Tel: +44 (0)1524 592674 Fax: +44 (0)1524 592503
Dr Rachel Cooper
Senior Lecturer
Degree: 1996-2002: Ph.D. History and Philosophy of Science, Cambridge University. Thesis title: Classifying Madness. 1995-1996: M.Phil. History and Philosophy of Science, Cambridge University. 1992-1995 B.Sc. Physics and Philosophy, Nottingham University (1st Class)
Associated research centres and groups: Philosophy of Mind and Psychology
Current Teaching
Philosophy of Mind and Philosophy of Science.
Research Interests
My major research interests lie within the philosophy of science and medicine. My research to date has culminated in two books, and a third is underway. My first monograph Classifying Madness (Springer, 2005) concerns philosophical problems with the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, more commonly known as the D.S.M. The D.S.M. is published by the American Psychiatric Association and aims to list and describe all mental disorders. The first half of Classifying Madness asks whether the project of constructing a classification of mental disorders that reflects natural distinctions makes sense. Chapters examine the nature of mental illness, and also consider whether mental disorders fall into natural kinds. The second half of the book addresses epistemic worries. Even supposing a natural classification system to be possible in principle, there may be reasons to be suspicious of the categories included in the D.S.M. I examine the extent to which the D.S.M. depends on psychiatric theory, and look at how it has been shaped by social and financial factors. I aim to be critical of the D.S.M. without being antagonistic towards it. Ultimately, however, I am forced to conclude that although the D.S.M. is of immense practical importance, it is unlikely to come to reflect the natural structure of mental disorders.
My second book is called Psychiatry and the Philosophy of Science and came out in Acumen's Philosophy of Science series in 2007. This book examines the ways in which psychiatric science is like and unlike more established sciences. The book is structured around five features that distinguish psychiatric science from many other sciences. These are that a) The subject matter of psychiatry is contested, b) Psychiatry employs particular modes of explanation, c) Mental health professionals work within different paradigms, d) Psychiatry is problematically value-laden, and e) Psychiatry is essentially action-guiding. Chapters of the book examine these features, and seek to show how philosophers of science can benefit by looking at psychiatry, and how psychiatry can learn much from the philosophy of science.
Over the next couple of years I plan to write a book on the concept of disease. This book will develop the account of disease that I proposed in my 2002 paper "Disease". On this account, by "disease" we mean a condition that it is a bad thing to have, that is such that we consider the afflicted person to be unlucky, and that can potentially be appropriately medically treated. The book will develop this account through three case studies, examining Deafness, Female Sexual Dysfunction, and ADHD. Together these illustrate how it becomes unclear whether a condition is pathological in cases where it is uncertain whether all of my three criteria for disorder are met. Thus, Deafness is problematic because it may not be bad, Female Sexual Dysfunction is arguably too common to be a disorder, and many question whether the symptoms of ADHD are an appropriate object of medical, as opposed to disciplinary or educational, concern. The final chapters of the book will consider issues particularly related to long-term illness and disability, and mental illness. A proposal for this book is currently under review by MIT Press.
Publications
Books
Psychiatry and the Philosophy of Science. Acumen.2007.
Classifying Madness: A philosophical examination of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. Springer. March 2005 [online sections]
Papers
Aristotelian accounts of disease - what are they good for? (2007) Philosophical Papers. 36:427-442
Can it be a good thing to be Deaf? (2007) Journal of Medicine and Philosophy. 32: 563-583
Thought experiments. (2005) Metaphilosophy. 36: 328 -347 [on line version]
Why Hacking is wrong about human kinds (2004) British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 55:73-85. [on line version]
What is wrong with the D.S.M.? (2004) History of Psychiatry.15:5-25. [on line version]
Can sociologists understand other forms of life? (2004) Perspectives on Science. 12:29-54
Disease (2002) Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences. 33:263-282.
Book Chapters
What value a unicorn's horn? A study of archaeological uniqueness and value (with Mark Pollard and Robin Coningham). In G.Scarre and C.Scarre (eds.) Ethics and Archaeology. CUP. 2005.
Potential Doctoral Proposals
Philosophy of science and medicine.
Especially philosophy of psychiatry; the nature of disease; metaphysics and epistemology of medicine; classification in science.
Career details
2000-2003: Lecturer in Philosophy, Bradford University.
1999-2000: Temporary Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Bristol.
Affiliation
British Society for the Philosophy of Science - Hon Secretary
Aristotelian Society - Commitee member
Associated Keywords: Philosophy, Philosophy of mind, Philosophy of psychology, Science and technology studies
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Contact Details
Tel: +44 (0)1524 594702
Room: Furness, C19
Office Hour: On maternity leave until April 2010
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