idea and shape of the European integration within the EU itself) that the language-related issues are embedded. Those issues are referred to in the last two paragraphs of the article (the former of altogether only 63 words, ca. 10% of the analysed news-report) within the argument which implicitly presents the British vision of Europe as prevailing over different visions, represented in this case by the French. As it is stated:

Example 10:

‘The change of atmosphere in Brussels is plain for anyone to see - or hear - as English supplants French as the new lingua franca’.

In the quoted statement (see Example 4), it is stated (i.e. treated as a fact, not debated) that English (predicated later on in a positive way as ‘the new lingua franca’) is already well on its way in ‘supplanting’ French (seemingly the previous ‘lingua franca’, at least of the EU). The strategic use of the verb ‘to supplant’ (meaning ‘replacing’, but also ‘eliminating’ / ‘suppressing’) is very symptomatic here: it shows that some struggle might have existed between various languages and their functioning within EU institutions (i.e. ‘in Brussels’). However, at present, it appears that ‘the struggle’ has been resolved (viz. it ‘is plain for everyone to see’) and that English has in the meantime become the ‘de facto’ lingua franca of the Enlarged Europe/EU.

That argument goes on and is particularly visible in the following, closing paragraph of the article which recontextualises that struggle in an anecdotal way:

Example 11:

‘At one European summit with applicant states, M Chirac was visibly irritated by the number of leaders speaking in English. When the EU Commission President also replied in English, Mr Chirac told him: "Langue maternelle!" [Speak in your mother tongue].’

In the paragraph, the once-active language-ideological struggle is thematised, although, it is presented as a situation which has long been resolved in favour of

English. The social actors are positioned in this discourse to support those claims: the majority of those presented and referred to (i.e. the representatives of the ‘applicant states’ as well as ‘the EU Commission President’ – viz. those who are both numerous and in power) does in fact speak English without even spotting a need to give any more thought about why/what for, etc. On the other hand, those willing to revive the struggle (the clearly-solitaire French President nominalised as ‘M Chirac’) are put on, as if, a lost position, and their subsequent pleas for ‘*langue maternelle*’ are ridiculed.

In sum, the article clearly favours the linguistic situation within which the EU is becoming an exact mirror of the (English-speaking, largely-monolingual) Britain. For that purpose, references to English as ‘the new lingua franca’ are present to highlight that the incoming new EU-member states are not only speaking English (like Britain and other key EU politicians) but that their larger views and conceptions of the European integration accord with the British visions. Thus, the language ideological debate (which is present, though purposefully marginalised and eventually treated as past and not vivid anymore) is clearly mitigated in the article and presented as irrelevant in face of the presupposed facts: English is by now, the *de facto* language of the enlarging EU and that should not be questioned.

7.4. Poland

A significantly different picture of the language-ideological debates within the EU appears from a large commentary published in the Polish key liberal daily *Gazeta Wyborcza* on May 5th, 2004 (four days after the official date of the Enlargement). In the article entitled ‘*Unijna Wierza Babel*’ (‘The Union’s Babel Tower’) and dealing with the linguistic situation within the EU institutions, a set of language-based struggles is described as currently ongoing in the European Union. Interestingly, unlike in the British case (see above), the language-related issues are dealt with throughout the entire article (one-page-size) and are not only marginalised to selected (closing) paragraphs or parts of the text.

The article opens up with a clear macro-proposition which summarises its ‘message’:

Example 12:

‘The Union’s Babel Tower speaking with eleven languages has now been enlarged by nine further tongues, though the Enlargement strengthened the position of English. The war for linguistic primate is not very likely, although the French-German resistance against the domination of English is taking ever-better organised forms’

The opening statement alone (see Example 12) is very symptomatic: using several conceptual metaphors ‘of war’ - mostly pertaining to different forms of combating like ‘war’, ‘resistance’, ‘positions’, but also to the description of the EU as a conflicted ‘Babel Tower’) it portrays the European Union (and its institutions) as an arena of an ongoing (not past) struggle over which languages should eventually take primate within the EU. And, while it is surely acknowledged that the position of English (as argued later on in the article - very widely-spoken among the representatives of the Enlargement countries) as the key means of communication

within the EU will be hard to underestimate, it is shown that there are also different (though very few and selected) languages which are at least trying to regain their ground within the EU institutions.

Among the languages which are ‘combating’ the English dominance in the EU, French comes to the fore as the main opponent – as is suggested in the following statement:

Example 13:

A few months ago French parliamentarians in the National Assembly have unanimously passed a resolution against “the hegemony of the English language” in the Union.

However, the French resolution against English (described later on as ‘waving the finger only’) has by far been ‘shelved’ and it only evaded in the fact that all French EU officials be obliged to use ‘French only’ within their work in the Union’s institutions. Such a plea is later on argued against in the article since the communication within the EU institutions would be significantly hindered if all of the EU officials would start to speak in their native languages (‘Germans and Austrians would start to speak in the Union’s for a in German only, Spaniards only in Spanish’, etc.).

Later on, different ways of resolving the language-related struggles and ‘wars’ within the EU institutions are described. Hence, an idea of speaking obligatorily in foreign languages is first referred to as is the conception of using a selected language (e.g. English) as means of communication. Here, it is argued that choosing English as a *lingua franca* was indeed approached as an ‘undemocratic heresy’, while it is however at the same time acknowledged that what counts is not the fact that only 16% of the EU citizens are native speakers of English but that almost one third of the Union’s citizens can freely communicate in that language. However, it is also argued that, in the EU-context, the English-only option does give an immense power to its native speakers, since they are then able to use their thorough native-like knowledge of language to shape EU laws and use minute details thereof in their favour.

In the following part of the article the history of the linguistic struggles in the Union is presented: here it is argued that with consecutive enlargements of the Union (since 1973 when the UK joined the EU and though the enlargement of 1995 when ‘English-skilful Swedes and Finns joined in’) the position of French has been gradually decreasing within EU institutions (whilst ‘May 1st, 2004 has pushed French even closer to the margin’):

Example 14:

‘The numbers speak for themselves: in the beginning of the 1980’s more than half of the EU documents was created in French, while that number dropped to only thirty percent in the 1990’s. (...). The Moliere’s language [MK: French] dominated in Europe’s most famous pressroom – in Breydel where more than hundred journalists accredited by the European Commission gather everyday at noon. It came as a great shock when English was introduced in the pressroom in the second half of the 1990’s’

However, it is not only French (referred to metaphorically as ‘Moliere’s language’) which remains in a state of struggle for its role within the EU institutions. As the article also suggests, it is also ‘Goethe’s language’ (viz. German) that fights to regain its importance, particularly vis-à-vis the ever-more powerful ‘language of Shakespeare’ (viz. English): the German language is struggling to remain in the position of the Union’s third official language; as is suggested despite the fact of being third, as well as a language with the largest number of native speakers throughout Europe and in the EU, German is clearly losing ground:

Example 15:

‘Only 3 percent of correspondence between the Union’s officials and the member states and only 1 percent of correspondence between the European Commission and other institutions is conducted in German’

But, as is later portrayed, the German motivation to regain their language’s role in the EU institutions is not dictated by ideological or national-identity reasons (as was suggested with reference to the French actions described above), but has some strictly practical implications. Namely, by defending their language,

Example 16:

‘Germans are not that much concerned with the issues of prestige as they are with job opportunities in the Union’s institutions, access to information and the opportunities in European Union funded public tenders’

Finally, in its closing, the article suggests that the language-related struggles within the EU remain (as for now) unresolved, yet, as it is acknowledged

Example 17:

‘The Union is still working within its old rule, yet one cannot exclude the possibility that the enlarged Union will have to do something with its Babel tower’

Thus, by referring elliptically once again to the EU as a metaphorical ‘Babel tower’ (as is the case in the title of the piece and in its opening sentence, see above), the ongoing language struggle within the EU institutions is recognised as is the fact that, in the future (with this and the forthcoming enlargement/s), the slowly exhausting model of language policies for the EU institutions will need to be changed.

Illustrating our previous claim on ‘selective/hegemonic multilingualism’ in the EU institutions, the article clearly portrays the language-ideological debates taking place in the EU as limited to a set of core languages (English, French and German) which are represented/defended within the EU by their powerful ‘representative’ countries (respectively: UK, France and Germany). Other languages are rarely, if at all, portrayed as elements of struggle since, implicitly, those who are set to represent them (viz. respective countries) are not considered to be powerful enough to promote their languages. And, while languages (other from the ‘core group’) such as Spanish or Italian are mentioned occasionally, the languages of the ‘2004 Enlargement Countries’ are never thematised or referred to and, accordingly, their role (as well as that of the other non-core languages) is only limited to those of *quasi* bystanders in the ongoing EU-language-ideological debates.

8. Conclusions

8.1. Multilingualism between 'Europe/EU-rope' and the EU Institutions

As we could see in the provided analyses, despite their clear political salience and controversy, the issues of languages and multilingualism were not put to the fore of the press reporting on the 2004 EU Enlargement in selected European countries. In particular, the 'new' linguistic diversity and multilingualism of the EU institutions were particularly silenced and discussed very rarely in a very limited set of articles and references. That, in turn, proves *the very low degree of politicisation of the issues of languages and multilingualism in the context of the EU-institutions*: that low politicisation results in a fact that languages, particularly in the context of the EU-institutional arrangements, are still approached in a very marginal and mechanistic ways (as, e.g., just means of translation/interpretation of debates on other, more crucial issues) and are still set to make place for other debates pertaining to politics, economy, education and other issues to which languages/multilingualism are only accidentally attached. That, we claim, is in turn very influential on the general perception of languages and multilingualism in the analysed national public spheres: as we could see, those public spheres are rarely interested in language-related issues and therefore the generally low public perception of the salience of languages in the context of the EU and its recent Enlargement(s) might clearly be described as rooted in the limited degree of newsworthiness of ascribed to those issues by the national media.

Despite that, we have observed that, in a broad perspective, the analysed press reporting of the 2004 EU Enlargement generally acknowledges that the latter is of prime influence to the growth of the generally-perceived diversity of the 'cultural space' of the European Union. That diversity, as has been frequently described (mainly, though, by means of the scarce and accidental references described before) is also reinforced by the growth of the linguistic capital of the EU after the Enlargement: as we could establish, many of the analysed newspapers saw the EU Enlargement as a process in which many new languages join the EU while thus the cultural diversity of the Union is increasing. However, while the growth of the number of languages in the EU was perceived as a crucial and positive development in a broader European perspective, that diversity clearly was not transferred onto the level of the focal EU institutions, in the context of which any further diversification of official/working languages was seen as an obstacle, perhaps as a 'challenge', but never as a positive development or an asset/advantage.

Accordingly, our newspaper analysis shows an *immense discrepancy which exists between, on the one hand, descriptions of languages/multilingualism as the positive (though clearly cultural, folklore-like) elements of the European cultural space and, on the other hand, the rather negative perception of the increased multilingualism of the EU institutions*. As we claim, that discrepancy is neither arbitrary nor accidental: while 'allowing' for linguistic diversity (and the resulting multiplicity of visions and ideas of Europe) is permitted in the vaguely-defined, broad area of the European space, it is not allowed in the area of EU-institutions (and politics) where the actual political interests/visions are realised and negotiated. Thus, we argue, our analysis also shows that nationally-driven public spheres approached

here through the media do not allow for the ‘mirroring’ of Europe’s (also linguistic) diversity in the communicative and political space of the EU institutions. That is, in turn, influential on the fact that the broad European public does not see the EU institutions as inherently multilingual (i.e. not as actually mirroring the linguistically ever-more diverse EU-ropes outside Brussels) since the media does not forge any public-wide expectations towards linguistic and otherwise-understood (e.g. political) diversity within the EU institutions. Here, importantly, we see a strategic role of the media: the latter clearly highlight the role of the Enlargement as a crucial socio-political change (in ‘Europe’) and foster public expectations towards the growing diversity of the European space. On the other hand, however, the media clearly silence down the role of the 2004 Enlargement as a crucial moment of political-institutional change in the EU institutions, where, as said, old status quo is still eagerly and actively defended and any crucial change is still prevented.

8.2. Key Identified Language Ideologies

The aforementioned ‘Europe vs. EU discrepancy’ is crucially reflected in the general picture of *diverse language ideologies* which, as we have shown in our qualitative analyses, were, as hypothesised, inscribed into several *language-ideological debates*. On the one hand, within the broader level of Europe / European space, where, as said, languages were perceived in a rather positive way, language ideologies were scarce and, if considered as such, they were clearly favouring the *de-facto multilingualism*. Within the latter, ‘positive’ language ideology, plurality of languages within European space (not EU-institutions) was considered as an asset since, as such, it emphasised the unique richness of the cultural space of the EU member states. Importantly, however, that ideology was not actually as much constructed as merely represented in the analysed instances of discourse: as we have seen, languages were only among ‘primordial features’ of the enlarging and ever-more diverse EU-ropes and were just ‘described’ rather than actually argued for.

Secondly, still within the broad area of Europe, we have seen that, if thematised, some language ideologies pertained to selected national landscapes and the role of particular languages therein. Here, a uniquely peculiar (though fairly traditional) ideology of *nationalistic monolingualism* came to the fore in the Polish conservative press, which, while clearly opposing the EU in general and its Enlargement in particular, saw the former and the latter as dangers to Polish culture and to its core element, i.e. the Polish language. Importantly, the thus understood Polish culture was defined in a very nationalistic and homogenous way while its core element, i.e. the Polish language was portrayed as endangered mainly by the ‘foreign forces’ understood as, e.g. elements of other languages penetrating into Polish or also as the political actions such as, e.g., Council of Europe which ‘forces’ Poland to sign/ratify its Charter of Minority Languages. However, crucially, the said monolingual language ideology was not encountered in any other national settings where, unlike in Poland, both liberal and conservative press acknowledged (historical/current) importance of the EU enlargement, albeit with nationally-specific differences. Furthermore, since rooted in the overt opposition to the idea of any transnational European integration as such, that ‘nationalistic’ ideology also could not be considered as viable for different conceptions of multilingualism in the EU institutions.

On the other hand, apart from the rather weak set of monolingual arguments in favour of English as the ‘anyway’ key language used in the EU and by the Enlargement countries (presented, though very scarcely, in the British press)³⁰, the most salient ideological stance which was elaborated and argued for in the context of the EU institutions was the one of the previously hypothesised *hegemonic multilingualism*. That ideology, viz. the key finding of our research, was mainly encountered in different instances of liberal press (in both then EU Countries of France and Germany and in the then accession state of Poland) clearly reflected the pre-Enlargement linguistic status quo of the EU – with the key ‘working languages’ of English, German and French – which, as was frequently suggested, should also persist in the aftermath of the big socio-political change marked by May 1st, 2004. Importantly, that ideology, which despite forging more than one language (but actually several languages) was very far from the actual multilingual stance that would allow for all languages of the EU member states to be fully represented in the EU institutions and their everyday functioning. On the contrary, while it was acknowledged within various displays of the hegemonic multilingualism that several languages of the broader EU should be given some symbolic status (i.e. as the Union’s ‘official languages’), it was even more strongly argued that only selected ‘core’ languages will (and should) remain the de-facto ‘working languages’ used in everyday functioning of the political organism of the EU institutions.

At the level of discourse, *the hegemonic multilingualism ideology was displayed in a vast array of argumentative strategies* which saw multilingualism in the EU institutions in the following ways:

- (a) the (eventual) post-2004-EU-Enlargement growth of the linguistic diversity of the EU institutions is considered as only a temporary, symbolic anomaly which, however, must be tackled (and the old order of key ‘core’ languages soon re-instantiated) if the EU is to avoid an unspecified danger of collapsing or coming to a ‘stall’ (i.e. becoming a ‘Babel Tower’)
- (b) the (eventual) post-2004-EU-Enlargement growth of the linguistic diversity of the EU institutions adds up to the anyway ongoing combat-like language-related ‘wars’ and struggles present before the Enlargement,
- (c) the (eventual) post-2004-EU-Enlargement growth of the linguistic diversity of the EU institutions is an obstacle to the ‘effectiveness’ of the EU-institutional arrangements (mainly due to, e.g., the growth of the translation/interpreting service),
- (d) the (eventual) post-2004-EU-Enlargement growth of the linguistic diversity of the EU institutions will come at a very high cost portrayed as ‘burden’ and as a ‘budgetary effort’,
- (e) the (eventual) post-2004-EU-Enlargement growth of the linguistic diversity of the EU institutions is a clear obstacle to realising the pre-Enlargement grand visions of the European integration (i.e. federalism, intergovernmentalism, etc.) forged by the traditional key power-players of the EU-politics (specifically: France, Germany and the UK)

³⁰ That ideology might surely be considered as the closest to ‘English as a Lingua Franca’ of the EU. However, due to the very low degree of implicitness of the representation of that ideology in the equally very modest British corpus, the said ideology cannot be considered here as viable as the other, clearly-displayed ideologies such as, e.g. the hegemonic multilingualism, etc.

- (f) the (eventual) post-2004-EU-Enlargement growth of the linguistic diversity of the EU institutions is a danger to the key political and economic interests of the key power-players.

Particularly the last two of the enumerated strategies ('e' and 'f') highlight the actual strategic and power-political motivations behind the ideology of hegemonic multilingualism. Namely, it is the actual defence and re-instatement of the pre-enlargement key roles of the EU-15 power players that is defended by that ideology. On the other hand, other arguments (cf. 'a' to 'd', above) are only serving as strategies which help legitimising the power positions and (however persuasively and subtly) tackling/counteracting the new diversity which was set to arrive within EU institutions in the aftermath of the Enlargement.

A final, though very important aspect of the ideology of the hegemonic multilingualism in the EU institutions is the fact that the languages defended by that ideology (viz. English, German and French) do not form a congruent coalition. On the contrary, as those languages are only 'surface-level' displays of power-political struggles which are taking place between Germany, France and the UK, it is also that the said languages are constantly portrayed in the state of contradiction. Thus, as we have frequently seen in the analysed texts, English (as the de-facto most-widely spoken/used language in the EU institutions) is clearly being combated by the defenders of French and German (as shown in, e.g. Polish and German liberal press), while, almost equally, it is recognised that despite its high ambitions and periods when it was winning ground (e.g. during 1990's in the then French-led European Commission – as shown in the Polish GW) the French language is currently on the losing position.

While such *state of 'permanent contradiction' of the core languages of hegemonic multilingualism* proves yet again our previous remarks on the actual power-political roots of the struggle which is displayed by that language ideology, it also points to the actual array of national interests hidden behind. For example, as we could see the national German interests were clearly displayed in the German liberal press which talked about French 'losing ground' and the English being ever more widely-used (while German was, seemingly on purpose, never talked about). Similarly, the French liberal LM talked about the 'core languages' (crucially including French) 'retaining' key role in the EU institutions despite the arrival of the new languages within the Union. Even more importantly, those core-EU positions were not tackled in the Enlargement countries, but were actually reproduced in the latter. Namely, as we have seen, the Polish liberal press clearly accepted the status-quo of the hegemonic multilingualism (and the key role of English, German and French), rather than, e.g., promoting the increase of the role of Polish (which was actually never mentioned by the Polish press in the context of the EU-institutions). Here, we could observe a specifically powerful role of the ideology of hegemonic multilingualism: the latter was not negotiated or tackled in the Enlargement states but was actually accepted as the element of the EU-institutional reality to which new EU-member states must adjust (by, e.g., gaining mastery in one of the 'core' languages rather than forging their national languages at the EU level). Such situation is, we argue, yet another display of the process of forcing pre-Enlargement visions of EU-15 onto the 2004

Enlargement states, which, as we have argued elsewhere³¹, were allowed (very) little political agency in the Enlargement process which we have approached in the present case from the language-ideological perspectives.

³¹ Cf. Krzyzanowski and Oberhuber (2007), Wodak and Weiss (2004).

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Annex I: Further Research Agenda within WP2 / Task 2.3. (Partner10: LANCS)

Detailed Research Plan for the period May 2007 – March 2008 (Months 8-18)

- May 2007: Final works on Deliverable D 2.1. (Working Paper) by:
 - (a) performing final stratification of the final version of corpus and providing a description of corpora
 - (b) final analysis of text contents and final in-depth analysis of the empirical material
 - (c) defining key findings and drawing up conclusions from the Pilot Study

- June 2007 – January 2008: EU Documents – Initial Data Collection & Sample Analysis
 - (a) EU Documents on Multilingualism and Language-Related Issues – Deductive Search → collection of the key language-related documents in the history of European integration (support: Noël Muylle, Advisory board; most likely source: European Union Historical Archive, EUI Florence), (b) other key EU documents of recent years known to the broad public and to the academic community (incl. the 2003 Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights, etc.).
 - (b) Sample analysis of selected EU Documents on Multilingualism and Language-Related Issues (e.g. in-depth discourse analysis of one/two documents per decade to establish key tendencies and transformation/change, testing and defining analytical categories vis-à-vis the previous pilot study and prior to the large-scale analysis of the entire corpus of documents, contextualisation)

- February – March/April 2008: Preparation of the Deliverable D2.2. (Draft Report) for the Spring 2008 consortium meeting

General Research Plan for the period May 2008 – September 2011 (Months 18-60)

Step I: Establishing the Corpus (Completion)

1. EU Documents on Multilingualism and Language-Related Issues – Inductive Search → identifying all documents from the last 50 years (since the 1957 Treaty of Rome establishing the ECSC) found in key data-bases of the European Union (e.g. the Official Journal of the European Communities) under the keywords ‘multilingualism’ (incl. variations of multilingual, etc.) → supplementing the previous ‘deductive search’
2. Systematisation of the entire Corpus of EU Documents on Multilingualism and Language-Related Issues → systematisation of documents into various ‘strands of the corpus’ according to different objective variables which might include: institutions in which they originate, authors, events they were prepared for, other documents they refer to, etc., possible drawing of different sets of variables (e.g. temporal axis vs.)
3. Contextualisation → defining key institutional and political macro- and mezzo-contexts and intertextual micro-contexts (e.g. document-chains) in which multilingualism has been debated within the EU-institutions within the period of investigation.
4. Literature → updating lists of readings and locating the research within the current literature on the key/neighbouring topics – in order to update on theory and methodology prior to further analyses

Step II: Analysis – Phase One

5. Quantifying the corpus (in general and within its strands identified in ‘3’, above; using corpus linguistic and other soft ware tools such as ATLAS-ti) according to:
 - authors (individual/collective)
 - key topics (themes) and sub-topics
 - key actors referred to in the texts

- key events and actions/activities described or planned in/through the text
6. Drawing conclusions from steps I & II of the Analysis by relating its outcomes (cf. ‘5’) to the previously-undertaken contextualisation (cf. ‘4’) and the previous pilot studies
 7. Scaling down the corpus for Step III (cf. below) by, e.g., identifying selected strands of the corpus to be analysed further, identifying texts/elements of the texts to be examined, etc.

Step III: Analysis

8. Initial comparison between the Pilot Study on ‘Multilingual European Institutions and the Discourse on the EU Enlargement in the National Public Spheres’ and the general features of the analysed material.
9. Performing in-depth analysis of the selected material with use of different methods specific for the Critical Discourse Analysis in general and its ‘Discourse-Historical’ tradition in particular, with hindsight to:
 - defining a catalogue of key arguments (topoi) which are used to argue for or against ‘multilingualism’ together with supporting strategies of self- and other-presentation, other discursive strategies as well as other means of linguistic realisation
 - defining various forms of representing social, political and institutional (individual and collective) actors who are portrayed in the texts as acting in favour or against ‘multilingualism’
 - other aims (t.b.d. according to the previous stages of research)

Step IV: Conclusions and Reflection Process

10. Putting together results of the in-depth analysis by drawing different ‘semantic fields’ surrounding the concept of multilingualism in different contexts and thus summarising key arguments in favour and against multilingualism in the EU-institutional discourse of recent years

11. Putting together the general results of the study and drawing up general conclusions from the research.