

**Disentangling the dynamic relationships between party performance, issue proximity
and party attachment**

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Abstract

Two rival models of issue voting are policy performance and policy proximity. While these are usually treated as distinct assessments made by voters, evaluations of performance and of proximity may in fact be related. Moreover, both assessments may shape and be shaped by partisanship, so the relationship between performance and proximity cannot be examined without taking party attachment into account. Given the relative ease of assessing performance, we argue that performance and partisanship are more closely integrated than proximity and partisanship. We examine the dynamic relationships between performance assessments, proximity perceptions and partisanship using five waves of the 2005 to 2010 BES internet panel survey. Using an autoregressive cross-lagged model, we test multiple specifications using a variety of different measures for each attitude. Our results confirm our expectations, and these findings have important implications for how we understand and study issue voting as well as the phenomenon of partisanship.

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Introduction

Performance and positions are often suggested as alternative approaches to understanding issue-based electoral choices. Roughly, voter decision-making is portrayed in two simple ways. When choosing based on performance, voters assess how well a government party has managed key political problems and punish or reward it accordingly. When choosing based on positions, they evaluate how closely the policy preferences of a party match their own. These decision-making processes apply to different types of issues: voters are said to assess performance on valence issues, that is, matters that all voters agree on (such as low unemployment and a high-quality education system), while ideological proximity is assessed on position issues, which are topics where parties disagree about policies (such as tax rates or gay marriage).

Thus, performance and proximity are generally seen as separate and distinct aspects of voters' electoral decision-making. In this paper, we challenge this view by considering how performance and position evaluations are related. It is likely that views on party performance and party positions influence each other. So, individuals may believe a party is close to them in terms of policies if they think that the party has performed well, and vice versa. This may occur because there are in fact intrinsic, logical links between performance and position. Thus, it makes sense to think a party has performed well if it has implemented policies one favours, and to think it has performed badly if it has introduced measures one disagrees with (Wagner and Zeglovits 2012). Moreover, even if there are no logical links between performance and position, voters may use one evaluation as a heuristic to assess parties on other aspects (Sanders et al. 2011).

In this paper, we also argue that both aspects of issue-based assessments share a common feature: they are strongly affected by partisanship. This is because party attachment is often an enduring social identity that shapes issue attitudes instead of being shaped by them (Campbell et al. 1960, Highton and Kam 2011, Miller and Shanks 1996). Partisans are likely

to reach performance and positional assessments that fit their prior party attachment (Bartels 2002, Evans and Anderson 2004, Goren 2005, Highton and Kam 2011). However, since performance assessments are easier to reach than positional assessments (Lenz 2012, Sanders et al. 2011), we expect these to be even more strongly affected by partisan bias. Yet we also know that partisanship itself can be shaped by issue attitudes (Achen 1992, Fiorina 1981, Highton and Kam 2011). Given the ease of making performance evaluations, we suggest that these views are also more likely to affect levels of partisanship than proximity assessments.

We study the interrelationship of issue-specific party performance, issue-specific party proximity and party attachment using five waves of the 2005 to 2010 British Election Study internet panel. This long-term panel is unique as many of its waves include assessments of party performance and of party proximity on the issue of the economy. The economy is a suitable issue as it has both clear positional and performance aspects. The BES panel also includes two measures of party attachment (party affect and party identification). The main model we estimate is an autoregressive cross-lagged model focused on assessments of the (then) governing Labour party. Where appropriate, we also discuss subgroup differences in the effects of each measure as well as supplemental analyses with alternative measures of each variable.

Our findings are as follows. First, perceptions of performance and proximity are related, but robustly only in one direction: perceptions of ideological closeness lead voters to rate a party's performance more highly. Second, partisanship shapes perceptions of both performance and proximity strongly, but the effects on performance assessments are particularly striking. Yet, third, performance assessments shape partisanship to a more meaningful degree than perceptions of proximity. That is, performance assessments are more closely tied to partisanship, in both directions of causation.

These results are important because they further our understanding of the place of issue-based assessments in political behaviour. Performance and positional assessments are

both important ways in which voters can evaluate parties relative to issues, and these two assessments are not unrelated. However, performance assessments appear to be more central to political behaviour than proximity, as evidenced by its tighter relationship with partisanship. In this way, this paper contributes to the long-running debate on whether and how partisanship shapes and is shaped by issue orientations by moving to a broader understanding of issue-based assessments. This paper also contributes to the literature on accountability as we show whether and how voters' assessments of party performance shape partisanship. Our finding that partisanship shapes issue-based assessments more than vice versa thus casts further doubt on the mechanism meant to ensure democratic accountability through elections (Gaines et al. 2007, Marsh and Tilley 2010). It also underlines the endogeneity of issue opinions and partisanship, a key challenge in explaining vote choice (Evans and Chzhen 2011).

This paper is structured as follows. First, we outline how assessments of party performance and issue proximity may be related. Then, we consider how these assessments may shape and be shaped by partisanship. Then, we describe the data and the statistical model. After presenting the results of the model, we conclude by considering the implications of our findings.

Party performance and issue proximity

Issues are central to theories of political competition. From a rational-choice, issue-voting perspective on electoral choice, voters examine and evaluate the policy record and proposals of the parties competing (Downs 1957, Enelow and Hinich 1984, Fiorina 1981). In this approach, the process of decision-making among voters is therefore guided by calculations of potential utility. There would be important democratic advantages if citizens chose parties in this ways. From the perspective of democratic representation, citizens would elect parties and governments in order to implement certain policy programmes (Downs 1957). From the

perspective of accountability, governments would be punished if they failed to deliver and perform (Fiorina 1981).

Yet when it comes to how parties are assessed relative to issues, it is important to note that there are distinct ways in which such assessments can be made. The first, and most well-known, way of deciding whether to support a party is to consider its policy preferences, i.e. its position. This, combined with the preferences of the voter, enables citizens to assess the policy distance between themselves and the different parties competing. The smaller the distance, the more utility a party would bring a citizen if it were elected to run the country. This conception of issues underlies the Downsian theory of party competition (Downs 1957).

Yet there are other ways in which citizens can assess parties relative to issues, for example whether it talks about the issue a lot and appears to care about it. In this paper, we focus on party performance on a specific issue. Citizens can thus evaluate whether the party has performed well on a given issue and has tackled key problems well (Belluci 2006, Green and Jennings 2012a,b, Walgrave et al. 2012). Such an assessment can be made most easily about governing parties, since they can be seen as responsible for developments occurring during their time in office (Wagner and Zeglovits 2012). Citizens can also try to assess whether a party would be successful at bringing about the policies it proposes and whether it has the necessary expertise and qualifications to do so. Party performance, whether retro- or prospective, has been shown to be an important consideration for voters (e.g., Belluci 2006, Fiorina 1981, Fournier et al. 2003, Green and Jennings 2012a, b, Lenz 2012, Stokes 1963).

Positional distance and performance are often seen as distinct assessments (e.g. Lenz 2012). This is because they are taken to refer to different types of issues, namely position and valence/performance issues (Stokes 1963). While individuals compare their own views to those of parties on position issues, they consider the performance of parties on valence/performance issues. In the latter type of issue, there are no distinct positions, as

parties and voters agree; examples are low unemployment, low crime rates or environmental protection.

The distinction between positional and performance assessments has led to several strong conclusions about voter decision-making. For example, the valence model of vote choice, proposed by Clarke et al. (2004, 2009) and Sanders et al. (2011) as an alternative to the traditional model, combines leader evaluations, party identification and performance indicators, and a series of tests indicate that this composite model clearly outperforms positional considerations (though see Evans and Chzhen 2011 for a critique). One of its assumptions is that assessments of performance are separate from positional assessments and occur on different types of issues. Similarly, Lenz (2012) has recently found that issue voting occurs on performance issues and not on positional issues.

Despite these claims, it is likely that performance and positional assessments are related. A first way in which this may occur is if individuals use certain issue attitudes (e.g. performance) as heuristics to assess other aspects of issues (e.g. policy proximity). This argument is made by Sanders et al. (2011), who state: ‘After performing possibly ‘rough and ready’ spatial calculations, voters sensibly economize by using them as heuristic devices when assessing the performance of competing parties....These cueing properties of spatial calculations have the potential to make them important sources of valence judgements.’ (Sanders et al. 2011: 301). They also find empirically that greater issue proximity leads to more positive valence assessments. Though the valence model encompasses more than just performance, Sanders et al.’s (2011) logic can clearly be applied to the connection between proximity and performance. Thus, it is likely that positional distance is used as a heuristic guide to assess past performance (Stubager and Slothuus 2012, Wagner and Zeglovits 2012).

Yet the relationship between performance and proximity assessments may be based on more than heuristics. Instead, there is also arguably a logical link between the two types of issue attitude. For one, the same issue area may have both performance and positional aspects

to it (Alt, 1979). Ellis and Stimson (2012: 15) provide a good example: we might assess parties on their performance in bringing about a good education system, there may nevertheless be debate about ‘whether government should spend more or less money in pursuit of good education, or whether greater emphasis should be place on federal or local governments in the structuring of the educational system’. The economy can also be evaluated in terms of performance, for example through the universally endorsed goals of low inflation and low unemployment, but it can also be considered in terms of positions, for example support for the single European currency or for extensive unemployment protection and benefits. Often, performance issues imply consensus on the ends to be achieved, within that consensus there may be positional disagreement on the means to achieve that end (Robertson, 1976, Alt, 1979). Our approval of the performance in terms of achieving ends may therefore be linked to policy preferences in terms of the means employed. For example, if I am in favour of increased tuition fees for higher education, then I would believe that a party performed well on that issue if it in fact increased those fees; I would also believe that it had performed badly if it lowered fees. As a result, there may also be an important conceptual connection between position and performance (Wagner and Zeglovits 2012). Our first hypothesis is therefore:

H1: Perceptions of issue proximity positively influence performance assessments (*proximity* → *performance hypothesis*).

There is therefore good reason to expect performance assessments do depend on judgements of policy proximity; but do perceptions of issue proximity also depend on performance evaluations? Even Sanders et al. (2011) do not consider whether spatial judgements are influenced by valence assessments. However, it may be that such an effect exists. If an individual believes that a party has performed well on an issue, then he or she may also see the party as less distant in terms of its position. The mechanism here could be

one based on heuristics and decision-making shortcuts. Indeed, performance may be more attractive as a heuristic for proximity than vice versa since performance is the easier assessment in terms of familiarity and cognitive effort (Lenz 2012: 11). To assess performance, it is enough for citizens to decide whether a party has dealt with an issue well, or even whether the situation has improved in the past years (Fiorina 1981). To assess proximity, individuals need to know their own position and that of the party in quite some detail (Campbell et al. 1960, Lenz 2012). Performance, unlike issue proximity, may therefore be a particular accessible consideration, especially for unsophisticated voters (Clarke et al. 2004, 2009, Lenz 2012).² Our second hypothesis is therefore:

H2: Better performance assessments positively influence perceptions of issue proximity (*performance* → *proximity hypothesis*).

Partisanship, Proximity and Performance

Examining the mutual influence of positional and performance assessments is complicated by one important factor: partisanship. Since Campbell et al. (1960), partisanship has been conceived of as a highly stable social identity (see also Green and Palmquist 1990, Greene 2002) that exerts a strong influence on issue opinions. So, partisan attachment may influence perceptions of both party positions and party performance. Any examination of positions and performance must therefore take partisanship into account.

What is partisanship? Also known as party attachment or party identification, it describes a psychological group orientation towards a political party, akin to religious identity (Campbell et al. 1960, Highton and Kam 2003, Green et al. 2002, Miller and Shanks 1996). For these scholars, partisanship is thus in itself an important political phenomenon. Importantly,

² In addition to performance being the easier assessment, voters may of course also quite sensibly believe that bringing about desirable goals indicates that the party is likely to share their issue positions.

partisanship is not necessarily developed based on issue preferences. Instead, party identification 'is an object in its own right, not just a synecdoche for social structure or ideology' (Johnston 2006: 331). Once they form a party attachment, individuals tend to remain loyal to their party. This means that the over-time stability of partisanship is high (Converse and Pierce 1985, Green and Palmquist 1990). Indeed, it is argued to be more stable than issue opinions (Converse 1964, Miller and Shanks 1996). Overall, as an enduring and stable identity, partisanship is key to understanding political behaviour. As stated by Converse (1964, cited in Highton and Kam 2011): 'The party and the affect toward it are more central within the political belief systems of the mass public than are the policy ends that the parties are destined to pursue.'

To these scholars, the strength of party identification means that issue opinions are often shaped by partisanship. Since Berelson et al. (1954), researchers have found that citizens formulate and adjust their views on specific issues to match those of the party they identify with and are attached to. In other words, issues are approached and understood via the 'perceptual screen' (Campbell et al. 1960) created by party identification (Miller and Shanks 1996, Zaller 1992). The biasing effect of party identification extends to core political values (Goren 2005) and a variety of specific issue opinions (Carsey and Layman 2006, Dancey and Goren 2010, Evans and Andersen 2004, Highton and Kam 2011, Layman and Carsey 2002, 2006). So, citizens' views on different issues may be shaped by their party attachment.

The biasing effect of partisanship may be particularly strong when it comes to individuals' assessment of how similar the position of a party is to their own preferences. As described by Berelson et al. (1954: 220, cited in Evans and Anderson 2004): 'In almost every instance, respondents perceive their candidate's stand on the issues as similar to their own and the opponent's stand as dissimilar – whatever their own position'. In later research, these two phenomena have been termed assimilation (pulling one's party closer) and contrast (pushing other parties away) (Merrill et al. 2001). Such projection effects on issue proximity are well-

known, have been studied extensively and have been found across many country contexts (Brody and Page 1972, Drummond 2011, Merrill et al. 2001,. Perceptions of issue proximity are perhaps more easily shaped by partisanship as individuals can maintain their original issue preferences and only need to believe that their party holds a similar view. There is thus extensive evidence that partisanship can shape issue preferences and issue proximity.

However, there is also strong and consistent evidence of partisan bias in performance assessments. The findings are strongest for the economic record of governments, where party identification has been shown to shape perceptions very strongly (Bartels 2002). Most fundamentally, perceptions of the ‘objective’ economy itself are strongly coloured by partisanship (Bartels 2002, Evans and Andersen 2006, Evans and Pickup 2010), to the extent that citizens base actual economic decisions on these biased beliefs (Gerber and Huber 2010). Unsurprisingly, there is therefore also significant evidence that partisans see their party as responsible for positive outcomes but not for negative ones (Evans and Chzhen 2011, Marsh and Tilley 2010, Rudolph 2003). In their study of partisan bias in attributions of responsibility, Tilley and Hobolt (2011) present ways in which performance assessments may be shaped by partisan bias (see also Gaines et al. 2007). Partisans may thus disregard information, evaluate it selectively or attribute responsibility selectively. It is therefore likely that partisan bias will colour performance assessments, perhaps particularly on the economy.

Arguably, the conditioning effects of partisanship should be even larger than with issue proximity. This is precisely because assessing performance is easier than assessing proximity (Lenz 2012: 11). This also means that the perceptual bias created by party identification may work even more effectively in ensuring consistent opinions than on issue proximity. In simple terms, it is easier to know which opinions are consistent with one’s partisan identity when thinking about performance than about positions. Our third hypothesis is therefore:

H3: The effect of party evaluations on issue-specific party performance assessments is greater than their effect on issue proximity.

While much evidence thus points to a strong impact of party identification on issue opinions, the nature of partisanship and its relationship with issues remains one of the key debates in political behaviour (Bartels 2010, Jacoby 2010, Johnston 2006). Many scholars disagree with the view of partisanship as a stable, enduring psychological orientation. Instead, they see measures of party identification as reflections of a ‘running tally’ of issue-related assessments (Fiorina 1981, Achen 1992, Clarke et al. 2004). They argue that partisanship is continually updated in reaction to new information, for example about issue positions, party leaders and economic circumstances. This is reflected in changes in partisanship, which show that the party identification is not very stable over time after all (Schmitt-Beck et al. 2006, Sanders et al. 2011). This ‘running tally’ view of partisanship is a better fit with rational-choice approaches to politics, whereby voters examine and evaluate the policies each party proposes based on their self-interest and determine the vote choice as a result (Downs, 1957, Enelow and Hinich 1984). Changes in party identification may therefore reflect changes in assessments of parties relative to issues (Page and Jones 1979, Franklin and Jackson 1983). In this view, issue preferences are therefore largely exogenous to political competition and not determined by partisanship after all.

So, party performance and party proximity may themselves have an important impact on partisanship. The effect of issue positions on partisanship has been studied in detail (Highton and Kam 2011, Layman and Carsey 2006, Dancey and Goren 2010, Carsey and Layman 2002, Milazzo et al. 2012). While these studies come to differing conclusions, it seems clear that issue positions do, at least on occasion, influence partisanship. This evidence appears particularly clear in Britain (Milazzo et al. 2012). While most of these studies examine issue attitudes and values, thus asking how individual views are shaped by party

identification, Franklin and Jackson (1983: 968) examine issue proximity specifically. They highlight the processes by which proximity may affect partisanship: ‘Party identifications are subject to change as individual preferences change, assuming fixed party positions, or as a consequence of shifts in the party positions, if individual preferences are stable, or both.’ Whether looking at raw positions or proximity, there is clear evidence that partisanship is not always a pure ‘unmoved mover’ but responds to issue attitudes (Johnston 2006, Milazzo et al. 2012).

Turning to performance assessments, it is likely that voters regularly form and update opinions about how competent parties are and how they have performed on key issues (Fiorina 1981). These opinions are cognitively less demanding than assessments of issue proximity (Sanders et al. 2011, Lenz 2012). Performance assessments are easily formed as they merely require individuals to assess the past competence of parties on issues that are important to them (Sanders et al. 2011: 290f.). Even voters with relatively little interest in politics are able to broadly assess how life has changed in the past years (Fiorina 1981). These straightforward opinions may then shape party identification. This argument is made most strongly by Fiorina (1981), who sees partisanship primarily as a ‘running tally’ of performance evaluations. Indeed, Fiorina (1981) argues that the impact of retrospective evaluations on vote choice is often indirect, namely via their effect on partisanship (see Bartels 2010).

Since performance assessments are easier to reach than assessments of issue proximity, the effect of party performance on party attachment should not only be significant, it should also be larger than that of issue proximity. Our final hypothesis is therefore as follows:

H4: The effect of issue-specific party competence assessments on party evaluations is greater than that of issue proximity on party evaluations.

Data and measures

We test our expectations with data from the British Election Study (BES) internet panel, which was carried out by YouGov and ran from 2005 until 2010. We use the five panel waves that included all the necessary indicators: March/April 2005, May 2006, June 2008, July 2009 and March/April 2010. Though the YouGov panel is not based on a representative sample of the UK voting-age population, a comparison with a contemporaneous representative in-person survey shows that differences in variable distributions are modest and multivariate models yield similar conclusions (Sanders et al. 2007). Moreover, comparisons of survey wave vote intentions with other opinion polls show that the panel remains broadly reflective of the UK population throughout (Sanders et al. 2011).

Issue-specific party performance and proximity

We measure party performance and proximity using questions about the economy and the welfare state. This issue is well-suited to examining our research question as it is one that is usually of importance in party competition, so it is reasonable to expect changes in these views to affect party identification. Moreover, the 2005-2010 period saw the onset of the financial crisis, so views on party performance and proximity are likely to have changed in that time, giving us the necessary variation in our key variables. Finally, the economy is a useful issue area as it has both clear positional and performance aspects. Parts of the issue area of the economy can thus be seen as exemplifying performance issues, while other parts are archetypal policy issues. Testing our hypotheses using other issue areas would of course have been desirable, but the BES only included economic questions across enough of its panel waves. We consider party performance and proximity relative to the Labour party as this was the governing party throughout the entire period of the panel. Results for the Conservatives, presented in the supplemental materials, are nevertheless very similar.

We measure issue-specific party performance using the following question:

How well do you think the present government has handled the economy in general?

The 5-point response scale ranged from ‘very badly’ to ‘very well’, with the responses in between labelled as ‘fairly badly’, ‘neither well nor badly’ and ‘fairly well’. We also ran our analyses using an alternative performance measure, replacing ‘the economy in general’ with ‘the National Health Service’. This could capture aspects of the economy related to the welfare state. The results for these analyses are overwhelmingly similar to those for the ‘economy in general’ question and are reported in our supplemental materials.

We measure issue proximity towards Labour on economic issues using the following two questions:

Using the 0 to 10 scale below, where the end marked 0 means that government should cut taxes a lot and spend much less on health and social services, and the end marked 10 means that government should raise taxes a lot and spend much more on health and social services, where would you place yourself on this scale?

Where would you place the Labour Party on this scale?

The issue proximity of the respondent to the Labour party is computed as

$$Proximity = 10 - |(Position_{Self(t)} - Position_{Labour(t)})|,$$

so party proximity ranges from 0 (=minimum proximity to Labour on taxes/spending) to 10 (=maximum proximity to Labour on taxes/spending). We also ran our analyses using the raw self-placement on the taxes-versus-spending scale. Due to projection effects present in proximity-based measures, we should expect the effects on and from other variables to be weaker using simple self-placement. In other words, using proximity measures provides a tougher test for our hypotheses as we are likely to find stronger effects in both directions. This is indeed the case in our analyses using the self-placement measure. For full results, see the supplemental materials.

Party attachment

We make use of two indicators for party attachment. One measure relates to party affect, that is, measure for the affective component of partisan attitudes. The other measure relates to partisanship as a group identity (for the distinction see Greene 2002).

First, we use a question that uses a 11-point scale to measure party affect:

On a scale that runs from 0 to 10, where 0 means strongly dislike and 10 means strongly like, how do feel about the Labour Party?

Note that the 2005 pre-election wave appears to have used a ten-point version of this scale.³

We also present the results using the two traditional party identification questions in the BES.

First, respondents are asked:

Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrat or what?

Those answering 'Labour' are then asked about the strength of their party identification:

Would you call yourself very strong Labour, fairly strong or not very strong?


We use these two questions to create a 4-point scale, ranging from 0 (other or no party ID) to 3 (very strong Labour ID). The party ID measure was not asked in this way in the 2005 pre-election wave, leaving us with four waves for our model.

Excluding cases listwise leaves us with a sample size of 1850 for the full model using party affect and 1924 (only four panel waves) using party identification. Figure 1 shows the distribution of respondents on performance and proximity assessments as well as party affect over the five panel waves. We can see that economic performance ratings for the Labour party changed from positive to negative in the period from 2005 to 2010, reaching their lowest values in 2009. This clearly reflects the financial crisis, which began in autumn 2007 with the collapse of Northern Rock but reached its apex with the collapse of Lehman Brothers in

³ While the documentation indicates a 11-point scale was used, the data includes cases only for 10 scale points. It appears that by mistake only a 10-point scale was used. Note that our results do not depend on the inclusion/exclusion of this panel wave.

autumn 2008. However, we can also see that the distribution of the proximity measure stays rather stable, with a strong increase in 2010. This increase can be attributed to the fact that Labour was seen as moving towards the centre in 2010. Interestingly, party attachment (here: the like-dislike measure) does not vary much over the five waves.

Figure 1: Voter assessment of Labour party 2005-2010



(Note: n=1850, Performance: 1=Very well / 5=Very badly, Proximity: 0=distant to Labour, 10=close to Labour; Attachment: 0=Strongly dislike / 10=Strongly like, Party ID: 0=other or no party ID, 3=very strong Labour ID)

Model

We model the relationship between performance, proximity and party attachment using autoregressive cross-lagged regression models.⁴ The cross-lagged regression model is often used for panel data in order to disentangle underlying causal mechanisms in the relationship between variables (Finkel 1995). With such models, it is possible to capture variation attributable to stable aspects of a variable (the autoregressive regression component) as well as variation that can be explained by other factors (the cross-lagged component). In the case of political attitudes, using cross-lagged models means that we are able to control for stable aspects of each variable while testing whether other variables are responsible for a change in attitudes.

Here, we focus on the causal relationship between the three core measures: the issue proximity of party (Px), the issue performance assessment of a party (Pf), and party attachment (At). The full cross-lagged regression model for the three variables of interest thus can be written as:

$$\begin{aligned}
 Px_t &= \beta_{Px_t, Px_{t-1}} \cdot Px_{t-1} + \beta_{Px_t, Px_{t-2}} \cdot Px_{t-2} + \dots + \beta_{Px_t, Pf_{t-1}} \cdot Pf_{t-1} + \beta_{Px_t, At_{t-1}} \cdot At_{t-1} + e_{Px_t} \\
 Pf_t &= \beta_{Pf_t, Pf_{t-1}} \cdot Pf_{t-1} + \beta_{Pf_t, Pf_{t-2}} \cdot Pf_{t-2} + \dots + \beta_{Pf_t, Px_{t-1}} \cdot Px_{t-1} + \beta_{Pf_t, At_{t-1}} \cdot At_{t-1} + e_{Pf_t} \\
 At_t &= \beta_{At_t, At_{t-1}} \cdot At_{t-1} + \beta_{At_t, At_{t-2}} \cdot At_{t-2} + \dots + \beta_{At_t, Pf_{t-1}} \cdot Pf_{t-1} + \beta_{At_t, Px_{t-1}} \cdot Px_{t-1} + e_{At_t}
 \end{aligned}$$

Each measure is specific to time t (i.e. for the five panel waves), while the equations include all available autoregressive components of a variable ($t-1$, $t-2$, etc.). This allows us to control for stability in attitudes. We model the effect of each variable on the other two using

⁴ It would have been preferable to use multiple indicators for each concept and to then run structural equation modelling rather than cross-lagged regression models with manifest variables. As shown by Ansolabahere et al. (2007), the use of multiple indicators attenuates the impact of measurement error in political attitude questions. However, multiple indicators were not available for all measures to enable us to use such modelling approach.

lagged measures ($t-1$).⁵ Residuals e at the same measurement occasion t are assumed to be correlated; this captures common effects resulting from time-specific factors in each survey panel wave.

All analyses were computed with *Mplus* (Version 7). We use MLR estimation (maximum likelihood estimation with robust standard errors) as this is more appropriate for nonnormal (skewed) distributions such as those of proximity and affect. In order to evaluate model fit we examine incremental fit indices used for structural equation models, where the cut-off values of CFI>.95, TLI>.95, and RMSEA<.05 are usually regarded as indicating excellent fit (Marsh et al. 2004). The chi-square test was also examined, though this statistic is known to be very restrictive in the case of large samples. Thus it is not taken as primary indicator of model fit.

Results

We first discuss the results of a simple model including just proximity and performance assessments; we then move on to the two full models including party affect and party identification respectively.

The relationship between issue proximity and party performance

Table 1 presents the results for the relationship between issue proximity and party performance without controlling for party attachment. The overall fit indices show that his simple model fits the data very well (MLR $\chi^2_{[12]}=44.102$, $p<.01$, CFI=1.00, TLI=.99, and RMSEA=.04), though the chi-square test is significant. Table 1 shows the results of all cross-lagged effects and first-order autoregressive effects. The strength of the autoregressive effects

⁵ Note that we refrained from restricting autoregressive parameters and cross-lagged parameters to equality. Variances of indicators vary over panel waves and time lags are not perfectly equal. Further, these restrictions would result in a drastically worse model fit.

indicates that performance evaluations in particular are relatively stable over time. Stability coefficients (first-order autoregressive effects) for later waves, however, usually decrease as all autoregressive lagged effects were taken into account.⁶

The results also suggest that both issue proximity and performance assessments affect each other positively. So, voters rate the performance of Labour on the economy more highly if they are also close to Labour on the issue of raising taxes versus increasing social spending. In turn, voters who regard Labour as less highly-performing on the economy will also see themselves as distant from Labour on taxes versus spending. The cross-lagged effects are also rather stable across panel waves, with all standardized coefficients statistically significant and of similar magnitude. However, the effects are weak. For example, a standard-deviation change in one assessment leads to a change in the other assessment of between 0.06 and 0.13 standard deviation units. So, only a minor part of change can be attributed to these two assessments.

If we were to examine only this model, we would conclude that there is a mutual, if weak, interrelationship between proximity and performance assessments. There is thus strong evidence in favour of both H1 (the proximity \rightarrow performance hypothesis) and H2 (the performance \rightarrow proximity hypothesis). However, we know that both assessments may be strongly shaped by partisanship; it is to this possibility we now turn.

⁶ As expected, higher order autoregressive effects decrease with larger time lags. Still, all autoregressive effects have statistically significant positive effects on the target variable and, hence, cannot be omitted.

Table 1: Labour issue proximity and party performance (tax/spend issue)

	Structural coefficients (cross-lagged effect)			Stability (1 st -order autor. Effect)			R ²
		b	S.E.		b	S.E.	
Pf '10	←Px '09	.06*	.01	←Pf '09	.52*	.02	.70
Pf '09	←Px '08	.12*	.02	←Pf '08	.52*	.02	.59
Pf '08	←Px '06	.09*	.02	←Pf '06	.46*	.03	.50
Pf '06	←Px '05	.13*	.02	←Pf '05	.69*	.02	.57
Px '10	←Pf '09	.07*	.02	←Px '09	.22*	.04	.28
Px '09	←Pf '08	.11*	.02	←Px '08	.34*	.03	.45
Px '08	←Pf '06	.10*	.02	←Px '06	.38*	.03	.38
Px '06	←Pf '05	.08*	.02	←Px '05	.49*	.03	.28

(Note: n=1858, *significant at p<.05. Entries indicate standardized effect sizes. Further autoregressive parameters and residual correlations were estimated but are not displayed.)

Party attachment, issue proximity and performance assessments

Since we have two ways of measuring partisanship (party affect and party identification), we also present two full models. Both of these fit the data very well (MLR $\chi^2_{[36]}= 92.43$ and $\chi^2_{[18]}= 56.93$, respectively, p<.01, CFI=1.00, TLI=.99, and RMSEA=0.03). Table 2 presents the results using party affect, Table 3 those using party identification.

Table 2: Labour issue proximity, party performance, and attachment

	Structural coefficients (cross-lagged effect)			Structural coefficients (cross-lagged effect)			Stability (1 st -order autor. Effect)			R ²
		b	S.E.		b	S.E.		b	S.E.	
Pf '10	←Px '09	.02	.01	←At '09	.32*	.03	←Pf '09	.38*	.03	.73
Pf '09	←Px '08	.07*	.01	←At '08	.37*	.03	←Pf '08	.33*	.03	.64
Pf '08	←Px '06	.03*	.02	←At '06	.34*	.03	←Pf '06	.31*	.03	.55
Pf '06	←Px '05	.06*	.02	←At '05	.27*	.02	←Pf '05	.55*	.02	.61
Px '10	←Pf '09	-.01	.03	←At '09	.12*	.03	←Px '09	.21*	.04	.29
Px '09	←Pf '08	.04	.02	←At '08	.11*	.03	←Px '08	.33*	.03	.46
Px '08	←Pf '06	.03	.03	←At '06	.11*	.03	←Px '06	.36*	.03	.38
Px '06	←Pf '05	.01	.03	←At '05	.13*	.03	←Px '05	.46*	.03	.29
At '10	←Pf '09	.11*	.02	←Px '09	.04*	.01	←At '09	.45*	.04	.79
At '09	←Pf '08	.13*	.02	←Px '08	.03*	.01	←At '08	.51*	.03	.79
At '08	←Pf '06	.11*	.02	←Px '06	.03*	.01	←At '06	.51*	.03	.69
At '06	←Pf '05	.10*	.02	←Px '05	.07*	.01	←At '05	.74*	.02	.72

(Note: n=1858, *significant at p<.05. Entries indicate standardized effect sizes. Further autoregressive parameters and residual correlations were estimated but are not displayed.)

Table 3: Labour issue proximity, party performance, and party ID

	Structural coefficients (cross-lagged effect)			Structural coefficients (cross-lagged effect)			Stability (1 st -order autor. Effect)			R ²
		b	S.E.		b	S.E.		b	S.E.	
Pf '10	←Px.'09	.06*	.01	←ID '09	.12*	.02	←Pf '09	.49*	.02	.71
Pf '09	←Px.'08	.11*	.01	←ID '08	.22*	.02	←Pf '08	.45*	.02	.61
Pf '08	←Px.'06	.06*	.02	←ID '06	.26*	.02	←Pf '06	.53*	.02	.52
Px '10	←Pf '09	.08*	.02	←ID '09	.03	.02	←Px '09	.24*	.04	.27
Px '09	←Pf '08	.12*	.02	←ID '08	.06*	.02	←Px '08	.38*	.03	.44
Px '08	←Pf '06	.11*	.02	←ID '06	.10*	.02	←Px '06	.48*	.02	.33
ID '10	←Pf '09	.11*	.02	←Px '09	.01	.01	←ID '09	.46*	.04	.80
ID '09	←Pf '08	.03	.02	←Px '08	.00	.01	←ID '08	.61*	.03	.79
ID '08	←Pf '06	.09*	.02	←Px '06	.00	.01	←ID '06	.80*	.02	.71

(Note: n=1924,*significant at p<.05. Entries indicate standardized effect sizes. Further autoregressive parameters and residual correlations were estimated but are not displayed.)

First, these models tell us that partisanship strongly influences issue assessments. This is particularly the case for performance assessments. For party affect, the standardised coefficient for partisanship is indeed almost as large as the autoregressive effect (Table 2). Furthermore, the fact that the stability of over-time party performance ratings diminish in the full models, so after having controlled for the impact of partisanship, supports the possibility that partisanship is an important exogenous factor explaining changes in performance assessments to a large extent. While proximity assessments are also affected by partisanship,

here the coefficients are smaller. Moreover, the stability of proximity measures as evidenced by the autoregressive component remains largely unaffected. In sum, both assessments are clearly shaped by partisan bias, but performance evaluations are even more closely influenced by partisanship than perceptions of proximity. We thus fail to reject H3.

In general, a case can be made that changes in partisan attachment or strength of party ID actually *precede* performance assessments rather than the other way round. First, this fact is evidenced by substantially larger cross-lagged effects from the partisanship measures on performance assessment. Second, looking at party ID in particular there even has been an instance (from 2008 to 2009) where we observe no impact of performance on party ID, but a – potentially negative – change in identification with Labour caused a change the overall assessment of economic performance.

However, partisanship is itself shaped by issue assessments. Again, this is particularly the case for performance evaluations, which influence both party affect and party identification. While the effects are rather weak, they are nevertheless consistent in their magnitude and statistical significance. The findings for proximity assessments are mixed, as they appear to influence affect but not party identification. The standardised coefficients for proximity are consistently smaller than those for performance, so party performance assessments appear to exert a stronger influence on partisanship than perceptions of proximity. However, the over-time stability of party affect is rather strong, indicating that this attitude remains relatively unchanged over panel waves. Nevertheless, there is still clear evidence in favour of H4.

Finally, controlling for partisanship modifies our findings concerning the relationship between proximity and performance. Most importantly, we find that the effect of performance evaluations on issue proximity is much smaller and no longer statistically significant in the full model using party affect. Results using party identification remain largely consistent with the simple model. The reason for this difference is likely to lie with the link between

performance and partisanship, which is much stronger for party affect than for party identification and, hence, affects the relationship between performance evaluations and perceived proximity. The findings for H2 are therefore not robust. While the effect of proximity on performance also changes in the party affect model, they do so less drastically. Proximity still positively and statistically significantly influences performance assessments, even if the magnitude of the effect is smaller. So, it appears that proximity does affect performance assessments, even controlling for the effect of partisanship. The evidence in favour of H1 is therefore strong.

Given the findings of Carsey and Layman (2006) and Milazzo et al. (2012), we also ran the models including general economic performance, proximity and partisanship in sub-groups: citizens with low and high political interest and citizens with low and high perceived policy polarisation between Labour and the Conservatives (see supplemental material).⁷ The key differences we find concern H1 and H4. First, proximity assessments significantly affect performance evaluations (H1) only among the more interested group. This may be an indication that more politically aware respondents are more likely to assess performance based on positional considerations. In other words, the link between the two attitudes is less due to heuristics and more due to logical interconnections.

Second, party affect is affected by proximity evaluations only among more interested respondents and those who perceive larger party differences (H4). This finding indicates the proximity is a consideration that requires greater political awareness. It also provides further evidence that the performance-partisanship link is stronger than the proximity-partisanship link as it is a more universal phenomenon.

⁷ Interest was measured by “How much interest do you generally have in what is going on in politics?” in 2005. “A great deal” or “Quite a lot” was coded as high interest, whereas “Some” “Not very much” “None at all” and “Don’t know” was coded as low interest. The perceived party policy polarization was measured as the absolute difference of the respondent’s placement of Labour and Conservatives on the taxes/spending scale (in 2005). Respondents who scored above the median value were coded as being in the high polarisation group.

Conclusion

This paper has been motivated by two questions: how are performance and proximity assessments linked, and how are both attitudes linked to partisanship? Our findings used several different ways of measuring our phenomena of interest. Nevertheless, the results have been clear. First, performance and proximity assessments influence each other. This is particularly the case for the effect of proximity on performance evaluations. Whether we think a party is doing a good job at bringing about certain ends depends in part on whether we agree with them on the means they are using to do so. Nevertheless, the links between proximity and partisanship are relatively weak, so these two attitudes are not tightly intertwined. Subgroup analyses further bolster our argument that the links between performance and proximity evaluations are not simply due to their mutual usefulness as heuristics. Moreover, both assessments are clearly influenced by partisanship. This goes especially for performance assessments, which reflect party affect almost as much as past performance evaluations. However, attachment itself is also updated, especially again in response to performance assessments. In sum, there is evidence in favour of all our hypotheses, with the partial exception of H1.

Our findings have several important implications. First, they show that performance and proximity assessments are not separate and distinct evaluations of parties on issues. Instead, they are logically intertwined, with proximity in particular a good predictor of performance assessments. This finding should cause us to rethink the way we approach issue voting and the debate on performance versus policy as electoral influences.

Second, our analyses underline the impact and resilience of partisanship. Even in the face of a momentous policy event – the financial crisis of 2007/2008 – and its attendant decline in perceived party performance, partisanship remained largely stable. Throughout the time period we study, partisanship impacts on issue assessments more than vice versa. Even a

simple, easy-to-reach assessment, such as whether Labour has performed well on the economy, is affected by partisanship as much as by its own past values. Proximity, meanwhile, has largely weak effects when examining how these three phenomena are related. Given previous findings for the UK (e.g. Milazzo et al. 2012), these findings are particularly striking and should prevent us from dismissing the role of partisan attachments in shaping political perceptions in the UK.

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Supplemental materials

In these supplemental materials, we present the results using (1) NHS performance instead of economic performance, (2) taxes versus spending self-placement instead of left-right proximity, (3) Conservative economic performance, taxes vs. spending proximity and party affect, analyses for sub-groups of (4) low and high political interest and (5) citizens with low and high perceived policy polarisation between Labour and the Conservatives.

Table A1: Labour party assessment, NHS issue performance as reference

	Structural coefficients (cross-lagged effect)			Structural coefficients (cross-lagged effect)			Stability (1 st -order autor. Effect)			R ²
		b	S.E.		b	S.E.		b	S.E.	
Pf '10	←Px '09	.03*	.02	←At '09	.18*	.02	←Pf '09	.41*	.03	.70
Pf '09	←Px '08	.02	.02	←At '08	.14*	.02	←Pf '08	.47*	.02	.69
Pf '08	←Px '06	.04*	.02	←At '06	.24*	.03	←Pf '06	.39*	.03	.60
Pf '06	←Px '05	.04*	.02	←At '05	.33*	.02	←Pf '05	.49*	.02	.60
Px '10	←Pf '09	.01	.03	←At '09	.10*	.03	←Px '09	.22*	.04	.29
Px '09	←Pf '08	.04	.02	←At '08	.11*	.02	←Px '08	.33*	.03	.46
Px '08	←Pf '06	.05	.03	←At '06	.10*	.03	←Px '06	.36*	.03	.38
Px '06	←Pf '05	.01	.03	←At '05	.13*	.03	←Px '05	.45*	.03	.29
At '10	←Pf '09	.09*	.02	←Px '09	.04*	.01	←At '09	.46	.04	.79
At '09	←Pf '08	.11*	.02	←Px '08	.02*	.01	←At '08	.52	.03	.79
At '08	←Pf '06	.11*	.02	←Px '06	.03*	.01	←At '06	.48	.04	.70
At '06	←Pf '05	.13*	.02	←Px '05	.07*	.01	←At '05	.72	.02	.72

(Note: n=1847, *significant at p<.05)

Table A2: Labour party assessment, self-placement (+ general economy issue performance)

	Structural coefficients (cross-lagged effect)			Structural coefficients (cross-lagged effect)			Stability (1 st -order autor. Effect)			R ²
		b	S.E.		b	S.E.		b	S.E.	
Pf '10	←Sp '09	.07*	.01	←At '09	.31*	.02	←Pf '09	.37*	.02	.72
Pf '09	←Sp '08	.04*	.02	←At '08	.38*	.02	←Pf '08	.33*	.02	.63
Pf '08	←Sp '06	.10*	.02	←At '06	.31*	.02	←Pf '06	.30*	.02	.55
Pf '06	←Sp '05	.04*	.02	←At '05	.30*	.02	←Pf '05	.52*	.02	.60
Sp '10	←Pf '09	.01	.02	←At '09	.07*	.02	←Sp '09	.35*	.03	.56
Sp '09	←Pf '08	.07*	.02	←At '08	.01	.02	←Sp '08	.38*	.03	.53
Sp '08	←Pf '06	.08*	.02	←At '06	.04	.02	←Sp '06	.39*	.02	.51
Sp '06	←Pf '05	.04	.02	←At '05	.09*	.02	←Sp '05	.63*	.02	.47
At '10	←Pf '09	.12*	.02	←Sp '09	.05*	.01	←At '09	.46*	.03	.79
At '09	←Pf '08	.14*	.02	←Sp '08	.02	.01	←At '08	.49*	.03	.77
At '08	←Pf '06	.10*	.02	←Sp '06	.07*	.01	←At '06	.50*	.03	.68
At '06	←Pf '05	.08*	.02	←Sp '05	.05*	.01	←At '05	.77*	.02	.71

(Note: n=2232, *significant at p<.05; Sp = self-placement on tax/spending scale)

Table A3: Conservatives party assessments

		Structural coefficients (cross-lagged effect)		Structural coefficients (cross-lagged effect)		Stability (1 st -order autor. Effect)				
		b	S.E.	b	S.E.	b	S.E.	R ²		
Pf '10	←Px '09	.04*	.02	←At '09	.34*	.03	←Pf '09	.28*	.03	.72
Pf '09	←Px '08	.01	.02	←At '08	.33*	.03	←Pf '08	.31*	.03	.68
Pf '08	←Px '06	.03	.02	←At '06	.31*	.03	←Pf '06	.31*	.03	.60
Pf '06	←Px '05	.05*	.02	←At '05	.28*	.03	←Pf '05	.50*	.03	.59
Px '10	←Pf '09	.03	.04	←At '09	.08*	.04	←Px '09	.20*	.04	.34
Px '09	←Pf '08	.08*	.03	←At '08	.06*	.03	←Px '08	.30*	.03	.49
Px '08	←Pf '06	-.05	.03	←At '06	.19*	.03	←Px '06	.35*	.03	.40
Px '06	←Pf '05	.06	.03	←At '05	.15*	.03	←Px '05	.52*	.03	.43
At '10	←Pf '09	.08*	.02	←Px '09	.04*	.02	←At '09	.41*	.04	.82
At '09	←Pf '08	.11*	.02	←Px '08	.03*	.01	←At '08	.48*	.03	.81
At '08	←Pf '06	.09*	.02	←Px '06	.10*	.02	←At '06	.53*	.03	.76
At '06	←Pf '05	.16*	.02	←Px '05	.10*	.02	←At '05	.65*	.02	.71

(Note: n=1595, *significant at p<.05)

Table A4: Labour issue proximity, party performance, and attachment (political interest subgroups)

Low political interest group (n=907)										
		Structural coefficients (cross-lagged effect)			Structural coefficients (cross-lagged effect)			Stability (1 st -order autor. Effect)		
		b	S.E.		b	S.E.		b	S.E.	R ²
Pf '10	←Px '09	.01	.02	←At '09	.32*	.04	←Pf '09	.36*	.04	.70
Pf '09	←Px '08	.07*	.02	←At '08	.36*	.04	←Pf '08	.29*	.04	.59
Pf '08	←Px '06	.02	.02	←At '06	.26*	.04	←Pf '06	.34*	.04	.50
Pf '06	←Px '05	.03	.03	←At '05	.29*	.03	←Pf '05	.51*	.03	.55
Px '10	←Pf '09	-.01	.04	←At '09	.13*	.04	←Px '09	.15*	.05	.23
Px '09	←Pf '08	.05	.04	←At '08	.12*	.04	←Px '08	.26*	.04	.41
Px '08	←Pf '06	.02	.04	←At '06	.09*	.04	←Px '06	.30*	.04	.25
Px '06	←Pf '05	.02	.04	←At '05	.14*	.04	←Px '05	.35*	.04	.20
At '10	←Pf '09	.09*	.03	←Px '09	.03	.02	←At '09	.45*	.05	.79
At '09	←Pf '08	.14*	.03	←Px '08	.02	.02	←At '08	.47*	.04	.74
At '08	←Pf '06	.14*	.03	←Px '06	.03	.02	←At '06	.50*	.05	.63
At '06	←Pf '05	.10*	.03	←Px '05	.06*	.02	←At '05	.73*	.03	.69
High political interest group (n=943)										
		Structural coefficients (cross-lagged effect)			Structural coefficients (cross-lagged effect)			Stability (1 st -order autor. Effect)		
		b	S.E.		b	S.E.		b	S.E.	R2
Pf '10	←Px '09	.04*	.02	←At '09	.31*	.04	←Pf '09	.39*	.04	.75
Pf '09	←Px '08	.07*	.02	←At '08	.38*	.04	←Pf '08	.36*	.04	.69
Pf '08	←Px '06	.04	.02	←At '06	.41*	.03	←Pf '06	.27*	.04	.60
Pf '06	←Px '05	.09*	.02	←At '05	.24*	.03	←Pf '05	.58*	.03	.65
Px '10	←Pf '09	.00	.04	←At '09	.12*	.04	←Px '09	.25*	.05	.31
Px '09	←Pf '08	.04	.03	←At '08	.11*	.04	←Px '08	.40*	.04	.49
Px '08	←Pf '06	.06	.04	←At '06	.11*	.04	←Px '06	.39*	.04	.47
Px '06	←Pf '05	.03	.04	←At '05	.11*	.04	←Px '05	.52*	.04	.36
At '10	←Pf '09	.13*	.04	←Px '09	.06*	.02	←At '09	.46*	.06	.80
At '09	←Pf '08	.11*	.02	←Px '08	.03*	.02	←At '08	.56*	.04	.83
At '08	←Pf '06	.07*	.03	←Px '06	.04*	.02	←At '06	.51*	.05	.74
At '06	←Pf '05	.10*	.03	←Px '05	.08*	.02	←At '05	.74*	.03	.73

(Note: *significant at p<.05)

Table A5: Labour issue proximity, party performance, and attachment (perceived policy polarisation subgroups)

Low polarisation group (n=892)										
		Structural coefficients (cross-lagged effect)		Structural coefficients (cross-lagged effect)		Stability (1 st -order autor. Effect)				
		b	S.E.	b	S.E.	b	S.E.	R ²		
Pf '10	←Px '09	.01	.02	←At '09	.30*	.03	←Pf '09	.37*	.04	.66
Pf '09	←Px '08	.08*	.02	←At '08	.36*	.04	←Pf '08	.30*	.04	.56
Pf '08	←Px '06	.01	.02	←At '06	.29*	.03	←Pf '06	.31*	.04	.45
Pf '06	←Px '05	.04	.03	←At '05	.29*	.03	←Pf '05	.49*	.03	.51
Px '10	←Pf '09	.03	.04	←At '09	.10*	.04	←Px '09	.18*	.05	.22
Px '09	←Pf '08	.06	.03	←At '08	.15*	.04	←Px '08	.26*	.04	.34
Px '08	←Pf '06	.02	.04	←At '06	.14*	.04	←Px '06	.33*	.04	.21
Px '06	←Pf '05	.00	.04	←At '05	.17*	.04	←Px '05	.28*	.04	.13
At '10	←Pf '09	.10*	.03	←Px '09	.02	.02	←At '09	.44*	.05	.74
At '09	←Pf '08	.12*	.03	←Px '08	.00	.02	←At '08	.51*	.04	.74
At '08	←Pf '06	.11*	.03	←Px '06	.00	.02	←At '06	.54*	.04	.62
At '06	←Pf '05	.08*	.03	←Px '05	.02	.02	←At '05	.74*	.03	.63
High polarisation group (n=923)										
		Structural coefficients (cross-lagged effect)		Structural coefficients (cross-lagged effect)		Stability (1 st -order autor. Effect)				
		b	S.E.	b	S.E.	b	S.E.	R ²		
Pf '10	←Px '09	.05*	.02	←At '09	.33*	.04	←Pf '09	.38*	.04	.78
Pf '09	←Px '08	.07*	.02	←At '08	.38*	.04	←Pf '08	.35*	.04	.70
Pf '08	←Px '06	.05*	.02	←At '06	.36*	.04	←Pf '06	.30*	.04	.62
Pf '06	←Px '05	.08*	.03	←At '05	.22*	.03	←Pf '05	.59*	.03	.67
Px '10	←Pf '09	-.04	.04	←At '09	.15*	.05	←Px '09	.22*	.05	.31
Px '09	←Pf '08	.04	.04	←At '08	.09*	.04	←Px '08	.37*	.04	.51
Px '08	←Pf '06	.06	.04	←At '06	.08*	.04	←Px '06	.35*	.04	.46
Px '06	←Pf '05	.05	.05	←At '05	.09*	.04	←Px '05	.52*	.04	.38
At '10	←Pf '09	.12*	.03	←Px '09	.05*	.02	←At '09	.45*	.05	.83
At '09	←Pf '08	.14*	.03	←Px '08	.05*	.02	←At '08	.50*	.04	.82
At '08	←Pf '06	.11*	.03	←Px '06	.06*	.02	←At '06	.46*	.05	.74
At '06	←Pf '05	.12*	.02	←Px '05	.10*	.02	←At '05	.72*	.03	.78

(Note: *significant at p<.05)