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Abstract This article offers an analysis of the discursive practice of reconciliation occasioned in the accounts of former British prisoners of war of their captivity and of other related events of World War II during a reconciliation trip to Japan. The overall aim is to examine ways in which autobiographical accounts about the past, as produced in interviews, constitute relevant identities and membership within social relations. In telling narratives of post-war experiences of reconciliation, the participants account for changes in their lives. I use the term 'narrative of redemption' to describe those narratives in which the participants address the moral sensibility of the problematic status of their wartime past and reconfigure and reformulate the significance of the past in relation to their present position of reconciliation. Adopting positioning theory as a guiding analytic concept, my analysis demonstrates how such talk shapes experiences of reconciliation with a problematic past. I focus on the redemption narrative to uncover the interactional work of positioning with special attention to similar concepts such as footing and reported speech. I discuss, although briefly, implications of applying positioning theory to the work of reconciliation studies.

Key Words British POWs, discourse analysis, narrative, positioning theory, reconciliation

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Positioning in Accounting for Redemption and Reconciliation

The Social Practice of Reconciliation

Reconciliation is a ubiquitous social phenomenon, woven into the fabric of social lives, and is emblematic of the human condition. It ranges from inter-personal relationships observed in everyday life to a wider social context of business, economics, politics, government, international relations and diplomacy. Conflict reveals our taken-for-granted sense that communities are united and imagined—they are ostensibly based on indicators of differences between nation-states, ethnicity, race, culture, religion and language. They are a fundamental and inevitable aspect of human history and cultures. Consequences of

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war and conflict affect all aspects of human life, both collectively and individually, ranging from migration, displacement and resettlement (e.g. Lavie & Swedenburg, 1996) to clinical psychological problems of depression and trauma (also known as PTSD, post-traumatic stress disorder) (Coleman, 1999). Reconciliation is analogous, for many, to conflict resolution, in which the chief aim is to restore and maintain peace between states through diplomatic talks and negotiation as well as ongoing social and international debates on apology, compensation and restitution (Abado, 1990; Ide, 1998; Murata, 1998).

A case of the reconciliation practice between former British prisoners of war (POWs) and the Japanese people addresses our principal question of what it means for society and individuals to achieve reconciliation. This article draws on research concerning the discursive organization of remembering and reconciliation. The research is based on interviews with surviving former British POWs—their recollection of experiences of post-war reconciliation as well as their captivity in the Far East during World War II. Initially, nearly 100,000 British soldiers were captured by the Japanese army at the Fall of Singapore and were taken to Thailand to work on the Thai–Burma Railway. Later, 300 British soldiers were transferred to a labour camp in Japan to work in a copper mine with local villagers and student workers. Whilst they were interned in the camp, 13 of them died due to tropical diseases which they contracted from the previous camps in Thailand. A small grave for the dead soldiers was built near the camp by fellow soldiers. Upon the end of the war in 1945, the remaining POWs were released and returned to Britain. After their departure, local villagers in Japan carried on with the maintenance of this grave, which they called ‘Little Britain’, and a senior citizens’ group took on the responsibility of looking after it. In late 1980 a refurbishment of the grave was proposed and it was completed as a village-wide project. For all these years, there was no contact between the surviving former POWs and the Japanese villagers. Around the same time, a newspaper article with a photo of the refurbished grave/cemetery, written by a British expatriate Catholic priest, was read by a former POW in Northumberland. Correspondence between the Japanese and the ex-British POWs began. In 1992, nearly 50 years after the war, the 28 surviving members of the POWs who worked in the camp and their family members were invited to take part in a reconciliation trip to Japan. They visited the former campsite and the refurbished cemetery and attended the joint memorial for the 13 dead soldiers. The 1992 reconciliation trip to Japan was a pivotal event that put Anglo-Japanese reconciliation back on the table. The current research set out to examine a discursive practice of

reconciliation of those British veterans who participated in the 1992 reconciliation trip, asking them to speak about their wartime captivity by the Japanese and the post-war experience of reconciliation.

It is striking that reconciliation is a term that is widely and unproblematically used to refer to the post-conflict condition and reconstruction of a nation. It is a concept in which the view of the experts—that of statesmen, political scholars, social scientists—and that of the lay public share roughly the same meaning: to make (oneself or another) no longer opposed; to cause to acquiesce in something unpleasant; to become friendly with (someone) after estrangement or to re-establish friendly relations between (two or more people); to settle (a quarrel or difference); to make (two apparently conflicting things) compatible or consistent with each other. Or, rather simply put, it refers to a unifying process of resolving the diverse, and often opposing, views and values between individuals, communities and societies (Patterson, 2002). The question is how societies and individuals move forward and re-build relations after experiencing moral transgression, wide-scale atrocity, intense violence and deprivation. Owing to its very promise of achieving unity as a concept, reconciliation has a powerful social force for restoring social order and justice following conflict and gives a positive sense of collective participation toward building a new nation (or community) and a shared sense of future and identity. In this approach, reconciliation often takes a handbook approach, calling for a straightforward, clear-cut, catch-all set of procedures and actions and detaches itself from the actual reconciliation work that involves multifaceted complicated human interaction and requires sensitivity to moral positions of the parties concerned. Monica Patterson (2002), in highlighting this point, asks why it is difficult for us to create consensus and break the impasse, overturning the seeming impossibility of reconciliation we observe in many regions of the world that are and have been in political, ideological or ethnic conflict.

A key to overcoming this problem may rest in our fundamental assumption of reconciliation. Reconciliation is often considered as an epistemic, definitive settlement in which differences of opinion, ideas, views, values, memories, feelings and sentiments are resolved and amalgamated into one. This is often represented as the popular view of reconciliation and is well documented in the recent work on relations between immigrant settlers in Australia and the indigenous Aborigine people (Humphrey, 2002; Pratt, Elder, & Ellis, 2001), and on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa's treatment of apartheid (Norval, 1998; Swartz & Drennan, 2000; Thelen, 2002). The view reflected in the literature holds reconciliation as a finished point,

or an outcome, of the process of two forces coming together as one: 'The reconciliation process has operated to produce and reproduce a discourse of singular and monolithic nationhood [of Australia]' (Pratt et al., 2001). Likewise, in a religious, philosophical tradition, reconciliation as an outcome and act is echoed in the Hegelian notion of reconciliation, referring to a dialectical process of striving to reach one end-point as the evolution of ideas and thoughts (Hardimon, 1994).

Whilst the conventional view of reconciliation is focused on the process of reaching a singular point and identifying the outcome reached, it does little justice in accounting for the complexities and ambiguities of the process, involving the way in which diversity and a multiplicity of positions and voices come to a single agreement. I offer an alternative view that the process is not just about resolving the conflict, purging past wrongdoing and starting from a blank slate as if the conflict never happened. Individuals, communities and societies involved in conflict and disasters do not simply leave behind experiences of trauma and suffering. Those experiences are dealt with in different ways, ranging from silence to a thorough judicial examination of events and the accountability of key players leading to the conflict. A unified voice of nationhood (or society and community) entails discursive practices which produce accountability. People view the event differently and offer accounts that do not accord with one another. I am interested in this dynamic process of accountability as remembered *in situ* in the research interview. This offers us an opportunity to examine the way in which individuals and communities handle multiple and diverse voices for the purpose of reaching an agreement and building bridges as friends for today and in the future. If reconciliation is a dynamic and complex process involving a discursive practice of generating an accord, we ought to be able to offer an analytical account as to how such a process termed as reconciliation is achieved. To make this argument, I take an approach inspired by discursive psychology (Edwards & Potter, 2001; Potter & Wetherell, 1987), social remembering (Middleton & Edwards, 1990) and discourse analysis. In this approach, I argue that reconciliation is a continual process—situated in the local interactional communicative practice and discursively managed and accomplished as a temporary settlement of meaning-making (Murakami, 2001). The discursive approach to reconciliation works toward unpacking how the singular voice of nationhood emerges, how different voices and views are held together and translated into the monolithic discourse of reconciliation.

I put forward this alternative view of discursive reconciliation, in which people's differences and multiplicity of opinions, views and

attitudes are not 'resolved' to produce a single voice. I propose an argument that reconciliation is an 'unfinished' process, in which people constantly reflect upon past events and experiences and continually evaluate them in terms of the current circumstances and a projected future. Central to discursive reconciliation is the role of narrative and story-telling as a tool that people use in order to settle with a meaning of a particular experience or event and the constitution of situated identities in a social relation. This temporary settlement is deeply embedded in the context of discursive practice and associated to the relevant membership of those who are involved in the interview.

The Discursive Psychological Approach

As Pratt et al. (2001) observed, reconciliation practices have produced a social order and harmony that mask other, defiant, multiple voices. In studying the discursive organization of reconciliation, analytical categories are not predetermined. I do not set out to identify an underlying mechanism with an assumption that people's voices were repressed by some institutional power generated by social relations. Instead, my analysis of talk-in-interaction focuses on language use. I therefore examine the consequences of discursive action without mobilizing a social theory of power and ideological argument that exist beyond what is made relevant in the data. In other words my analysis is primarily concerned with how varying voices and positions regarding reconciliation are made available and how they are made relevant (and irrelevant).

One discursive device that exemplifies discursive reconciliation is the way in which interview participants use various positions to claim a change of identity—as someone who has changed, who is no longer the same person, or sees themselves differently. For instance, without speculating on the emotional state of a person, I can treat an utterance such as 'I feel like a better man' as a moral claim of his conciliatory position. I look at how moral accountability is used to warrant participants' position of reconciliation. Such a claim about one's change of position and world-view would entail a concept of identities that are interactionally constituted and situated within social context and cultural practices, dismissing an idea of a single coherent identity throughout the life course. Instead of simply reporting the participants' declaration of reconciliation, I discuss how these identity claims would afford reconciliation. In other words I show how reconciliation is both claimed and demonstrated. The participants' narratives and talk produced in the interviews are our analytical resource. Using a few

extracts from the interview I focus on the ways in which one's redemption of self is a storied feature of moral accountability involving change of identity.

My analysis draws upon the discursive psychological perspective (Edwards, 1997; Edwards & Potter, 1992; Edwards, Potter, & Middleton, 1992). In discursive psychology accounts are not treated as definite facts about people's lives and past events, but are occasioned in the present context of telling and address current concerns of the participants who are engaged in the interview. In addition the interview participants and interviewer can be seen to handle alternative versions of their experiences of life. The interview reported in this article was focused not on gathering participants' accounts of war and associated atrocities and violence *per se*, but rather on the consequence of their participation in a 'reconciliation trip' back to Japan. This visit was organized some 40 years after their wartime experience. I am interested in what the participants did with the event and their experience of having participated in such reconciliation activities. The issue here is not to judge whether they have become reconciled with the wartime past, or to identify the causal factors that led them to reconciliation as an outcome of the trip. Rather, the interview talk was looked at in terms of the following questions: (1) What do the participants say about their current position in relation to the wartime experience of captivity in POW camps? (2) What has been constituted as the impact of war experience on their post-war life? (3) What identities are invoked which work in the participants' telling of the narratives? (4) How do they establish a particular version of the past as relevant to demonstrate their current position?

The Redemption Narrative

I harbour an analytical approach to the definition of narrative that is roughly as follows:

Narratives can function as an account by verbally reconstructing a temporal sequence of particular events and the actor's part in them so as to justify actions. . . . Narratives as a discourse genre work as accounts when tellers represent past events in such a way to defend their conduct. (Buttny, 1993, p. 18)

I use the term 'redemption' to describe the narrative being told by the ex-POW participants as their way of claiming reconciliation. This term might not be as self-evident in terms of that from which they have been redeemed. Journalistic interviews and accounts in public media report that ex-POWs for all these years have shown their entitlement to hate Japanese people (whether or not they had direct contact with them).

Throughout the entire interview data in the present research, no single statement such as 'I have been reconciled' was found. Reconciliation as a conversation topic was mentioned and attended to by the ex-POW participants as well as the interviewer, yet there was neither an exposition nor an explicit claim for reconciliation.

This does not mean that the data are invalid, because that is too quick a dismissal of them. To some, this poses a puzzle as it raises a question of whether the ex-POW participants had been 'really' reconciled. In other words, the facticity of their reconciliation may be in question. What, then, are the criteria in judging whether these participants have been reconciled? Social constructionists, discourse analysts, and the like, would treat the problem of facticity as a member's concern and examine the way in which the facticity of reconciliation is rhetorically constituted in talk-in-interaction as social action. The question of real reconciliation is irrelevant. In other words, the participants 'do' facticity as social accountability.

How, then, can any claims of reconciliation be made at all? I focus on the way in which World War II veterans produce accounts of the post-war consequences of their wartime experiences. The accounts given in the interviews are inundated with narratives of wartime and post-war events and portrayals of people and places. In other words, I attend to the participants' way of reporting the event and displaying the consequences of some events. I take it as a discursive action of addressing the possibility of being otherwise to what might have been warranted from wartime events and experience. These narratives, instead of claiming change, demonstrate change from a particular way of being. The narratives envelop the events that display different selves. They are taken to be more persuasive rhetorical tools for reformulating the self and ways of being, rather than repeatedly making assertions that the former POW participants no longer harbour hate and antipathy toward Japanese nationals and that this is attributed to returning to Japan on the reconciliation trip.

Accounting for Change: Positioning

In the analysis of the redemption narrative, I examine the mobilization of identities and its rhetorical effects—the ways in which positions are made legitimate and stories become persuasive (Antaki & Widdicombe, 1998). My analysis was informed by using positioning theory as a guiding concept, illustrating the flexible, dynamic discursive moves located in time and place and the attribution (and non-attribution) of agency. Positioning theory is a name given to recent attempts to

articulate an alternative way of reading and understanding the dynamic of human relationships within a social constructivist paradigm. Positioning theory, drawing on the pioneering work of Henriques, Hollway, Urwin, Venn and Walkderdine (1984), especially the chapter by Hollway (1984), was developed by Davies and Harré (1990; also Harré & van Langenhove, 1991, 1998). The concept of positioning is introduced as a metaphor to enable an investigator to grasp how persons are 'located' within conversations as observably and subjectively coherent participants in jointly produced storylines. The act of positioning refers to the assignment of 'parts' or 'roles' to speakers in the discursive construction of personal stories.

I apply positioning theory to my analysis in order to understand the nature of the experience of reconciliation—what it is to remember the problematic past and what it is to be reconciled with it. Harré and Van Langenhove note that there are three ways of expressing and experiencing one's personal identity or unique selfhood (Harré & van Langenhove, 1991; van Langenhove & Harré, 1993). They are by stressing one's agency in claiming responsibility for some action; by indexing one's statements with the point of view one has on their relevant world; or by presenting a description/evaluation of some past event or episode as a contribution to one's biography. I will show in the following analysis of an extract how such indexing and marking of one's agency are empirically observed in the redemption narrative.

Furthermore, Harré and van Langenhove state that the positioning has larger theoretical implications for the moral sensibility of a person in taking a particular position in a given conversational setting. Positioning is a metaphor for oscillating subjectivity located in time and place/space. The utterance is indexed with his or her spatial and temporal location, and as a claim about a state of affairs it is indexed with its speaker's moral standing (Harré & van Langenhove, 1991, 1999). Such indexing allows us to look at the ways in which a speaker takes responsibility for the reliability of his or her claim. A discourse produced in the interview is not treated as the single account representing the truth. I examine the narrative as the speaker/teller's version of truth that was produced as relevant to a particular social relation. The discursive act of positioning thus involves a reconstructive element: the biographies of the one being positioned and the 'positions' may be subject to rhetorical redesignations (van Langenhove & Harré, 1993). The question, then, is to examine how this 'rewriting' is understood with regard to personal identity and selfhood (van Langenhove & Harré, 1993, p. 85). My analysis will show this precise working of rhetorical description (and re-description)

as to how the narrative is structured and affords possibilities of being otherwise.

As in recent work exemplified in critical and discursive psychology, positioning does not assume a stable, fixed identity or individual state of mind, but is situated in discursive practices. Positioning indeed strikes a chord with this view of multiple, unfixed, fleeing and dynamic identity. Yet, van Langenhove and Harré identify that '[t]here seems to be a tension between the multiplicity of selves as expressed in discursive practices and the fact that across these discursive practices a relatively stable self-hood exists as well' (p. 82). Notice that they do not handle this tension by resolving the two, but by holding two positions together as follows:

... [T]he singularity of selfhood ... is equally a product of discursive practices as the multiplicity of selfhood. ... Moreover, in order to make it possible for a person to understand him- or herself as a historically continuous unity, he or she will have to engage in very different—possible contradictory—forms of biographical talk. (p. 82)

I see this argument working in tandem with my view of reconciliation. Using positioning reconciliation can be construed as a move not only to resolve this tension, but also to holding the two positions together as a way of understanding the multiplicity of selves, voices and work of identities in analysing narrative. What the particular experience means to an individual is up for grabs for re-description and re-formulation in the activity of telling stories. Flexibility and variability are key features in positioning theory. Indeed, we often explicitly position ourselves in relation to a stated position. Notable in these activities is the fact that positioning typically takes place in a conversation; we explain our positions, defend them and alter them. Furthermore, we often try to position others, as, for example, wrong, incompetent, misinformed, or right, competent, knowledgeable. Finally, these positions tend to be taken up according to an unfolding narrative. These positions will be tried out and abandoned or maintained, depending upon the outcome they generate. The view of a stable individual is discursively challenged by the speaker in his or her telling of the redemption narrative and accounts.

In the following I demonstrate how accounting for change in the narrative is performed discursively. Rather than stating, 'I have changed,' the speaker claims change by discursively producing two different ways of being at two different occasions. I approach the issue of positioning in terms of how rhetorical devices of footing (Goffman, 1981), reported speech (Buttny & Williams, 2000; Holt, 1996) and language of the past (Murakami, 2001) are used in the redemption

narrative and how a particular kind of being or identity is made relevant to the participants' concern, that is, reconciliation.

Data

For the analysis, the following extract was taken from a group interview with four interviewees;¹ Freddie and Bill, two ex-POWs who took part in the reconciliation trip; a spouse (Bill's wife); and Maki, a Japanese woman who accompanied the group as an interpreter during the first reconciliation trip to Japan in 1992. The interview was conducted at Bill's home in Greater London in spring 1998. It lasted nearly four hours, including afternoon tea served by his wife, halfway through the interview. The interviewer, the author of the present article, is a Japanese researcher. The ex-POWs and the wife were in their late seventies. The extract is a story told by Freddie. This particular story follows from the speaker's recollection of an episode of a 'little reunion' with his old mates at Heathrow Airport in departing for Japan on their reconciliation trip. He said that the reunion put him on the road to reconciliation after having experienced old camaraderie at the airport. We now examine how the story is told and is made relevant to the issue of reconciliation.

Extract: Photograph story

- 1 Freddie I was in Battersea Par:k some years ago
- 2 after the war, ten years after the war (1.)
- 3 and I'm sitting out in the open air a cup
- 4 of tea at the table and two little (0.8)
- 5 children running around in front of me (2.)
- 6 and I thought to myself, 'oh my god, >is
- 7 that< Japanese↓' because they could be
- 8 Chinese or (0.8) [Thai, or any=
- 9 Int. [°hum° °hum°
- 10 Freddie = >you know what I mean< but to me they
- 11 were Japanese (1.0) I thought (0.8)
- 12 and I didn't have to wo-wonder very long
- 13 because It's just behind me (.)
- 14 somebody called out
- 15 'Oi, koi.' (1.8) right↑
- 16 (.)
- 17 Freddie come here or
- 18 Int. [°hum°
- 19 Freddie [yeah, I thought (.)
- 20 'I know that↓'((hushed dramatic voice))(.)
- 21 that means come here (.) or means
- 22 of course come back (.) and

- 23 I half reluctantly turned around and the
 24 next table behind me was a Japanese man and
 25 woman (.) They was (.) and
 26 they all got up and they went down (.)
 27 stood by the lake (.)and this is the story
 28 He:h took (.) a picture (.)
 29 of his wife and two children
 30 °assume it's his wife° and two children.
 31 she:h came (.) and took a picture
 32 of him and the two children (.)
 33 and me being (.) Having
 34 used a camera and all that,
 35 >I thought to myself<
 36 oh↑ what I would,
 37 what I would nor↑mally do in
 38 A case like that, °and I have done it (.)
 39 many times° (.) I would go out and say and
 40 'excuse me >do you mind if<, would you like
 41 me to take a photograph of all of you?'
 42 Int. yes.
 43 Freddie I-I half got up and I thought (.)
 44 °no why should I↓° ((dramatic voice))(.)
 45 And I've regretted that.
 46 I didn't. °I regret it.°
 47 but some years later, when I was over at
 48 Haruko's place in Croydon, a Japanese (.)
 49 man, lady, doctor↑
 50 Int. Hum
 51 Maki Hiro ↑
 52 Freddie and the two children they came and they
 53 stood (.)hh on the (.) by the stairs
 54 in Haruko's room there and I took a
 55 photograph with my camera then. I thought
 56 (.) perhaps I've been redeemed at last.
 57 -ha [hh You know.h [That's a little thing.
 58 ? [hh [hh
 59 Int. Yes

At first glance, this story appears to be a straightforward description of events that the speaker, Freddie, experienced. Ostensibly there is a symmetry of action in a sequence of two events, in which we see Freddie's photo-taking experience on two different occasions—presumably before ('some years ago after the war') and after the reconciliation trip ('some years later' after seeing the family in the park). The story invokes a notion of change in the brief biography of the speaker. What is implied here is that this trip afforded him the opportunity for him to see himself differently. The story features the

speaker's change by recounting two different ways of behaving in the presence of the Japanese. It discursively marks the point when Freddie realizes that for all these years being an ex-POW by the Japanese had prohibited him from being the person that he normally is, in this case, an agreeable person who would stand up and offer to take a photo for someone in a public place.

Claiming the Speaker's Position vs. Showing How

This narrative was produced following the speaker's comment pertaining to reconciliation: 'the little reunion at Heathrow Airport put him on the road to reconciliation'. How, then, does the narrative work as a stronger claim of reconciliation rather than simply claiming 'I have reconciled'? In arguing that story-telling is an act of remembering, Edwards (1997) points out that telling a story is a participant's category of talk. Not only analysts of 'narrative structures' but the participants themselves display sensitivity to what might count as a proper, 'well-formed' instance of a story.

Accountability is being managed, on two levels, both in the story itself, and in the current interaction (cf. Edwards & Potter, 1992; Edwards & Potter, 1993) with regard to culpability, reasons for actions and the reasons for describing them, precisely, one way or another. (Edwards, 1997, p. 265)

I therefore suggest that this narrative is a form of accountability in which the consequences of and reasons for participating in the reconciliation trip to Japan are made available to participants in this setting. The narrative serves not only to claim the speaker's reconciliation, but also to show how it happened as part of reconstructing two contrasting ways of being. The speaker's narrative does not 'explain' the meaning of reconciliation *per se*, but by description of two events, the sense of Freddie being the person who is different from whom he was in the first instance is generated, which achieves the very work of accountability.

Descriptions as Scene-Setting

We examine this interview talk as 'experience narrative' (Schrager, 1983), referring to its qualities as narrative whose subject is lived experience. The story begins with a detailed description of where and when the event took place (ll. 1–2) and who the protagonist is (l. 1). The first few lines (ll. 2–5) are so called 'scene-setting' (Buchanan & Middleton, 1995), providing rich and vivid descriptions of a seemingly

ordinary setting—Freddie (i.e. the speaker) sitting in the open air and drinking tea in a park. Buchanan and Middleton, referring to Sacks' and Schrager's work (Sacks, 1992/1995; Schrager, 1983), point to the way in which talking about the past works to locate us in this event, setting up a context for an extra-ordinary experience to happen. It is regarded as an interactional feature of story-telling (Edwards, 1997) and enables the speaker and the recipients to *experience* the narrative event to show how this experience warrants a claim for reconciliation.

The Social Nature of Positioning, Footing and Reported Speech

Using the concept of 'experience narrative', Schrager explains the complicated relationship between the narrator and the events described. This involves not only the narrator's own position with respect to what happened, but also the stances he or she takes towards other participants in the events. In pointing out the social nature of narratives, he says: 'When we tell about the past, we incorporate the experiences of a multitude of others along with our own; they appear in what we say through our marvellous capacity to express other perspectives' (Schrager, 1983, p. 80). There is clearly a link here—Schrager's observation highlighting the social nature of narrative—to the use of reported speech (e.g. Buchanan & Middleton, 1993; Buttny & Williams, 2000; Holt, 1996; Leudar & Antaki, 1996). Focusing the analysis on the use of reported speech, I show the way in which the speaker Freddie incorporated multiple perspectives that are both his, at different times, and those of others.

Reported Speech

In examining the extract with reported speech, the speaker adopts two different positions in terms of his attitude towards Japanese people, and his identity as an ex-POW is clearly relevant. In other words, in this two-part narrative of the past, the speaker's two different positions are made available, which serve to account for a re-alignment of his position toward Japanese people. The speaker's different positions are situated in two different occasions in past encounters with Japanese families—'ten years after the war' (l. 2) and 'some years later' (l. 47). The multiple positions (or voices), converged in this narrative by way of reported speech, profess his claim about change and generate a sense of his redemption from the troubling past.

Using reported speech, this narrative shows that the speaker's identities are situated in two different moments of the past in his post-war life. The utterance of 'oh my god, is that Japanese' (ll. 6–7), signalling Freddie's perturbation with the presence of the Japanese in the park, formulates his recognition that what he was seeing in the park might present trouble. This is made available from the position of *Freddie-in-the-past*. The speaker immediately undermines this first-hand judgement made at the encounter in the park. Why? Because the recipients of the story (others present in the interview) could come back and point out that judgement as hastily formed, mistaken or biased without having a valid way of confirmation.² So he manages such a possibility precisely in ll. 7–9 ('because they could be Chinese or Thai or any'). This is called the recipient design or 'stake inoculation'—the way interests (in this case the speaker's) are invoked in undermining alternative versions in a discursive analytic term (Potter, 1996). This utterance is designed for those hearing the story, the recipients. With this utterance, the speaker establishes the rationality of his initial judgement, hedging a comment from the recipients, especially the two Japanese participants (i.e. Maki, the Japanese participant, and the interviewer) in the interview. The speaker interactionally manages a possible danger of being biased, while seeking the Japanese participants' alignment in line 10, where Freddie says 'you know what I mean' to the rest of the interview group. But he maintains his original judgement, in lines 10–11, 'to me they were Japanese'. Here again, he manages the storyline, by warding off a possible comment criticizing his bias. Here the participant's knowledge about Freddie's biography and former POW identity is significant. Freddie is known to be a former POW to the group and the absence of a critical reply to Freddie is how the story is managed.

Language of the Past

In lines 15 onward, Freddie in the park overheard an utterance, '*Oi, koi*', and this utterance assured him that the family he saw at the park was Japanese. In sociolinguistics, the use of a foreign language in the middle of conversation is called code switching (Blom & Gumperz, 1972, p. 424; Holmes, 1992; Myers-Scotton, 1997). Code switching occurs in various intercultural contexts involving bilingual and multi-lingual speakers. The switching is observed when the speaker is expressing solidarity with a particular social group and/or conveying his/her attitude to the addressee by means of varying the language itself. Code switching creates a special effect, and the use of '*Oi koi*'

certainly has an effect in various ways. Here we treat it as what it does rather than presuming these functions and effects at work as it deserves analytical attention as to how this particular Japanese utterance is treated as an interactional concern.

'*Oi koi*' has a heavy interactional currency. It is a form of imperative, the English equivalent of '[Hey] you! Come [here]!' as the speaker provides his gloss of the utterance and checks with the Japanese participants in the interview. In l. 16, his acknowledgement of '*Oi, koi*', as in 'I know that', constitutes Freddie as a knower of this language, but for him it is also the language of the POW camp, making his identity as a former POW relevant. There is audibly a sense of 'then-ness' or 'there-ness' in the way that this Japanese expression is used in the story and how Freddie heard it in the park. '*Oi koi*' opens up an array of experiences in the camp—characterized by captivity, austerity and work under surveillance, in which language of this kind was routinely used.

The use of '*Oi koi*' conveys Freddie's attitude toward the situation at issue in this story. Here in the story, Freddie in the post-war era is faced with the Japanese people. Not only is his use of '*Oi koi*' in the story attributed to his experience of captivity by the Japanese. With his 'half' reluctance in turning around (l. 23), the speaker is also signalling a delicate issue of him facing the Japanese in his post-war life. The following description, from l. 23 onward, detailing the sequence of actions of the Japanese man and wife's reciprocating act of photo-taking, creates a situation where he could offer to take photos for this family. This action of offering to take photos is formulated as a normative action for him in ll. 33–41. It is indicated that he even thought about offering to take a photo then. Using an internal dialogue (thinking to himself), two different Freddie's—what he normally is and the exception to it—are described in ll. 43–45. The speaker formulates this action as a missed opportunity, as problematic in a moral term of 'regret' in ll. 45–46. Here, what he considers normative is made questionable. The voice of aversion and resistance to the possible action of kindness (i.e. to offer to take a photo) in line 44, 'no, why should I', is dramatically presented in a hushed voice. This creates a conflict between two voices (*Freddie-in-the-park* and *Freddie-as-a-moral-being*) in which the troubling experience with the wartime past warrants Freddie's failure of action. In other words, hearing the language of the camp reveals a discrepancy between who he normally is and the way he acted at that particular post-war time.

Reported speech in this story mobilizes voices of others and those of himself linked to the troubling war-related past, rhetorically

formulating the conflict Freddie had within himself about the Japanese family he was seeing at the park—whether he should help the family with photo-taking or not. The rest of the story provides a further instance in which the second time around Freddie was redeemed from the regret—in another situation with a Japanese family sometime after the first incident, Freddie willingly offered to take photos for the family without hesitation.

Re-configuring the Past in Story-Telling

I am aware that some narrative researchers would be interested in examining formal structural properties of narratives in relation to their social functions (e.g. Labov, 1972; Labov & Waletzky, 1967). Labov suggests that a fully formed oral narrative of personal experiences has a six-part structure—abstract, orientation, complicating action, evaluation, resolution and coda. Indeed, the narrative analysed here has the very structure of the evaluation model (Labov, 1972), yet the application of the structure prevents us from looking at a relational aspect of story-telling. In taking a discursive approach, Edwards's criticism of the structural approach to narrative is relevant here:

The analysis of narratives in the human and social sciences has mostly ignored the interactional business that people might be doing in telling them . . . and studies of narrative have tended to pursue generalized types and categories of narrative structure, rather than dealing with how the specific story content, produced on and for occasions of talk, may perform social actions in-the-telling. (Edwards, 1997, pp. 265–266)

In this view, narrative is an outcome of social interaction. Thus, we look not only at the story content, but also at the place of narrative in the social organization of conversation in which multiple positions are identified and a particular kind of person is developed and constructed within a particular storyline in a particular interactional setting. The first episode, when Freddie did not go to the family to offer to take a picture, in contrast with the second episode, is a missed opportunity for Freddie. The speaker formulated it as a regret, moralizing his past failure of action in two *relational* ways. One way is that *Freddie-now* acknowledges *Freddie-in-the-past* as failing to act to his perceived standard of conduct. This is a reflexive evaluation of self, marking a different kind of person: that he is not the same person as he was in the past. The other is by way of talking to the others present at the interview. The telling of this narrative makes this missed opportunity both personally and publicly significant for *Freddie-now* and the interview participants.

The telling of narrative allows the participants, including the speaker, to re-evaluate his actions and interpret the story. Moral sensibility, a right way to act, was not just a matter for Freddie then, but it was made a matter for the other participants in the interview talk. The telling of narrative is what might be termed an accomplishment of moral accountability, in which the speaker accounts for a moral failure of his past conduct and his overcoming the failure located in a different time and place. The past events told are not fixed in time and place, but rather are made available for the discursive practice of moral accountability.

It is important to note that this analysis is concerned with the way in which the narrative was told in relation to who was hearing the story and how it was construed. Therefore, the trajectory of the told events was not a fixed inbuilt feature of the story; it is a constructed element in the social organization of the past. Although seemingly minimal, what the listeners are doing (even not saying anything) can constitute interactional significance. The narrative unfolds, utterance by utterance, turn by turn, to the participants. Freddie's formulation of redemption affords his claim for reconciliation in the narrative form of accountability. We view the speaker's redemption not as an inherent, pre-designed element of the story. The analysis highlights a social nature of the story-telling as it positions morality and remembering of the past as things that transcend the conventional notion of the past as fixated in time and place. Morality and remembering thus are to be considered social activities, rather than mental activities that take place in the individual mind. In identifying positioning devices such as reported speech, footing and use of the language of the past, moral sensibility emerges in the unfolding of the narrative; it is not represented in the story as a precursor.

We may see a culturally appropriate moral principle at work here, but such a principle is not based on a single universally reduced logic of morality. For instance, Freddie did not have to get up and take a photo for the family in the park (it may be perfectly appropriate not to interfere in the family affair there). This was not expected of him in the first place. His action in the park was turned into a failure and regret in the way he told the story, making relevant his identity as an ex-POW and his knowledge of some basic Japanese that he learned in the POW camp. By way of telling the narrative, managing potential critiques and comebacks from the listeners, the speaker-Freddie achieved reconciliation, illustrating what it means for him to relate to Japanese people in the post-war era.

Conclusions

In this article, I have approached an examination of reconciliation in terms of positioning. Analysing the devices of positioning in terms of reported speech, footing and use of the language of the past, I suggest that reconciliation is not a once-and-for-all settlement of the problematic past. Rather, it is a dynamic process in which interview participants discursively achieve reconciliation, whilst constituting moral accountability and mobilizing relevant identities and formulating (and reformulating) the past and the change of person. I have illustrated the use of reported speech and language of the past (not as code switching) as a carrier of emotions and moral dilemmas, producing a particular identity as to how the former POW had changed. Change is a rhetorical effect emerging from discursive practice. Thus I have offered an alternative approach to studying reconciliation which does not amount to merely an analytical task of defining and evaluating who has and what was reconciled. The discourse analysis has detailed delicately negotiated and contested positions emerging from the process of interview talk and the formulation of a moral sensibility of the events as a particular resolution of dilemma.

In advancing positioning theory, Harré and van Langenhove (1999) indicate that 'there seems to be considerable room for further exploration of connections with and contrasts to other concepts that work in similar ways to "position"' (p. 195). For instance, they question 'whether such sibling concepts as "role" and "footing" can be used in analyses of real interaction in ways complementary to the use of "position," or whether they simply occupy parts of the same territory' (pp. 195–196). Role and position are related and often haphazardly used in qualitative analysis. Adopting or being assigned a role fixes only a range of positions; positions compatible with that role. Equally it is noted that a distinction between footing and position becomes blurry: 'footing and position are sometimes complementary, and it seems to us that when they are, both may have their uses in an analysis' (p. 196). The future task of discursive analysis in application to positioning theory seems to remain in endeavouring to produce an analysis that would embrace the flow of changes and continuity of a person, addressing how these two seemingly contradictory elements hold together in the lived world of a person.

Taking a discourse-analytic approach to the work of positioning, it has been shown that the narrative is a place where the discursive accomplishment of reconciliation takes place in social interaction, rather than in the mind of an individual. We can free ourselves from

the structural treatment of narratives by considering that this narrative itself does not have a particular *a priori* moral principle. The moral sensibility of the story was up for grabs by the participants, both the speaker and the listeners. The analysis examined this dynamic, flexible, interactional process—the joint construction and sense-making of events and experiences. The discursive approach to reconciliation provides a way to empirically examine the reconciliation process by focusing on language use and positioning, identifying participants' discursive reconfiguring of the world and seeking possibilities of being otherwise.

Appendix: Transcription Notation

The transcription convention used in the thesis has been developed by Gail Jefferson for the purposes of conversation analysis (see Atkinson & Heritage, 1984).

[Overlap begins
↑↓	Vertical arrows precede marked pitch movement, over and above normal rhythm of speech.
<u>Underlining</u>	Signals vocal emphasis
°I know it,°	'degree' signs enclose obviously quieter speech
()	Inaudible, indecipherable utterance, uncertain hearing
(.)	A micropause, hearable but too short to measure.
((text))	Additional comments from the transcriber, e.g. gesture, context or intonation comments by the transcriber
she wa::nted	Prolonged syllable or sound stretch
hhh	Audible aspiration or laughter
Yeh,	'Continuation' marker, speaker has not finished; marked by fall-rise or weak rising intonation, as when enunciating lists.
y'know?	Question marks signal stronger, 'questioning' intonation, irrespective of grammar.
Yeh.	Periods (full stops) mark falling, stopping intonation ('final contour'), irrespective of grammar, and not necessarily followed by a pause.
bu-u-	Hyphens mark a cut-off of the preceding sound
>he said<	'greater than' and 'lesser than' signs enclose speeded-up talk.
solid.=	Latched utterance (no interval between them)
uh um	Filler between words. Alternatively 'er,' 'erm', and 'ah' 'ehh' are used.
<i>Oi koi</i>	In addition to the above, the following is added: Italicized words are of Japanese origin.

Notes

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1. Participants' names are pseudonyms.
2. Harré and van Langenhove (1999) argue that

... stereotypes are not pre-existing mental entities that determine the outcome of social judgements; nor is stereotyping an inevitable outcome of human cognitive functioning. Instead we believe that stereotypes have to be treated as rhetorical devices that people use in order to position themselves and others. (p. 137)

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Biography

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