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States without sovereignty

These differences, to some extent, reflect the different starting points for these entities; in particular their access to resources and the depth of destruction wrought by the wars that in most cases preceded their creation. Some unrecognised states, such as Abkhazia and Nagorno Karabakh, experienced devastating warfare, while the violence in other cases, such as Transnistria, was on a much smaller scale. The cases also differ in terms of their geography - including access to natural resources - population size, pre-existence of institutions, and degree of international isolation. State-building is therefore a highly difficult task in all unrecognised states, but for a number of these entities the task is near-impossible. Chechnya and Republika Srpska Krajina, for example, struggled to maintain a minimal degree of control and their existence was ultimately short-lived. These differences in outcome are, however, not explained solely by variations in access to resources. Another important factor is the internal dynamics in the entity, such as the degree of popular constraints and the extent to which the entity is characterised by infighting. These factor impact on state-building in recognised states as well, but they take on a specific form in the context of non-recognition which acts both as an enabler and a constraint on state-building.

The imitation of democratic statehood constitutes a key strategy for unrecognised states, since it seemingly furthers their two primary goals: preserving their de facto independence and gaining international recognition. I have argued elsewhere (Caspersen 2008) that the popular image of unrecognised states as anarchical badlands is overplayed and the context of non-recognition actually contains incentives for turning warlords into committed state-builders. This process is, however, also constrained by the lack of recognition and it is precisely the factors that may enable the entity to make the first move towards becoming an effective entity – such as centralisation of resources, absence of pluralism and support from an external patron – that subtract from its substance.

Unrecognised statehood consequently develops in ways that differ significantly from that of their recognised counterparts, and the final – or not so final – product differs as well. One of the main barriers to properly understanding this form of constrained and conflictual statehood is our usual conception of sovereignty. In International Relations literature there is, as Jens Bartelson (2001) has pointed out, an inability to imagine an order not based on sovereignty. Disorder is assumed in the absence of sovereignty and this dichotomy, in part, explains the common image of unrecognised states as anarchical badlands. But the struggle for recognition and for maintaining de facto independence can, under the right circumstances, enable these "places that don't exist" to make a significant move away from chaos and disorder. Non-recognition provides powerful incentives for imitating democratic statehood - for imitating what good, recognised states look like - but unrecognised states are not just like other states, merely without the added bonus of recognition. The context of non-recognition and the path of their creation set them apart from their recognised counterparts, and make the claim to viable democratic statehood, at best, a claim filled with tensions and contradictions.

For further analysis of these issues, see my forthcoming publications:
Nina Caspersen, Places That Don't Exist: The Politics of Unrecognised States (Book manuscript, currently under review at a major university press)
Nina Caspersen, “States without sovereignty.” In Making Sense of Unrecognized States in the International System, N.Caspersen and G.Stansfield, eds. (Manuscript in preparation)