

Kant: morality & society

UK Kant Society annual conference

Lancaster University 27-29 August 2009

www.lancs.ac.uk/kant

Keynote speakers Tamar Schapiro Arthur Ripstein Stephen Darwall

Final programme

Apart from keynote talks, all papers were held in two parallel sessions.

Abstracts of papers are at the end of this document.

Conference kindly supported by the Aristotelian Society, the Analysis Trust, the Society for Applied Philosophy, the Political Studies Association and its specialist Political Thought group, Lancaster University Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, and the UK Kant Society (www.keele.ac.uk/UKKS)

Thursday 27 August

11:30 onwards Registration, followed by lunch from 12:00

13:15 – 14:30 Opening plenary – Stephen Darwall ‘Closing the gap in Kant’s argument for the categorical imperative’ – Chair: David Archard

15:00 – 17:00 Faculty sessions

	Chair: Alison Stone	Chair: Garrath Williams
15:00	Alix Cohen ‘Moral anthropology and its role in Kant’s ethics’	Jennifer Uleman ‘He fears no king and no torture: making sense of Kant on suicide’
16:00	Paul Formosa ‘A good meal in good company: Kant on the highest moral-physical good’	Dita Wickins-Drazilova ‘Kant on the perfect similarity of duties to humans and duties to animals’

17:30 – 19:00 Graduate sessions

	Chair: Tatiana Patrone	Chair: Stijn Van Impe
17.30	James Garrison ‘Revolution in Kant’s relation of aesthetics to morality’	Ralf M. Bader ‘Kant and the conditional intrinsic value of happiness’
18.15	Heather Roff ‘Kantian provisional duties’	Marcy Latta ‘Kant’s problem regarding others’

Dinner

Friday 28 August

09:00 – 11:00 Faculty sessions

	Chair: Sorin Baiasu	Chair: Gary Banham
09.00	Kyla Ebels Duggan ‘Kant on freedom and character development’	Chris Onof ‘Re-visiting Kant’s formula of universal law as principle of obligatory and permissible action’
10.00	Jeanine Grenberg ‘The enemy within: Kant and Aristotle on the nature of virtue’	Elizabeth Foreman ‘Focusing respect on creatures’

11:30 – 12:45 Plenary – Arthur Ripstein ‘Moral practices’ – Chair: Adrian Piper

Lunch

14:00 – 15:30 Graduate sessions

	Chair: Gary Banham	Chair: Benjamin S. Yost
14:00	Stan Erraught ‘Everyman a king? Moral persons, kingly peoples and the doctrine of right’	Ana Barandalla Ajona ‘Korsgaard’s public reasons as relational normativity’
14:45	Alice Pinheiro Walla ‘Economic justice and the Kantian state’	Jennifer A. Bautz ‘On metaphysics and anthropology: the practical application of a priori moral law’

16:00 – 17:15 Plenary – Tamar Schapiro ‘From passion to action’ – Chair: Sorin Baiasu

17:20 – 17:50 UKKS meeting – all members invited

Conference dinner

Saturday 29 August

09:15 – 11:15 Faculty sessions

	Chair: Alix Cohen	Chair: Arthur Ripstein
09:15	Stijn Van Impe & Bart Vandenabeele ‘Kant’s moral world: realm of ends and realm of grace’	Benjamin S. Yost ‘Kant’s justification of the death penalty reconsidered’
10:15	Melissa Seymour Fahmy ‘Kantian respect and the ethics of care’	Melissa Zinkin ‘The moral basis for Kant’s principle of public right’

11:45 – 12:45 Faculty sessions

	Chair: Jennie Uleman	Chair: Dita Wickins-Drazilova
11:45	Tatiana Patrone ‘Kant on moral deliberation and the “fact of reason”’	Christopher Arroyo ‘Love, human nature, and moral progress in Kant’s ethics’

Conference close / packed lunch

Abstracts of all papers

Keynote talks / Faculty papers / Graduate papers – in alphabetical order by author.

Keynote talks

Stephen Darwall (Yale University) ‘Closing the gap in Kant’s argument for the categorical imperative’

It has been long noted that there is a gap in Kant’s two arguments for the Categorical Imperative in Groundwork, I and II, one from the idea of a motive that could give an action moral worth and express good will, and the other from the very idea of a categorical imperative. I discuss these respective gaps and then show how both can be filled by an aspect of the concept of moral duty that Kant does not exploit – its conceptual connection to moral accountability (or as I call it, its second-personal character). I also show how Kant’s argument that actions with moral worth must be done from a formal and not material motive can be made good with the same assumption.

Arthur Ripstein (University of Toronto) ‘Moral practices’

Since Hume, philosophers have thought that the concept of a social practice has a fundamental role to play in practical philosophy. The basic motivation behind this line of thought is that a practice exists if a group of people regards its standardized ways of doing things as constituting a distinction between correct and incorrect performances. The rules of such conventional practices tell you what to do within the practice, but whether the practice actually imposes obligations on you must, so the thought continues, on pain of circularity, turn on a moral test that is not itself a matter of conformity to some other set of accepted rules.

Recent critics have cast doubt on the need to appeal to the concept of a social practice to explain Hume’s signature example of promise-keeping. My aim in this paper is to provide a more general criticism of the entire appeal to social practices, not only in Hume’s deployment but in other, seemingly more sophisticated versions. I will show that the basic distinction that motivates practice-based accounts, between the existence of the rule or practice and its merits, is inconsistent with the normative structure of the parts of morality to which the concept of a practice is thought to be relevant, because it cannot capture the moral distinction between contributing to a practice and acting in accordance with its rules. In its place, I will propose a Kantian account, which shows how the rules that constitute a system of equal freedom govern standardized way of doing things.

Tamar Schapiro (Stanford University) 'From passion to action'

My concern in this talk is with a certain moment in the story of action. That moment is the transition from the condition of having a passion to that of acting on it. Intuitively, to have a passion is to be in a condition that somehow anticipates or leads, though not infallibly, to acting on it. The philosophical tradition offers us two quite different ways of conceiving of this transition. On the first view, one who is in the condition of having a passion has everything she needs, motivationally, to act on it. Having a passion leads to acting on it, provided nothing (including reflection) interferes. I will call this the "hydraulic" view of the transition from having a passion to acting on it. On the second view, associated with Kant (in particular his "Incorporation Thesis"), one who is in the condition of having a passion does not have everything she needs, motivationally, to act on it. In order for an agent to act on a passion she has, she must endorse or assent to the passion from a reflective standpoint. I will call this the "discursive" view.

My aim is to explore the philosophical motivation behind the discursive view, and to show what it does and does not imply. Using the hydraulic view as a foil, I argue that the discursive view hangs together naturally with a bipartite conception of the human agent, one according to which we have distinct rational and nonrational agential parts, the latter being the source of our inclinations. I argue that theorists of action should be careful not to reject or adopt the discursive view without recognizing this link to a broader moral psychology. I also argue that the discursive view does not have certain counterintuitive implications critics commonly take it to have.

Papers by faculty members

Christopher Arroyo (Providence College) 'Love, human nature, and moral progress in Kant's ethics'

Love, considered as a feeling, has not received much attention in the English literature on Kant's ethics. This is not surprising, since Kant does not have much to say about the feeling of love, and what he does say almost exclusively runs counter to many people's beliefs about the positive role of love in the lives of human beings. Kant seems to think that the feeling of love, like all empirical feelings, expresses the egotistical tendencies of our human nature and nothing more. I think there are reasons to be critical of Kant's account of the feeling of love, though I also think there are reasons to believe Kant captures quite well what goes wrong with love when it is corrupted by self-centeredness. But giving arguments in support of these reasons is not my task in this paper. My aim, rather, is exegetical and interpretive: I want to demonstrate that, despite the dangers this empirical feeling poses for moral agency, love, according to Kant, is a natural feeling necessary for the positive development of the moral capacities of the human species. For the most part, the influence of love (like all empirical feelings) is something we must guard against if we are to be moral consistently, even though the feeling of love may (under the watchful eye of reason) serve as an instrumental aid to the fulfilment of our moral obligations. But this account of the role of love in Kant's ethics only tells part of the story, and not even the most important part. My thesis is that the feeling of love, on Kant's view, can and does play a dual role in our lives, a dual role analogous to the one played by our unsocial sociability. Specifically, love functions as a propaedeutic to moral action in the species, since the feeling of love motivates us to overcome our social antagonism and benefit each other when we have not yet developed the strength of will to do so from duty.

Alix Cohen (University of Leeds) 'Moral anthropology and its role in Kant's ethics'

As has been noted by commentators, a difficulty raised by the idea of a moral anthropology is that Kant's *Anthropology* and the *Lectures on Anthropology* do not seem to contain much discussion of it. However, I believe that these works provide sufficient evidence to support the following claims: first, there is a legitimate place for moral anthropology within Kant's system, and second, it can be identified and expounded on the basis of textual evidence. This paper will show that anthropology is relevant to our moral practice insofar as it identifies the helps and hindrances to the realisation of duty, thereby making us more morally efficacious. More precisely, I will suggest that it plays two distinct roles vis-à-vis moral agency, a general and a local role. Its general role consists in identifying, and thus recommending, the means that help the realisation of duty for all human agents. Its local role consists in recommending specific means to particular types of agents, and above all to agents endowed with particular temperaments. In this sense, although Kant's account of freedom precludes empirical factors from having any effect on our moral character, I will argue that it does not by any means entail that they are irrelevant to our moral practice.

Kyla Ebels Duggan (Northwestern University) 'Kant on freedom and character development'

Kant claims that we cannot make another's virtue our end, but also that we are able to influence one another's moral character, and have obligations based on this. Most dramatically we have an obligation to join together in what Kant calls the Moral Community, because we purportedly require its support in order to achieve virtue. I consider the possibility of shaping another's character in light of two apparent problems: First, it seems to require that we have a causal influence on another's will, but such influence seems incompatible with the very idea of a will. Second, the influence to which moral education subjects people risks being objectionably coercive. I argue that we can simultaneously solve both problems by understanding the influence we have on one another's development as rational rather than causal. This then provides a model for understanding the role of the Moral Community in our character development, and I end by spelling out this role in some detail.

Melissa Seymour Fahmy (University of Georgia) 'Kantian respect and the ethics of care'

This paper argues that care ethicists should explicitly acknowledge Kantian recognition respect as an indispensably important component of caring and one of the norms by which caring relations should be evaluated. I argue that feminist critiques, which maintain that Kantian respect is blind to the particularity of persons and indifferent to human vulnerability, rest on a pair of errors: the conflation of the grounding of respect for persons with its practical implications, and the assumption that Kantian respect entails only negative duties of non-interference. Kantian respect is shown to be not only *not* antithetical to caring, but absolutely essential to the practices of identifying and responding to human need in morally appropriate ways and establishing the bonds of trust. The paper thus aims to defend an important Kantian insight, that respect does not merely *constrain* love, respect *improves* love.

Elizabeth Foreman (Saint Louis University) 'Focusing respect on creatures'

When we attempt to give a philosophical analysis of respect for persons *qua* persons that explains *why* this respect is owed, a particular problem arises. In order to explain why a creature is owed respect, one must indicate something *about* the creature that generates this obligation. As a result, our grounding of the obligation of respect will rest in the moral relevance of *features* of creatures rather than in the creatures themselves. This is troubling for two reasons: (1) There is a difference between what we take the attitude of respect to be (i.e., showing regard to creatures themselves), and the way in which our theories structure our obligations, and (2) If the presence of a feature is what generates our obligations, then the creatures to whom we are obligated lose their claim on us if they lose the feature that qualified them for this regard. In an attempt to resolve these difficulties, I offer a formal analysis of respect according to which the objects of respect are *creatures* that have an irrevocable status derived from a particular value-conferring feature. On this account, the value of the relevant feature is seen as giving the possessor a value of her own, and respect is recognition of the status of having such value.

Paul Formosa (Macquarie University) ‘A good meal in good company: Kant on the highest moral-physical good’

In §88, entitled “On the highest moral-physical good”, in his *Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view*, Kant argues that “good living” (physical good) and “true humanity” (moral good) best harmonise in a “good meal in good company” (7: 277-8). But how is it that the sharing of a good meal with good company comes to hold such an important, if often unrecognised, place in Kant’s thought? This paper attempts to answer this question through examining Kant’s analysis of such social gatherings, and placing this analysis in the wider context of Kant’s understanding of enlightenment, cosmopolitan hospitality, gratitude, friendship, love and respect. Sociable conversation will be shown to be the key link between these various ideas. For Kant, it is through such sociable conversation, which promotes both our virtue and our happiness, that we achieve our highest moral-physical good.

Jeanine Grenberg (St. Olaf College) ‘The enemy within: Kant and Aristotle on the nature of virtue’

Rosalind Hursthouse has recently reignited the debate amongst both Kantians and Aristotelians about how best to understand the Kantian virtuous person vis à vis the Aristotelian distinction between mere continence and full virtue. The central text of concern in these discussions has been the Friend of Humanity, or Philanthropist, example from *Groundwork I*. In this paper, I review both Hursthouse’s and, before her, Philippa Foot’s Aristotelian interpretations of this example, and suggest that, without placing the example within Kant’s larger moral psychology and theory of human nature, we fail to appreciate both the true moral status of the Philanthropist and the status of a Kantian virtuous person more generally. In the end, Kant’s account of human nature makes it difficult for us to draw any easy comparisons between the Kantian fully virtuous person and the Aristotelian virtuous person.

Chris Onof (Birkbeck College) ‘Re-visiting Kant’s formula of universal law as principle of obligatory and permissible action’

The Formula of Universal Law has been extensively examined by Kantian scholars. There is however no clear consensus as to the nature of the maxims to which this formula applies. I argue that this issue is related to another question, namely: how can this formula serve as test for both the morally permissible and the morally obligatory? Although many commentators take it that it must be the case that this formula can be used to characterise these two deontic modalities, it is not clear how. The key to the connection between these two issues is to be found in a re-examination of the derivation of the Formula of Universal Law. By proposing a valid reconstruction of this formula which addresses standard criticisms, I address the issue of how it can be seen to apply to maxims as subjective (specific) principles of action, and used to define both permissibility and obligatoriness in Kant’s ethics.

Tatiana Patrone (Ithaca College) ‘Kant on moral deliberation and the “fact of reason”’

The paper examines and assesses Kant's doctrine of the ‘fact of reason’ and his account of moral deliberation. First, I examine Kant's account of the ‘fact of reason’ and reconstruct (on Kant's behalf) the missing argument to the conclusion that the fact of reason is *transcendental*. Second, I show that in the ‘fact of reason’ consists Kant's *interpretation* of our moral deliberation. On this interpretation, essential to our deliberation is our capacity to engage the world practically *either* from the standpoint of (Kantian) morality *or* from the standpoint of prudence. I argue that, for Kant, this disjunction is *exclusive* and *exhaustive*. Third (and very briefly), I assess Kant's view and provide some counterexamples to show that, as it stands, Kant's argument is unsound. From this it follows that in the *Groundwork* and in the second *Critique* Kant fails to show that his account of pure practical rationality applies to human volition.

Jennifer Uleman (Purchase College, SUNY) ‘He fears no king and no torture: making sense of Kant on suicide’

A few notable exceptions aside, Kant's arguments that suicide is immoral tend not to receive much sustained or critical attention. The reasons for this are easy to guess: few Kant commentators today think suicide deserves moral censure, and Kant's central *Groundwork* arguments against suicide are, *prima facie*, pretty weak. The aim of this paper is to show that there is something worthwhile to be gained in giving Kant's arguments more sustained attention. In particular, I argue that Kant's *Groundwork* discussions of suicide tellingly express some of Kant's most deep-seated commitments. I reconstruct Kant's arguments, with help from his often quite passionate remarks about suicide in the *Metaphysics of Morals* and the *Lectures on Ethics*. The *Groundwork* argument that a maxim of suicide cannot be universalized makes sense once we see its relation to Kant's insistence that free will be exercised only in the service of a rational order. The *Groundwork* argument that suicide amounts to using oneself as a means makes sense once we see it as expressing a prohibition on ‘trashing’ free rational will. The relevant commitments here all flow from the central claim of Kant's moral theory, viz. that there is nothing more valuable than humanity, conceived as free rational human willing. I do not argue that Kant's arguments about suicide offer good practical advice, but I do argue that they are interesting, illuminating, and repay study.

Stijn Van Impe & Bart Vandenabeele (Ghent University) 'Kant's moral world: realm of ends and realm of grace'

Throughout his writings Kant offers several assessments of a moral world. He approaches this idea in terms of a 'realm of grace' in the *Critique of pure reason* and a 'realm of ends' in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of morals*. In this paper, we address the following pressing questions. What does Kant understand by the realm of ends and the realm of grace? Are these concepts identical or are they to be distinguished from one another. And if so, how is the difference between the realm of ends and the realm of grace to be conceived? First, we examine how Kant assesses the realm of ends. After advancing a secular or liberal reading of it, we argue that it also has irreducible religious overtones. Secondly, we focus on Kant's realm of grace and examine its similarities and differences with the realm of ends. Hence, we argue that the realm of ends is the appropriate term to designate Kant's ideal moral world from a moral-secular viewpoint, whereas the realm of grace is more suitable to designate this ideal from a judicial-religious viewpoint. The realm of ends is characterised by its focus on the moral ought, the centralisation of the moral law as the supreme principle of morality, the assessment of morality in terms of acting from duty and the emphasis on autonomy and freedom as the *ratio essendi* for morality. By contrast, the realm of grace is characterised by its focus on the judicial-religious hope, the centralisation of the highest complete good as the final object of morality, the assessment of morality in terms of the worthiness to be happy, and the emphasis on the immortality of the soul and the existence of God as the necessary conditions for a moral belief in (the justice of) an exact distribution of virtue and happiness.

Dita Wickins-Drazilova (Lancaster University) 'Kant on the perfect similarity of duties to humans and duties to animals'

The two major passages in the *Metaphysics of morals* and the *Lectures on ethics* where Kant talks about duties to animals have been analysed, defended and criticised by several scholars. In my paper I offer a careful analysis of the two passages that differs in interpretation from those of other scholars (O'Neill, Timmermann). I claim that the crucial key to understanding Kant's concept of duties to animals is based on correctly understanding the terms 'analogy' and 'amphiboly.' The reason why we must not mistreat animals is the perfect similarity (analogy, amphiboly) of human-human and human-animal relations. This similarity is so strong that Kant claims we must cultivate our morality by being kind to animals. Whoever is cruel to animals already is or soon necessarily will be cruel to humans as well. Kant's theory doesn't grant animals moral status, nor does it save them from being killed for food or medical experiments. However, Kant offers a good rational argument why we must protect the welfare of animals.

Benjamin S. Yost (Providence College) 'Kant's justification of the death penalty reconsidered'

Critics claim that Kant's enthusiastic embrace of the death penalty is incompatible with, or at least not required by, the principles of his practical philosophy. I will argue that Kant has a strong justification of capital punishment. To do so, I will sketch an interpretation of Kant's view that meets the three most common objections to it. The first objection charges Kant with inconsistency, stating that he has no reason to apply a flexible version of the *ius talionis* to rape while applying a strict version to murder. The second claims that the death penalty is impermissible because it infringes on a person's inviolable right to life. The third holds that execution violates human dignity. To address the third – and most important – concern, I will argue that motives of honor, as Kant describes it, would drive a rational person to endorse her own execution, were she to commit murder.

Melissa Zinkin (Binghamton, SUNY) 'The moral basis for Kant's principle of public right'

This paper argues that Kant's transcendental formula of public right is grounded in his moral theory; but in order to see this, we are required to see the categorical imperative in a new light. I use Kant's transcendental formula of public right to reveal that his "formula of universal law" (FUL) formulation of the categorical imperative relies on the form of publicity. For Kant, the moral law is therefore a public law, and a maxim that cannot be made public is *morally* wrong. Furthermore, I argue that, according to Kant, not only is a maxim that must be kept secret in order to succeed wrong, but it is wrong to keep a moral maxim a secret. We therefore have a duty to publicity. It is by means of publicity that it is possible to make politics be in accord with morals and gradually to achieve a state whose laws are in conformity with morals. The practical use of reason therefore provides not only reasons that ought to be acted on, but also reasons that ought to be *known*.

Papers by graduate students

Ana Barandalla Ajona (Edinburgh University) ‘Korsgaard’s public reasons as relational normativity’

Christine Korsgaard, in her *The sources of normativity*, attempts to vindicate Kant’s argument leading to his Formula of Humanity, by developing an account of reasons according to which their normativity is essentially public. If she succeeds, that would provide moral constructivists with a promising tool with which to attempt to expand obligation to others besides the agent. Korsgaard’s conception of public reasons, as well as her arguments surrounding them, has been widely criticised. In this paper, I endeavour to show that one common line of criticism has as its target a wrong construal of Korsgaard’s views. I shall then present what I consider to be the correct construal of her views. And I shall end by highlighting some problems accosting Korsgaard’s theory.

Ralf M. Bader (University of St. Andrews) ‘Kant and the conditional intrinsic value of happiness’

In this paper I will argue that we should interpret Kant as claiming that happiness has conditional intrinsic value. This means that happiness is valuable in virtue of how it itself is, on condition of being attached to a good will. This line of reasoning runs counter to a widely held view, which considers the value of happiness to be extrinsic and conferred upon it by the good will and thereby leads to a disalignment of the two distinctions in goodness. I will provide three arguments in favour of according conditional intrinsic value to happiness, namely (i) Kant is committed to there being two distinct kinds of value that are not reducible to each other, (ii) happiness must have conditional intrinsic value if it is to contribute to the consummatum bonum in the way envisaged by Kant, and (iii) the value of happiness is a function of certain intrinsic features of happiness and not of features pertaining to the good will.

Jennifer A. Bautz (Johns Hopkins University) 'On metaphysics and anthropology: the practical application of a priori moral law'

Interpretations of the moral law's authority in Immanuel Kant's ethical philosophy inevitably turn on the following questions: How can we square the moral law, as a metaphysical a priori principle, with our intuitions about morally good actions? Is pure morality robust enough to sustain the richness of an individual's moral life? These concerns undoubtedly arise from a common fear that morality must entail more than acting solely from duty. However, approaching moral obligation on the terms of practical anthropology creates special difficulties, and the conflation of a pure philosophy of morals with a philosophy of applied morals renders the concept of duty incomprehensible without the antecedent proposition of some type of moral identity, attuned to the moral law and already prepared for the appraisal of moral actions. This paper investigates the aforementioned conflation as it occurs in Christine Korsgaard's Theory of Practical Identity and Barbara Herman's Rules of Moral Salience, and suggests that each theory offers a preprocedural foundation to the concept of duty, subsequently lending an empirical context to moral decision-making and judgment that usurps the moral law's genuine a priori authority.

Stan Erraught (University College Dublin) 'Everyman a king? Moral persons, kingly peoples and the doctrine of right'

For many commentators, Kant's Universal Principle of Right as set out in the *Rechtslehre* is troubling, in that it appears to be at once stated in the form of an imperative, and therefore prescriptive of a duty, whilst at the same time, external conformity only is expected. We are not required to conform to this principle through any inner conviction as to its rightness: Kant affirms instead that our freedom *is* limited to its conditions, and this limitation may be – indeed, is – enforced by coercion. Marcus Willaschek has argued that what he terms the "Externality Thesis" and the prescriptivity of the principle, along with its unconditionality, gives rise to a paradox: a principle cannot at once prescribe obedience – since obedience is, for Kant, definitively inward and autonomous – whilst licensing coercive enforcement. His conclusion is that the doctrine of Right is 'akin to' but independent from the domain of morals, and constitutes a kind of moral anthropology. The view that I wish to argue for is this: the prescriptivity and moral force of the universal principle of Right can be rescued if we take the addressee to be the state, considered as a sovereign moral person or 'the united general will' and not the individual agent. In support of this I examine Kant's view of the state as a moral person, and his notion of sovereignty, and look at how a person, or a subject, or a citizen, can be at once the guarantor of the legitimate title of the state as – notionally – a part of the 'general united will', whilst at the same time, absolutely subject to the laws of the state, laws that may legitimately be enforced through coercion.

James Garrison (University of Hawai'i at Mānoa) 'Revolution in Kant's relation of aesthetics to morality: regarding negatively free beauty and respecting positively free will'

For Kant, beauty, like goodness, follows from the form of cognition and not from external interests. The parallel course of the arguments leads many commentators to note how both investigations start from free agency and its formal dictates and lead to ends which are independent from the determinations of natural change. However, Kant's work is vague on how and to what degree the two inquiries, aesthetic and moral, relate a priori. In what follows I make use of distinctions within Kant's transcendental account of freedom as the basis for enacting a Copernican revolution in his aesthetic framework. I employ unutilized resources in Kant's own theory, which indicate how art objects themselves exhibit a measure of freedom from the determinate laws of nature. Furthermore, I demonstrate that regard for this limited freedom allows the free play of ideas to take place in subjective imagination. This in turn shows how regarding the artwork's spontaneity is akin to respecting the freedom of other rational agents. This line of argument helps rehabilitate Kantian aesthetics by using its vocabulary to genuinely include the art object along with Kant's own focus – the subject's aesthetic experience.

Marcy Latta (University of Pennsylvania) 'Kant's problem regarding others'

Kant offers an explicit criterion regarding how we ought to *treat* humanity in his fundamental moral law, the Formula of Humanity, yet he seems to give us little or no account of why we must *view* others in a way that entails an obligation to treat them in accordance with this principle. In the absence of providing either metaphysical or empirical grounds that compel us to recognize other members of humanity as such, Kant cannot show that we are bound to *treat* the others we encounter in any particular way. Since Kant's moral theory clearly assumes the existence of a plurality of members of humanity, he owes us a justification for this assumption. While, arguably, he implies that in presenting us *a priori* with the moral law as a necessary and binding "fact of reason", our practical reason leads us also to postulate the free will of others as a necessary condition of that law; a closer look at the Formula of Humanity reveals that its validity does not depend on the actual existence of members of humanity. Thus, it does not seem that Kant would be justified in taking the postulation of the existence of other free beings to be a precondition of this law. This result constitutes a difficulty not only for our application of the moral law, but also for our understanding of the Formula of Humanity as a distinctly *moral* law, that is, as a law concerned with our treatment of others. I draw attention to the asymmetry between Kant's arguments concerning our knowledge of our own membership in humanity (or our freedom) and those concerning our knowledge of the humanity or freedom of others, to show that considerations of practical reason alone do not compel us to view others as appropriate objects of moral consideration.

Heather Roff (University of Colorado at Boulder) 'Kantian provisional duties'

This paper argues that Kant's traditional dichotomized framework of duties is not complete. Perfect and imperfect duties do not exhaust the moral landscape. This is so because Kant assumes a civil condition, in which all have the ability to perform positive duties of justice and ethics, as all have sufficient guarantees of reciprocity. Yet there are certain normative and empirical situations where civil society is highly degenerated or absent these guarantees are not present. In these instances, I argue, one can only have a *provisional* duty. A provisional duty is one that permits an exception on the basis of a lack of ability to act.

Alice Pinheiro Walla (University of St. Andrews) 'Economic justice and the Kantian state'

According to a widely accepted interpretation, the Kantian state is a version of classic liberalism's *night watchman*. Since strict right for Kant consists in the protection of individual freedom and property and not in the attempt to make people happy, the Kantian state must be indifferent if not opposed to the promotion of social welfare. A concern with social justice can have at most a merely instrumental character for the state, in which it contributes to the stability of the system. Is it possible to account for any *duties* of the state to foster social and economic justice or any welfare rights within a Kantian theoretical framework? – In this paper, I will reject a libertarian interpretation of the Kantian state. I will argue that Kant's liberal theory of right does not exclude the possibility of deriving an obligation of governments to promote social welfare. Although Kant's theory of social justice is in need of further development, there is enough textual evidence for the claim that Kant had a broader conception of the state than usually assumed.